An Interview with Kissinger

Detente should not become a tranquilizer

Henry Kissinger, in or out of power, is a judicious analyst of geopolitics. Last week the former Secretary of State discussed the global dimensions of the Iran crisis with TIME State Department Correspondent Christopher Ogden. Excerpts from the interview:

Q. How will the turbulence in Iran affect the surrounding area?

A. It is bound to magnify an already enormous unreadiness. Even before, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were re-examining their policies. Turkey was in a state of turmoil or, at any rate, in a state of reappraising its policy. Clearly, Saudi Arabia has shown at the Baghdad conference of rejectionists and with respect to the rise in the price of oil that it has opted for a more autonomous course from us. I think all of these tendencies will be magnified by the turbulence in Iran. Geopolitically, this area has been a barrier to Soviet expansion, and it has defined the limits of Soviet influence. Such countries as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia have had a clear-cut foreign policy orientation. There is now a great danger that this will become much more ambiguous and therefore an area of enormous uncertainty.

Q. What is the Soviet role in this area?

A. The Soviet role is twofold: one, geopolitical. During all of the postwar period, the countries bordering the Indian Ocean believed that the United States was strategically predominant in that area and that, therefore, that friendship with the United States assured their security, both internationally and, to some extent, domestically. The Soviet march through Africa, with Cuban troops, from Angola to Ethiopia, and the Soviet moves through Afghanistan and South Yemen, or at least the moves of Soviet clients, altered that perception. That inevitably decreased the importance of friendship with the United States and emboldened our opponents We simply did not understand that what happened in the Horn of Africa had a geopolitical design, independent of any specific action that the Soviet Union might have undertaken to foment any particular upheaval.

Secondly, I believe that sophisticated kinds of strikes occurring simultaneously in widely separated parts of Iran and run so effectively that even when people go back to work they do not increase production could not have taken place without central organization. Whether they were organized in the Soviet Union or organized by people trained by the Soviet Union in other countries is really a secondary question. I think it is certainly the result of Soviet support of radical movements on a global basis, which has also now reached Iran.

Of course, there are other factors. I do not think that the mullahs were triggered by the Soviet Union. However, some trained agitators probably helped fan the flames that already existed even there. No doubt there existed objective reasons for discontent, but the margin between unrest and revolution came at least in part from the outside.

Q. Can we expect more from the Soviets along this arc?

A. The more that the United States looks out of control of events, the more it appears as if our friends are going down without effective American support or even effective American understanding of what is occurring, the more this process will accelerate. It will seem self-started and, in effect, spontaneous.

Q. What should we be doing?

A. The issue is not only formal Soviet exploitation, but the geopolitical momentum which in that area has turned against us. As for the Soviet Union, it must understand, or must be brought to understand, that a relaxation of tensions is not compatible with a systematic attempt to overturn the geopolitical equilibrium.

If it is not understood by the Soviet Union and if detente becomes a kind of tranquilizer, then sooner or later a showdown is likely to occur with tremendous dangers for everybody. So the first necessity is to bring home to the Soviet Union that to us detente means a restrained international conduct, and if we cannot achieve that, then we will have to confront expansionism where it takes place, however indirect it is.

Q. How can the U.S. halt the Soviets?

A. By imposing penalties and risks that they are not willing to accept. I think that for people out of office it would be improper to give a precise tactical prescription. As a general proposition, I simply cannot believe that it can be beyond the capacity of the United States to stop Cuban expeditionary forces thousands of miles from home. It just cannot be. To claim that it is, is in itself a symptom of such weakness that it will accelerate the geopolitical decline of which we have been speaking.

Q. Are you talking about stopping the Cubans through military action?

A. I don't want to get into details. I think the first issue is to make a decision of what our basic policy is. In 1948 we faced a comparable situation in Europe after the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia ousted a democratically elected government. We could not do anything about that coup. However, the then Administration made sure that everyone in Europe understood that the United States would not acquiesce in a further expansion of the Soviets' sphere. After the coups in Afghanistan and South Yemen and the Cuban and Soviet intervention in Ethiopia, nobody in the Middle East or Africa understood a similar thing, or even that we had grasped the nature of the challenge.

Q. Has the Administration lost certain levers to conduct foreign policy?

A. There is no question that since Viet Nam the mood in the country is less international. This is one of the big problems that any Administration would have to deal with. On the other hand, it is the responsibility of national leaders to tell our people their necessities. A problem avoided turns into a crisis, and the crisis not mastered can turn into a cataclysm further down the road.

I think the basic problem is that the Administration has not managed to convey a clear perception of where it stands. It sometimes conveys the impression that we are more sympathetic to elements that oppose the people who have heretofore been our friends than to our friends.

Q. Can we establish a working relationship with whatever government evolves in Iran?

A. We have to try to establish a working relationship. But I think we have to recognize a number of dangers. First, the same forces that shook the existing institutions will still be there to assail the new government whenever it emerges. Secondly, the new government is bound to have a much more complex situation with respect to the centers of power in Iran than the previous one, so that the new government will begin in a much weaker position.

I would think that the unconditional alliance with Iran that we enjoyed before will be in the gravest jeopardy now. We have to face the fact that our own position, and that of all free countries, has been gravely weakened. We must do our utmost to limit the damage.

Q. Can you predict the likely nature of Soviet influence on Iran's future?

A. We have to distinguish between direct Soviet influence and the general orientation of any new Iranian government. Whatever the formal Soviet influence, any new Iranian government will have to deal with the conservative religious orientation, which in foreign policy will be influenced by radical Arab states like Iraq and Libya, if not formally, then ideologically. It is likely to be antiWestern, even if it is not officially proSoviet.

In addition, there are the elements that organized the strikes. These are clearly inspired by radical forces at least indirectly organized and trained by the Soviet Union. Those two trends could merge in a manner that would be very inimical to Western interests. And then, of course, we have to remember we are at the beginning of a process, not at the end. Unless this process is mastered, the end could be even graver than the beginning.

Q. At the beginning, what do you think the United States should do?

A. The United States has to make a coldblooded assessment of its interests and its purposes. It must establish some discipline in its Government so that it is clear who is responsible and who speaks for us. It must convey an impression that we understand our interests and are willing to defend them, and that requires consistent management over a period of time.

I have great confidence in Secretary of State Vance. I have a very high regard for his professionalism and decency and competence. I also have great sympathy for what the Administration as a whole is going through in its deliberations.

Q. Is revitalization of CENTO something that could or should be considered?

A. We now have to see, first of all, what emerges in Iran and judge what realistic possibilities exist. This is not the time for hasty proposals which may convey panic. Now is the time to define our purposes and set a global strategy. We should not make that re-examination a partisan issue. The remedial measures that are needed in this crisis should receive bipartisan support. There will be opportunities later to discuss what went wrong. The problem now is to face our difficult task as a united people.

Q. Should there be any kind of effort to provide more than rhetorical support?

A. I think it would be extremely important for us, the Europeans and Japan to attempt, at least, a common analysis of the Iranian situation. The most disastrous course would be a competition among the industrial democracies geared entirely to assuring their immediate oil supply while the geopolitical and strategic situation continues to deteriorate. The industrial democracies need a global strategy urgently.

Q. How serious is the oil supply problem?

A. I think it is serious in the sense that it changes the market. But I don't think it is the most decisive factor. The most decisive factor is the progressive collapse of pro-Western governments in the developing world and especially in the Middle East and Africa. This is bound to affect even countries like Egypt and Morocco on the Muslim side as well as Israel. It will encourage radical states independent of whether the Soviet Union actively eggs them on. What we may find is a confluence of Communist organization and radical currents which together produce major historical changes.

Q. Do you think this collapse of pro-Western states is inevitable?

A. No, but we will not prevent it unless we face the fact that there is a grave danger. It can only be arrested by a firm, purposeful and consistent American policy in which everybody follows the same line. It requires disciplined tactical management. It isn't just a question of what we tell others. It is also, decisively, a question of what we tell ourselves.

Are we to promote certain abstract theories of internal change all over the world? Or do we have some fundamental national interest that must be defended even when we are associated with people who do not meet all our maxims?

These are fundamental questions that we have to ask ourselves and that must be settled within our Government.

Q. And have not been settled so far?

A. In my view we are oscillating between incompatible views of the world. No clear-cut sense of direction emerges for foreign leaders. But again I want to stress having conducted foreign policy myself I know how difficult it is, and I don't wan to make it sound as if there have been easy answers.

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