An Interview with Brezhnev

During the 15 momentous years that he has ruled the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev has reaped an abundant harvest of medals, decorations and titles. General Secretary of the Communist Party, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and Marshal of the Soviet Union are only a few of the positions he occupies. But Brezhnev is now 72, and his long absences due to mysterious ailments have set foreign analysts and Soviet citizens alike speculating whether he is actually in full command. Last week, on the first occasion that the party chief has granted a personal interview with U.S. journalists, five representatives of TIME had an opportunity to judge for themselves. Among them was Moscow Bureau Chief Bruce Nelan. His report:

One of the senior Kremlin watchers in Moscow puts it flatly, and puts it best: "Brezhnev runs the show." In the old days, it is true, the President's sleek black ZIL limousine roared down the center lane of Kutuzovsky Prospekt to the Kremlin every morning at 8 o'clock. Now it usually arrives after 10. Brezhnev takes more naps than he once did, and more vacations. His attention span is shorter. Instead of the impromptu policy discussions he used to thrive on, he greets important political visitors with remarks and toasts read from papers prepared for him. Much of his old zest has vanished.

It is true that he rules with the support of his allies in the Politburo and in consensus with Premier Aleksei Kosygin and Party Ideologist Mikhail Suslov, but he is still the boss. If there were any doubts about this, they were resolved a month ago when Brezhnev added two more of his closest allies to the top leadership, Konstantin Chernenko as a full Politburo member and Nikolai Tikhonov as a candidate member.

Brezhnev was Nikita Khrushchev's protege, but Brezhnev has groomed no heir apparent. Prognosticators in Western capitals, who admit they do not know how the Politburo really works, are unable to point to a logical successor, let alone a challenger, to Brezhnev. Here in Moscow it is still very much the Brezhnev era, and he gives every indication that he intends to keep it that way.

Brezhnev still has the will and the energy to do those enervating things that national leaders have to do. He meets foreign visitors--U.S. Senators, Communist delegations, Asian and Arab ministers, bankers and industrialists--almost every day. He participates in uncounted party and government conferences. Perhaps most trying of all, he not only delivers long public speeches and reports, but sits through interminable speeches by others.

On his good days he can accomplish all that and more, but it is said in Moscow that he also has bad days, as old men do. There has been speculation about why he has not retired voluntarily and honorably, or been replaced by a younger and healthier man. One reason is that Brezhnev appears genuinely popular inside the huge Communist Party bureaucracy. He is a master politician, able executive and respected leader of a world power. He is considered fair in his dealings with the party, loyal to his political allies, responsible and cautious in his policies, and reluctant to purge his colleagues. In party terms he is a centrist and he collects support from all segments of the bureaucracy.

Brezhnev has appeal for the ordinary citizen. Russia's old imperial regime is long dead, but Russians still like a leader who displays power and can make a show. When he first assumed power, Brezhnev was underestimated, dismissed as a faceless bureaucrat. Later it became clear that this was a mistake. He proved to be an outgoing politician, a strong leader and, for all his preaching of frugality, a man who likes pomp and the good things in life. His passion for expensive foreign cars, yachts and luxurious surroundings is well known, and in his beautifully cut dark suits and fine shirts he is one of the best-dressed men in Russia.

He was wearing one of those elegant dark suits when the door to his imposing Kremlin office was opened for the visitors from TIME: Corporate Editor Henry Grunwald, Managing Editor Ray Cave, Chief of Correspondents Richard Duncan, Moscow Bureau Chief Bruce Nelan and Moscow Reporter Felix Rosenthal. Brezhnev stood in the center of the room to greet them and solemnly shook hands, establishing glinting blue eye contact as each of his guests was introduced. His medals--Orders of Lenin, Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor--shone in the bright lights as Soviet television cameras whirred.

He walked slowly to one side of a long green-baize-covered conference table, accompanied by Leonid Zamyatin, chief of the Central Committee's information department. The TIME delegation sat down opposite them. Though the room is large, it is rather bare. On the off-white silk walls hang two portraits, Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. In one corner stands Brezhnev's working desk with its three white phones and large pushbutton console with direct lines to senior officials. At the far end are curtained double doors that lead to the study-bedroom where he takes meals and naps. Brezhnev is known as a clean-desk man; there was little on the desktop except a calendar and clock.

It is true that Brezhnev does not look well. His face was flushed, his eyelids red, his mouth and jaw contorted. He moved slowly and wrote painstakingly as he inscribed one of his autobiographical books as a gift. It seemed to take a long time before he looked up through his famous eyebrows, over his rimless reading glasses and said: "There, I've settled my accounts." He was wearing a hearing aid in his left ear, and his interpreter addressed him in a slightly raised voice.

Brezhnev replied to both written and oral questions. No matter how often one might have listened to his voice on Soviet television, it is still almost painful to hear at close quarters how slurred and labored his speech can be. But as the discussion continued, Brezhnev seemed to warm to the task; his words came more quickly and clearly, his gestures sharpened, his eyes flashed. There was plainly nothing slow about his thought processes, and the aura of command around him was almost tangible.

The mood Brezhnev struck during the interview was one of seriousness and sincerity. Though stating an essentially tough Soviet line, he was reaching for understanding, looking hard into the faces across from him. Only twice did he display spontaneous animation. At one point he picked up a bent paper clip, twirled it almost delicately in one large hand until all eyes were concentrating on it and then thumped the table strongly, saying, "Mir, mir, i yeshche raz mir" (peace, peace, and once again peace). Later, when Ray Cave said he hoped they would meet again at the 1980 Olympics in Moscow, Brezhnev raised both arms high and, like a man who looks forward to many more years of power and pleasure in life, replied with great delight, "Absolutely!"

The interview in full:

Introduction

Gentlemen, I am glad to see you and welcome you here in Moscow. Frankly speaking, it is not in my nature to give interviews. But, given the importance of the relations between our two countries and the solid reputation of your magazine, I decided to take advantage of your request to answer TIME'S questions.

Politics is a subtle thing, and I'd like you to present my viewpoint accurately. My answers to your written questions, therefore, are in written form as well.

Unfortunately, our meeting can't be a long one. I hope you will understand that my time budget is extremely tight. I still have to hold a few conferences and talks.

It is a pleasure to meet you. I thank you for coming to Moscow from the United States to meet me, and wish you all the best.

Q. How do you evaluate the state of U.S.-Soviet relations in view of the progress toward SALT II and a possible summit meeting?

A. To begin with I should like to convey through your magazine good wishes to the American people for the new year. The extent to which this year and the years to come will be truly good and, above all, peaceful depends in many ways on our two countries. For my part, I can say that the Soviet Union will continue, as before, to act unswervingly in a spirit of cooperation and honest partnership.

You and we have entered the year 1979 with a positive head start, so to say. Work on a new agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic arms is drawing to a close, although it will obviously take some more time for the positions to be finally agreed. We trust that the principle of equality and equal security, which the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. recognize as the starting point, will prompt correct decisions and that President Carter and I will be able in the near future to affix our signatures to the accord. The task set by life itself --to put an end to the unrestrained arms race, to ensure security for our nations and to consolidate international peace at a lower level of military confrontation--is worth the effort.

On the whole, over the last couple of years there have been few encouraging moments, to be frank, in Soviet-American relations. Speaking quite candidly, I will tell you that very often we are hard put even to understand Washington's persistent desire to seek advantages for itself in the disadvantages of others. All this has, indeed, been tried--on more occasions than one--by American politicians in the cold war period. However, objective reality led the United States to conclude that it was necessary to cooperate with the Soviet Union, particularly in preventing nuclear war and in settling conflict situations in various parts of the world. Our reciprocal will to act precisely along these lines was then recorded in the relevant documents which we in the Soviet Union highly value and in which we continue to see a good basis for a durable and lasting turn for the better in relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

Yet, if one looks at the other side only as an "adversary"--and this is something which is not infrequently discussed in Washington--it is, of course, difficult to work for systematically deepening and expanding areas of cooperation. Not only does such an approach make it agonizingly long and complicated for new agreements to be born, but the relations as a whole also mark time or reverse their course, as has, in fact, been the case in the past two years. Whereas, given an attitude of respect for each other's sovereign rights and interests, our two countries will not be worse but better off. Indeed, the world at large will gain if there is agreement between them.

Personally, I am convinced by my entire life experience that good-neighborliness--regardless of differences in political systems and views --is the best line in international relations. And I am deeply convinced that Soviet-American relations really can be not just normal, but truly good. This is not a Utopia. A while ago, a foundation for achieving this goal was laid, but then artificial obstacles were erected in its way, which can and must be removed.

Q. Many Americans, including many who favor improved relations with the Soviet Union, are concerned over the large number of forces maintained by the Warsaw Pact along its western borders. This is often referred to as "the Soviet threat." What do you think of such concerns and about the state of detente in Europe?

A. Fabrications about a "Soviet threat" are nothing new. There was much trumpeting about it in the West when, following October of 1917, Soviet Russia was invaded by some 15 countries, including the United States, in order to strangle the revolution and restore the old order. British Prime Minister Chamberlain expatiated about it when concluding a deal with Hitler in Munich aimed at directing his aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union. The Nazis covered up their rapacious attack on the U.S.S.R. with cries about a "Soviet threat." It was also invoked by those who set up the NATO miltary bloc spearheaded against the Soviet Union, which lost 20 million people in the struggle against the aggressor. The same pretext was used when Washington proclaimed a policy of "brinkmanship" directed against us.

And again today, when detente has become fairly tangible on the European continent, when the European conference in Helsinki has charted paths toward broader peaceful cooperation and when talks are under way in Vienna to reduce the level of military confrontation, there is a hullabaloo about "the Soviet military threat to Western Europe." Apparently, some in the West have found it very difficult to stomach both political detente and especially the intention to reinforce it by lessening the concentration of the military forces of the two sides in the center of Europe.

It so happened historically that large numbers of troops and armaments of the two military-political blocs are concentrated here facing each other. Different in their structures, the forces of either side in sum total approximately equal each other. Such a military balance has existed in Europe for several decades now.

But a huge concentration of armies and armaments is dangerous in itself. Peaceful ties will be far easier to build if this concentration is reduced on both sides without upsetting the existing balance of forces. This is precisely what we are seeking to achieve in Vienna.

Yet, we are being told in reply that a reduction is possible only if the U.S.S.R. and other members of the Warsaw treaty cut down their forces to a significantly greater degree than the NATO countries. Otherwise, there will allegedly be a "Soviet military threat." And it is to the tune of these incessantly repeated allegations that military budgets are frantically growing and NATO forces in Europe are built up.

What has happened? Why has the balance that existed for many years suddenly become a "threat," and come to think of it, whom are we "threatening"? Are we really claiming a single square kilometer of the territory of any state? Does not the U.S.S.R. have normal and even good, peaceful relations with practically all countries of Western Europe? Is not the Soviet Union a major sponsor of, and active participant in, all actions to strengthen peace and develop peaceful cooperation in Europe?

Why then mislead people, scaring them with "the Soviet military threat"?

I should like to emphasize once again what I have repeatedly said of late: we are not seeking military superiority over the West, we do not need it. All we need is reliable security. And the security of both sides will no doubt be greater with the arms race curbed, war preparations curtailed and the political climate of international intercourse made healthier.

Q. Since the announcement of normalization between Washington and Peking, there has been much talk in the U.S. of "playing the China card" and presumably some Chinese hope to play the American card. What do you think of such concepts, and what is the probable future of Soviet relations with China?

A. There are some in the U.S. and in other Western countries who have found the course hostile toward the Soviet Union followed by the present Chinese leadership so much to their liking that they are tempted to turn Peking into an instrument of pressure on the world of socialism. Such a policy appears to me to be adventurous and highly dangerous for the cause of universal peace.

The point is not at all the establishment of diplomatic relations. The point is that attempts are being made to encourage in every way and to stimulate with economic bait and now, gradually, also with deliveries of modern weapons, materiel and military technology those who, while heading one of the biggest countries in the world, have openly declared their hostility to the cause of detente, disarmament and stability in the world, those who lay claims to the territories of many countries and stage provocations against them, those who have proclaimed war inevitable and mounted active preparations for war.

Is it really difficult to understand that this means playing with fire?

As for plans to use the Peking regime, which has gained in strength, as an instrument of NATO policy, to channel its belligerent cravings in the direction that suits the West--they are, pardon me, nothing more than presumptuous naivete. It is sufficient to recall what the Munich policy brought upon the Western powers. Can it be that the lessons of history are so quickly forgotten?

As to relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, we have neither territorial nor any other claims to that country, and we see no objective obstacles to re-establishing not merely good, but also friendly relations--provided, naturally, the stand of the P.R.C. becomes more reasonable and peaceful.

Now and again statements are heard from Peking alleging that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance concluded in 1950 "has lost all significance," has become a "mere sheet of paper," and so on. Apparently the Chinese leaders are provoking us to abrogate this treaty. I can say that we shall not give in to provocation. We shall never tear up of our own will a document which epitomizes friendship between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and China. But should the Peking leaders take such a step, they would have to bear the entire onus of responsibility before the people of their country, before the forces of peace and progress all over the world.

Q. Since we left New York City, dramatic events have taken place in Cambodia. How do you think they will affect relations with China?

A. The Kampuchean people have risen to fight a hateful regime, to fight a tyranny imposed on them from the outside. It's their right, and the Soviet public supports the just struggle of Kampuchea, led by the Front for National Salvation. The Soviet Union also supports the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea, that is, the government backed by the broadest segments of the population.

As far as China is concerned, I believe that you know as well as I do what the policy of their present leadership is. Truly, I am sick and tired of talking about China. I can only say that there existed a pro-Peking regime in Kampuchea, a so-called Chinese model of political structure, and the mass killings of people in Kampuchea were nothing but the Chinese "Cultural Revolution" in action on foreign territory. Chinese propaganda is making a lot of noise about the intervention of Viet Nam into Kampuchean affairs. It is a gross attempt to distort the real state of affairs. It's another example of the anti-Vietnamese, chauvinistic nature of the policy of the present Chinese leadership, which also organizes other anti-Viet Nam provocations.

Q. Many Americans remain confused by the word detente, or razryadka. How do you understand its meaning in concrete policy terms and as it applies to regional problems such as those in Africa and the Middle East?

A. When we say "relaxation of tension," or simply "detente" for short, we mean a state of international relations opposite to a state which is commonly termed "cold war" and which was characterized by permanent tension threatening to develop at any moment into open conflict. In other words, detente means, above all, the overcoming of the cold war and transition to normal, smooth relations among states. Detente means a willingness to resolve differences and disputes not by force, by threats or saber rattling, but by peaceful means, at the negotiating table. Detente means a certain degree of trust and ability to reckon with each other's legitimate interests. Such, briefly, is our understanding of detente.

We, on our part, actively work toward strengthening the process of detente in every possible way and extending it to all regions of the world, including, naturally, Africa and the Middle East. But it would be unfair and unrealistic to expect the peoples of those or any other regions to give up the struggle for their legitimate rights in the name of a concept of detente that some people falsely interpret.

If we speak, for example, of the Middle East, the interests of detente are in no way contradicted by the struggle of the Arab peoples for the return of lands which belong to them but have been seized by Israel and for the right of the Palestinians to set up a state of their own, or by the actions of those who support these legitimate demands of the Arabs. It is those who support the aggressor, encouraging the expansionist cravings, that are acting contrary to the interests of detente in the Middle East.

The same applies to the situation in southern Africa as well. The source of the threat to the relaxation of international tension is to be found in the policy directed against the peoples struggling there for liberation from colonial and racist domination, against neocolonialism, for independence and social progress and not in the struggle, as such, of the peoples for their rights.

Q. The Carter Administration has cited the Helsinki Final Act as a reference point for criticism of Soviet domestic policy. What is your view of the Helsinki document's applicability to Soviet internal policies?

A. Our view of the document signed in Helsinki can be expressed very briefly and categorically: the Soviet Union stands for full implementation of all parts of the Final Act. Incidentally, the Soviet Union is the only country in the world whose constitution enforces all the ten principles of international relations recorded in the Final Act.

It should not be forgotten, however, that the Final Act is a document governing precisely international relations. None of its provisions gives any states the right to interfere in the domestic life of others, to meddle with other people's affairs. Moreover, the signatory states of the Final Act assumed an obligation to "respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations."

I would not like now to go into polemics concerning the line of the American Administration on this matter, although, believe me, one could say a great deal and pose a lot of questions on this score, taking into account, in particular, the interference of the United States in the internal affairs of other nations in full view of the entire world.

Q. One last question. Could you please tell us your hopes and aspirations for the future of your country?

A. It is hard to answer this one briefly. Ours is an enormous country, and its plans are equally big. It has a well-organized party which mobilizes the people to fulfill the tasks set forth by the 25th Congress. We work, and in fact have always worked, for the well-being of the Soviet people.

In the international field, we think that the struggle for a stable peace on earth is the most important thing. Peace, peace, and once again peace, is our cardinal task. Because if only one nuclear bomb were to fall anywhere in the world, it would be bad for editors, for me, and for everyone on earth.

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