Vorster's Double Shocker

A resignation and a stunning rejection may invite renewed warfare

Terse. Unemotional. Pragmatic. Unpredictable. Those were the hallmarks of Prime Minister John Vorster's twelve-year rule in South Africa, and never were they more evident than on his leaving last week.

In a brief, businesslike address to the country, speaking first in Afrikaans and then in English, Vorster, 62, declared that he was quitting his post as well as the leadership of the right-wing National Party, which has dominated South African politics for 30 years. He gave no reason, though his resignation had been widely rumored because of his failing health (he reportedly suffers from lung congestion and an embolism in his leg). But he made one thing plain: "I leave this office with no regrets whatsoever."

As if that announcement were not dramatic enough for one day's rumination, Vorster followed with another, this one concerning Namibia (South West Africa), the mineral-rich territory that South Africa has administered since 1920. South Africa, said Vorster, was withdrawing its earlier agreement to a United Nations-supervised plan to grant independence to Namibia. Instead, it would proceed with its own "internal settlement" and hold elections in the territory in November. Among the reasons: the U.N.'s postponement of elections from December until next April would endanger Namibia's security, and the proposed increase from 3,000 to 7,500 U.N. peacekeeping troops to supervise the transition period and cease-fire had been decided upon without Pretoria's consultation. Both conditions, in South Africa's view, would favor the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the militant political group that has been engaged in a civil war with South Africa for the past twelve years.

In Western capitals as well as in Africa, the Vorster double shocker exploded with all the calculated force of a hidden mine. At U.N. headquarters in New York City, there was concern that the whole future of southern Africa was now cast into an ominous state of uncertainty. Vorster's turnabout on Namibia and his departure added up to an invitation to renewed warfare between South Africa and SWAPO, a fresh opening for Soviet and Cuban influence on the guerrillas, and ultimately a drive to impose economic sanctions against South Africa.

There was dismay, too, that Vorster was bowing out at the very moment when his brand of pragmatism was most needed. The Namibia decision was seen as a kind of backlash by Cabinet elders against what they regarded as U.N. highhandedness. The reasons given for the turnaround on the U.N. plan convinced no one. Pretoria, it was now clear, was not about to let SWAPO come to power, even in free elections. That means a long-term military commitment by South Africa in Namibia--and a dilemma for the U.S. and Britain, who will face pressure to punish South Africa's recalcitrance with economic sanctions. British private investment in South Africa totals $10 billion, while trade amounts to $3 billion. The U.S. has more than $2 billion in trade and $1.5 billion in private investment.

Balthazar Johannes Vorster, a lawyer by training, has been a dominant figure on the political scene since 1961, when he became Justice Minister. In that position he was a strict enforcer of apartheid, earning the nickname "Jackboot John" for introducing the drastic Sabotage Act of 1962 and such policies as detention of dissidents without trial and "banning"--a form of house arrest. When Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd was assassinated in 1966, Vorster succeeded to his office, and contrary to expectations, proved to be far more moderate and practical than his predecessor.

He relaxed some measures of "petty apartheid"; post offices, parks and certain hotels and restaurants were opened to blacks. But he pursued the policy of geographical separation, by which South Africa would be broken up into racial enclaves. Since the Soweto riots in 1976, racial tensions have worsened. In a sweeping "security" crackdown last October, the government arrested more than 50 black leaders and banned 18 black and interracial organizations. In retaliation, the U.N. imposed a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.

This week the National Party caucus is expected to choose Vorster's successor. The top contenders:

Pieter W. Botha, 62, Defense Minister and most senior Cabinet member, filled in for Vorster during his absences and is regarded as the leading candidate. A tough and autocratic man who is not very well liked by his colleagues, he is considered less inflexible on racial issues than he is in security matters. He strongly favored the dispatch of South African troops into the Angolan civil war in 1975, and has led a no-holds-barred campaign against SWAPO. He has been one of the most persistent opponents of the West's Namibia plan.

Cornelius Petrus ("Connie") Mulder, 53, Minister of Information and Minister of Plural Relations (which oversees policy for nonwhites), is also a hardliner, though he has made some modest reforms in his department. They include eliminating use of the disparaging name Bantus for blacks, and legislation upgrading facilities in black areas. His standing has been tarnished, however, by a scandal earlier this year involving financial irregularities in the information department.

Roelof F. ("Pik") Botha (no relation to P.W.), 46, Foreign Minister, is a moderate whose youth, engaging manner and advocacy of negotiation rather than confrontation have made him one of the most popular politicians in his country. Although he is said to be Vorster's personal choice for the succession, his lack of a strong power base within the party may be a major handicap.

As Vorster himself suggested in his farewell speech, his successor will have his hands tied to a considerable extent by his own Cabinet colleagues and the dictates of party policy. Traditionally, Nationalist ideology has been divided between so-called verligte (enlightened) and verkrampte (narrow-minded) elements, though these days it tends to break down more between younger and older Afrikaners, farmers and city dwellers. If the choice is for a verligte approach, South Africa--and the West--might yet be able to buy a little time to try to salvage a peaceable future in the region. If the verkrampte forces prevail, the confrontation between the U.N. and South Africa could come within months. In that event, the U.S. and Britain will have to join in economic sanctions or see the total collapse of the humane African policy, based on self-determination for blacks, that they have painstakingly constructed during the past two years.

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