Monday, Oct. 30, 1978

A Peace Breakthrough?

Egyptians and Israelis consider a draft treaty

Pessimism suddenly turned to optimism in Washington. On Sunday morning, less than one week after Israeli and Egyptian negotiators had begun work at Blair House on a peace treaty between the two states that would carry out the Camp David accords. State Department Spokesman George Sherman announced that they had basically achieved their goal. "Principle issues have been resolved" said Sherman. A draft of the treaty, consisting of nine articles and a preamble, had been sent to Jerusalem and Cairo for study and approval. Negotiating work would continue this week on three annexes dealing with such issues as the exact dates of Israel's military withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula and the sale of Egyptian oil to Israel.

The Israelis initially were a bit more guarded than was the American spokesman. Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan conceded that he had no personal problems with the draft, although he added that "a lot of things still need to be resolved." Some observers felt that Dayan may have been excessively cautious in order to avoid antagonizing hard-liners in Premier Menachem Begin's cabinet, which will discuss the draft at meetings this week.

Once again, as at Camp David, a last-minute intervention by President Carter helped save the day. Initially, the Israeli and Egyptian negotiators had arrived in Washington convinced that the details of the treaty could be quickly settled. On Tuesday, when the President summoned the two delegations to separate meetings at the White House, it was apparent that some snags had developed. Carter, however, insisted that "there are no particular problems, no crises."

Two days later, the President invited both delegations to lunch. Dayan told Carter--within full earshot of the press --that the negotiators might not be able to reach an agreement without the presence of their heads of state.-At week's end, both delegations were prepared to head home for consultations about the apparent obstacles.

It was then that Carter made his move. On Friday night, he spent 3 1/2 hours with Dayan and Defense minister Ezer Weizman; on Saturday morning, he spent an hour and a quarter with the Egyptians. A source privy to the conversations said that the President "did some extremely straight talking--especially with the Israelis--reminding them what both sides had agreed to at Camp David and what had to be done." Dayan and Egypt's Acting Foreign Minister Boutros Ghali then met for 4% hours with Alfred Atherton, the State Department's roving ambassador to the Middle East. After that came the negotiators' tentative agreement on a draft treaty.

The most serious problem to emerge at Blair House dealt with what is known in diplomatic jargon as "linkage"--the possible relationship between an Egyptian-Israeli treaty and subsequent pacts between Israel and other Arab states over such problems as the future of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

Wary of charges by Arab rejectionists that they had betrayed the common cause, the Egyptians were determined to hold Israel to its promise of establishing Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, which could lead to an Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty within five years. Thus, they proposed last week that the evolution toward normal diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt should also take place over a five-year period. Specifically, they sought to insert a clause in the draft treaty calling for a review of the situation in five years. The Israelis spurned this idea, calling it a "nasty surprise" and insisting that any peace treaty with Egypt must be considered "separate and eternal."

The Israelis were also unhappy that the Egyptians demanded a precise timetable for Israeli military withdrawal from the Sinai but were unwilling to accept a similar schedule for the establishment of full diplomatic relations. The Israelis want to exchange ambassadors immediately following the signing of the peace treaty. The Egyptians want to proceed cautiously, first with liaison offices or missions, then with consulates and finally embassies.

Lesser problems that had to be worked out included Egypt's demand for compensation for oil that Israel has pumped from the Gulf of Suez during the eleven years of Israeli occupation, and the Israeli demand for payment for its investment in roads, airfields and settlements in the Sinai during the same period.

Last week Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders was dispatched to Amman, carrying answers to a series of questions that King Hussein had asked the Carter Administration in the aftermath of Camp David. The subject of East Jerusalem was skirted in the Camp David accords because no agreement was possible; but Saunders assured Hussein that Washington--which maintains its embassy in Tel Aviv--still believes that Israel's jurisdiction over East Jerusalem is illegal. Saunders also said the U.S. anticipates a restoration of Arab sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza following the five-year period of autonomy.

Egyptian and Israeli delegates apparently got on well with each other, both in the Blair House talks and during informal meetings at the Madison Hotel, their common residence. But as the week passed, the Israelis became somewhat irritated that the U.S. was not being more evenhanded, especially while the Blair House talks were going on. Thus, Dayan's semipublic comments about trouble brewing were partly intended to warn the Carter Administration not to go too far in siding with the Egyptians. "They are getting all of Sinai," Dayan reportedly grumbled to Carter. "You would think they might at least say thank you." But he also seemed genuinely convinced that the peace talks should be upgraded to the heads-of-state level.

At week's end, with the negotiations in recess while the Egyptians and Israelis began to study a document that could end 30 years of war, Washington was hoping against hope that a political miracle had been achieved. Many problems remained, but the first step toward Middle East peace was being taken. -

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