The Shah Is Not Giving Up

At Niavaran Palace, the royal family's winter quarters in Tehran, there is a deceptively peaceful air these days. Beyond the gates guarded by paratroopers, gardeners tend the roses and manicured lawns as usual; inside, household footmen dressed in tail coats go about their duties. The Shah's private office is in a small, cheerfully wallpapered room on the second floor, where the telephone rings almost constantly. Because of the crisis, the Shah is not giving on-the-record interviews, but he did agree to talk with Cairo Correspondent Dean Brelis and TIME'S Parviz Raein. Brelis' assessment of the Shah's thinking and mood:

After considering every possible alternative, the Shah has made up his mind to stay in Iran with his people. He does not believe that he is finished, not even close to it. Despite the disappointments and the brutal punishment he has taken in the streets, he feels it is his duty to protect the throne and thus his country. He believes one day his son, Crown Prince Reza, 18, will ascend the throne. But not now, not even under a regency council. The Shah wants his heir to have a viable monarchy, not a weak one. As for talk about a constitutional monarchy, the Shah believes Iran already has one.

He has no timetable for the suspension of martial law. It could take two months or two years to bring about the stability required for a transitional government to pave the way for free elections. The Shah thinks that such a government would have to reflect the full political spectrum, with the exception of the outlawed Communist Party. To head it, he hopes to find a Premier whom he can trust and the Iranian people will find credible. So far, he has not succeeded.

One man whom the Shah considered for the post only three weeks ago was Karim Sanjabi, leader of the opposition National Front. But then Sanjabi went to Paris and pledged his loyalty to Ayatullah Khomeini, the exiled leader of Iran's Shi'ite Muslims. When Sanjabi returned to Iran, he was arrested. There have been rumors in Tehran that the Shah has had secret meetings with Sanjabi. Not true. In fact, he no longer finds Sanjabi acceptable. Nor does the Shah feel that there is any way to negotiate with Khomeini. After trying several times to make peace with the defiant mullah, he has written him off.

Recalling other struggles between the Shi'ites and earlier rulers dating back to the 16th century, the Shah believes that history is on his side. In his view, his most important accomplishments were wresting the province of Azerbaijan from Soviet hands after World War II, nationalizing Iranian oil, settling border differences with Iraq, and gaming possession of many of the islands in the Persian Gulf. But he does not think it does any good to dwell on the past.

Nor is he much given to looking for where he went wrong. He admits that he did not realize that corruption was as deep rooted and widespread as it is. But he now thinks that Iran's upheavals were inevitable. Money was pouring in, he was trying to modernize at a hectic pace, and the social, political and economic fabric was torn apart. The people had no chance to participate in the political process. The Shah means to give them that as soon as possible. But having made what he feels are substantial concessions over the past year, he now says that reforms must wait their turn.

In the meantime, he intends to be tough but fair. He does not want to see more bloodshed, but neither will he give up his constitutional role as commander in chief of the army. If he had to do that, he would pack Ms bags and leave Iran for good. He believes he alone holds the army together and inspires its loyalty, and that without him everything would collapse.

The Shah is hopeful that new riot equipment being flown in from the U.S. will make it easier to break up street demonstrations without bloodshed. At the same time, he is convinced that if he left, thousands would die in the ensuing fight. Eventually, if that happened, he feels that Communist forces would win control of what would then be a bankrupt and fragmented country. For all that, he does not consider the CIA blameless, and firmly believes that a "dirty-tricks" operation was begun 15 years ago to make contact within dissident ranks so the U.S. would have influence with anyone who might manage to overthrow Mm. In any case, the Shah believes such efforts by the CIA are doomed to defeat, because in the event of civil war there would be no pro-American sympathy left in the country.

But the Shah is not leaving, and he is confident that Iran will overcome its present difficulties and become a better nation for all its sufferings and trials. He will rest when they are over. Now, having made his decision, he is firm in the conviction that he has done his duty.

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