Close, Yet So Far Away

The linkage issue holds up peace treaty talks once more

Ah, that final 10%. "We have already achieved 90% of our goal [of peace]," declared Egyptian President Anwar Sadat last week. That sounded great, but then he added: "Now we are in a serious crisis, and if we can avoid it in order to achieve the remaining 10%, even by suspending the talks for a while, so be it."

That did not sound promising, considering that nine weeks have passed since the Gamp David accords. But if nothing else, Sadat's good news-bad news comment proved anew, in case any such demonstration was needed, that Middle East peace negotiations are still on a roller coaster of moods ranging from the rhapsodic to the bleak. A few days after Cairo officials had been saying privately that the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was almost wrapped up, they were hinting that the talks were on the verge of collapse.

The Israelis were also up and down.

After flying home from Washington for Cabinet discussions about the latest version of the treaty, Israeli negotiators announced: "The draft is almost ready." Within days, they too were expressing worries about a new crisis. Discouraged by the weeks of haggling, President Carter worried aloud last week that the peace process might be collapsing over mere "technicalities, legalisms and phrases." Said one U.S. official, exhausted by the endless treaty revisions that have been requested by both sides: "We are close, yet so far away."

The main sticking point, as always, was "linkage"--the relationship between the pending Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the pursuit of a broader peace that will, among other things, provide autonomy for the Palestinians of the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the aftermath of the recent Arab summit conference in Baghdad, which condemned the Sadat peace initiative and the Camp David accords, the Egyptians are more determined than ever to prove to their Arab brethren that they are not selling out the cause by making a separate peace with the Israelis.

The U.S. last week proposed another compromise peace formula. Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin should exchange letters on what Egypt's First Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Osama el Baz calls "the chronological parallelism" (euphemism for linkage) between Israel's Sinai withdrawal and preparations for self-rule in the occupied territories. In these letters the two leaders would pledge that 1) talks on autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza would begin within one month of the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and 2) elections for local governing councils for those territories should take place by the end of 1979. U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance presented the plan to Begin and Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan at New York City's John F. Kennedy International Airport as the Israelis were preparing to leave for home. Begin was, predictably, unenthusiastic; Dayan surprised his Premier by telling Vance: "If the Egyptians are willing to accept [this proposal], I am ready to accept it."

Meanwhile, Sadat offered a compromise proposal of his own. In effect, he suggested that the negotiators set aside the question of the West Bank for the moment and concentrate on Gaza. The West Bank is just too complicated and too emotional an issue for both the Israelis and the Arabs, he was implying, and Egypt was hardly in a position to negotiate alone on behalf of the West Bank Palestinians, while neither they nor Jordan's King Hussein was willing to join the peace process.

Gaza is another matter. Egypt administered it from 1948 until 1967, when the Israelis captured it, along with the Sinai. Thus Sadat proposed that the Egyptians and the Israelis agree to a time limit for negotiating self-government for Gaza, and that Israel allow the Egyptians to maintain civil order there until local governments have been established. Sadat thought it possible that some Gaza leaders could be persuaded to join the talks. He also believed that if a Gaza settlement could lead to West Bank negotiations, then perhaps Hussein and some of the West Bankers might be willing to participate. As Egyptian Vice President Husny Mubarak put it in Washington last week, "We would like to push both the West Bank and Gaza at the same time, but Gaza may come first because it may be easier."

That sounded fine in Cairo, but it did not play very well in Jerusalem. The Israelis were particularly distrustful of Sadat's suggestion that the Egyptians should assume police powers in Gaza on a temporary basis. To the Israelis, this sounded as if the Egyptians were widening their demands and were trying to regain a special status in the Gaza Strip.

Many of Begin's Cabinet members are still opposed to any form of linkage. Some groused last week that Dayan and Defense Minister Ezer Weizman had "acted without authority" in their zeal to reach a settlement with the Egyptians in Washington. Later the Cabinet was the scene of an unusually angry argument over a plan by hawkish Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon to establish a big new Israeli settlement in Gaza. Many of Sharon's colleagues thought this a bad idea anyway; practically all of them were angry that his aides had leaked the details of the plan while the peace talks were at a delicate stage in Washington.

These are difficult days for Menachem Begin. Among his harshest critics are close comrades from his days as leader of the Irgun underground, who have not only criticized his position but branded him a traitor to the Zionist cause. Begin's performance this week may well decide the fate of the proposed treaty with Egypt. If he breaks with his chief negotiators, Dayan and Weizman, over the Israeli response to the latest proposals from Washington and Cairo, he could destroy the negotiations--and bring on a crisis for his government. If, on the other hand, he can win approval from his unruly Cabinet for a compromise formula on linkage, the achievement of a peace with Egypt after 30 years of war could lie just ahead.

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