Monday, Mar. 26, 1979
Peace: Risks and Rewards
The gesture was eloquent. Emerging from the doorway of Air Force One on the floodlit tarmac at Andrews Air Force Base last week, an exhausted Jimmy Carter greeted several thousand welcomers by flinging open his arms. It was a movement that oddly combined a sense of triumph with just a hint of martyrdom. Said Carter: "I believe that God has answered our prayers."
He had taken a tremendous risk and had won. At times during his six-day mission to Cairo and Jerusalem in an attempt to forge an Egyptian-Israeli peace, failure seemed all but certain. Discouraged aides talked openly of the trip becoming "a debacle." But at the last minute Carter achieved a victory of presidential diplomacy that has brought Egypt and Israel to the threshold of peace after 30 years of enmity and four brutal wars. By his daring and persistent personal intervention, Carter fundamentally altered the geopolitical equation in the volatile Middle East. He also strengthened his own standing both at home and overseas.
The red-coated Marine Band welcomed him back to Washington by playing Hail to the Chief. The jubilant crowd of Government officials, political leaders and well-wishers waved tiny American flags and held posters proclaiming JIMMY, PROPHET FOR PEACE. The President emotionally declared that he was "glad to be home-back in our beloved United
States of America." Then he told the gathering what it had come to hear: years of American diplomacy and months of his own Administration's extraordinarily intensive efforts had brought Egypt and Israel to where they "have now defined the major components of a peace treaty."
Carter lavished praise on Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Premier Menachem Begin for "daring to break the pattern of 30 years of bitterness and war" and for "venturing into the unknown." He promised that the U.S. "will be with them as they begin to make peace a living reality for their people."
Acknowledging that his intimate personal participation in the peace process had also risked "the prestige of the U.S.," the President stressed that "the efforts would have been worth making regardless of the outcome. In war, we offer our very lives as a matter of routine. We must be no less daring, no less steadfast, in the pursuit of peace."
Only minor differences remained between Cairo and Jerusalem, and even these soon faded. The morning after Carter's return home, he received a telephone call from Jerusalem. The Israeli Cabinet, reported a hoarse and flu-ridden Begin, had unanimously endorsed the carefully worded U.S. compromise on the few disputed issues. Said Carter after the call: "This means that all of the outstanding issues in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel have now been successfully resolved."
The following day the Egyptian Cabinet also unanimously approved the final details of the agreement. Congratulating Begin and Sadat, Carter declared that "the peace which their peoples so clearly need and want is close to reality." Said Sadat in Cairo: "I think we have achieved peace, thanks to Jimmy." Meanwhile, the Israeli and Egyptian Defense Ministers met in Washington to put the final touches on the annex dealing with the military terms of the treaty. The two also separately presented their requests for U.S. military aid.
The main hurdle left for the treaty was the approval of Israel's Knesset. Debate begins early this week and is expected to last for a few days. Although rhetorical fireworks are anticipated and Begin is certain to come under blistering attack from the ultra-left and ultraright, there is almost no chance that the measure will fail. The opposition Labor Party leader, Shimon Peres, has already indicated that he will support the treaty, even though by voting against it he might be able to topple Begin's government. Said Peres: "Peace comes before power, and I would prefer to see a peace with mistakes rather than the removal of a government that I do not consider the right government." Once endorsed by the Knesset, the treaty, in its English version (which is the authoritative one), will probably be signed in Washington by Carter, Begin and Sadat, perhaps as early as next Monday.
By his considerable diplomatic achievement, Carter substantially reduced the risks of future wars in the Middle East and made it possible for Egypt and Israel to enjoy the rewards of peace. In the Middle East, however, even peace has its risks, and they may prove to be substantial. At the very best, a Cairo-Jerusalem accord can only be a first step toward a general reconciliation of Israel with all its Arab neighbors. Central to this reconciliation is a resolution of the Palestinian question. In seven Arab towns on the West Bank, Palestinian crowds greeted last week's news with jeers and barrages of stones. Israeli troops in Halhul impetuously fired into a crowd, killing two demonstrators, one of them a 17-year-old girl.
While the Palestinian problem remains unresolved, the main risk in the Egyptian-Israeli peace is that other Arab states may persist in viewing the pact as a bilateral deal that ignores broader Arab interests. Such a view could result in the near complete isolation of Egypt and Israel and in acts of terror against their leaders. Even today the possibility that a radical Arab assassination squad might murder Sadat haunts Washington and Jerusalem as well as Cairo. The disappearance of the courageous and moderate Egyptian leader could destroy whatever stability has been achieved by U.S. diplomatic efforts.
Even if the hostility against Sadat's treaty does not reach that level of violence, the Arab opposition will nonetheless be serious. The radical Iraqi government announced last week that as soon as the treaty is signed, it will convene a conference of other Arab states and consider various economic sanctions against Egypt. These would include severing diplomatic, cultural and trade relations with Cairo, boycotting Egyptian products and re-evaluating ties to countries that remain friendly with Egypt. Saudi Arabia, which has been supporting Egypt with $2 billion a year, may cut back or even eliminate its aid.
Peace also poses a risk for Washington. If the U.S. comes to be regarded as the architect of a strictly bilateral Egyptian-Israeli settlement, it too could become dangerously alienated from the rest of the Middle East. With Iran now in unfriendly and potentially hostile hands, Washington cannot afford too great a loosening of its ties with Saudi Arabia, a country strongly committed to pan-Arab interests. To assure moderate Arab states of the U.S. dedication to a general Middle East settlement, Carter is dispatching a high-level delegation on a rush visit to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Reflecting the broad geopolitical concerns of the U.S., the group is headed by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and includes General David Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To dramatize his personal involvement, the President is sending his son Chip on the mission.
The fact that peace has its hazards -and that it will cost U.S. taxpayers a large amount of money (see box) -should not dim the luster of Carter's diplomatic triumph. Reaction to it has nearly been unanimously positive. "A minor miracle," exclaimed Jim Wright, Democratic majority leader in the House of Representatives. Said New Hampshire Democratic Chief Romeo Dorval: "Now the President can tackle bread-and-butter issues with more confidence. People will look to him with more respect because of what he's accomplished. It was quite a gamble, but worth it." The Republicans made little effort to denigrate Carter's achievement. G.O.P. National Chairman Bill Brock said he was "delighted" with Carter's success and reckoned that it would provide the "international boost which [Carter] needs and which we all need."
Overseas, the President's diplomacy was widely applauded. Exclaimed West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, a frequent critic of Carter: "Very good news. Well done. It's a great relief." A top British official said, "Carter deserves praise. The risks were great, but in the post-Iran situation, the risks of doing nothing were greater." Editorialized London's Daily Telegraph: "A peace treaty between [Egypt and Israel] will have a tremendous potential." The only completely sour notes were heard from some of Sadat's fellow Arab leaders and the Kremlin. Protested the Soviet Communist Party daily Pravda: "This is an abandonment [by Sadat] of the defense of the interests of the Palestinian people."
Like September's Camp David summit, Carter's mission seemed doomed until almost the very end. At one point just before Carter was scheduled to fly home, Press Secretary Jody Powell told reporters, "We tried everything, and it didn't work." Carter had flown to the area carrying a set of U.S. compromise proposals that had been approved by Begin and the Israeli Cabinet. In Cairo, Sadat accepted some of the points, balked at others and offered modifications. Then Carter flew on to Jerusalem.
From the start of the week, the outlook seemed unpromising. Begin was surprised to hear Carter talk as though he believed that the dramatic presence of an American President in the Middle East would provide enough impetus to produce an Egyptian-Israeli treaty. He listened quietly as Carter, at a dinner in the Premier's home, focused primarily on the formalities of a treaty signing. Sadat was ready to fly to Jerusalem for the ceremony, said Carter. When the President finished talking, Begin bluntly said such a timetable was impossible. In the didactic manner that has antagonized many who deal with him, Begin reminded Carter that Israel was a parliamentary democracy in which the Knesset had to be consulted before a treaty could be signed.
Now it was Carter who was startled -and dismayed. While he knew that Knesset endorsement was required at some point, he had never been told explicitly that the boisterous Knesset had to debate the whole treaty before it could even be signed. When it became apparent that his hopes for concluding a treaty before returning to the U.S. were vain, Carter was upset and angry. But Begin remained firm. In a subsequent session, when Begin again refused to sign an agreement before Knesset approval, Carter declared bluntly: "What you are saying means that we shall leave the Middle East without a joint statement or any kind of signature."
The situation clearly seemed to have reached an impasse. When Carter brought up Sadat's proposals, Begin said they were "completely unacceptable." Then, according to an American at the negotiating table, "there was tremendous haggling. It was vintage Begin." Said another White House adviser: "There was no way for us to win, particularly by trading cheap shots with Begin." At the end of the first day's talks, Begin told newsmen, "The problems are serious."
Actually, agreement was being blocked by only a few relatively minor issues. The most important points of the Egyptian-Israeli dispute had been settled in the Blair House talks following Camp David. Most of the key secondary issue had been resolved by the compromises that Carter had brought to the Middle East. Both sides, for example, had generally agreed on the touchy matter of setting a one-year duration as the target for negotiations intended to provide autonomy for the 450,000 Palestinians in the
Gaza Strip and the 700,000 on the West Bank of the Jordan River.
What was causing Carter problems ast week in Jerusalem was some new demands made by Sadat and points raised the Israelis. In the endgame of negotiations, however, minor points acquire enormous symbolic value, and each side may find it psychologically painful to make the final concession. Cairo was insisting that an Egyptian liaison office be stablished in Gaza immediately after the treaty is signed. Sadat called this a means of protecting the "human rights" of the Gaza Palestinians. And to ensure that Gaza attains autonomy on schedule even if there are delays on the West Bank, Sadat wanted a firm commitment that Gaza self-rule would begin twelve months after the treaty ratification. Sadat also asked for the Israeli military withdrawal from Sinai to proceed in stages.
For their part, the Israelis were demanding guarantees of oil from the wells that will be turned over to the Egyptians when Cairo regains sovereignty over the Sinai. Sadat refused this, saying that it was not part of the original Camp David agreement. He argued that by giving Israel a long-term petroleum agreement, he would be granting it "favored nation" treatment. This would offend other Arab states, something he could scarcely afford.
Begin insisted on an exchange of ambassadors between Cairo and Jerusalem one month after the completion of the first stage of Israel's Sinai withdrawal (ten months after the treaty signing). Such an exchange, the Israelis said, would be a dramatic symbol of the new, normalized relations between the two former enemies. But Sadat wanted the ambassadorial exchange to await the establishment of self-rule in Gaza and the West Bank, something that could take several years. He was concerned that, once the Israeli Star of David flag begins flying over an embassy in Cairo, some Arab states would recall their envoys from Egypt. It is almost certain, moreover, that the Arab League's headquarters would move out of Cairo rather than remain in a city that is host to an Israeli senior diplomat.
At Monday morning's session, the Israelis disclosed that they would accept some of Sadat's changes but refused to budge on the issues of Gaza, Sinai oil and the exchange of ambassadors. Declared Carter: "That is not enough." The President then pressed Begin hard, insisting that Israel sign the treaty. "No, sir," replied the Israeli leader. "We are a free people and we are not going to sign it unless we decide." In a separate meeting with senior Israeli deputies, Carter was chided for dealing as Laban did with the Patriarch Jacob in Genesis 29: 15-28, reneging on a bargain and increasing the price. Retorted Carter, an accomplished student of the Bible: "But look at what a beautiful wife Jacob got in the end."
Monday afternoon, Carter went to address the Knesset, and he did not mask his frustration. Going over the heads of the Israeli Premier and Cabinet, the President appealed directly to their nation. Said he: "The people of [Israel and Egypt] are now ready for peace. The leaders have not yet proven that we are also ready for peace -enough to take a chance." The Knesset listened to Carter in silence and politely applauded only once, when he had finished. This was in marked contrast to the enthusiastic response Carter had received two days earlier from the Egyptian parliament, which interrupted him 14 times with applause.
The Knesset's treatment of Carter, as it turned out, was much friendlier than that accorded Begin. Obstreperous deputies subjected the Premier to such prolonged heckling that at one time the Speaker had to plead: "Please, only one heckler at a time." Some hard-lining members of Begin's own Likud faction accused him of abandoning Israel's claims to the West Bank, while Communists shouted that the government was suppressing the Palestinians.
Throughout the uproar, Carter sat stonefaced. According to a White House aide, the President was dismayed by the lack of decorum on what was, in many respects, a formal state occasion. But Begin, who used to be quite a heckler himself when he was a deputy, seemed almost to relish the rowdiness as a proof of his repeated argument that his negotiating powers are limited by opposition in the Cabinet and Knesset.
After the Knesset adjourned, the Israeli Cabinet Committee for Security and Foreign Affairs took up the treaty. It could find no way of breaking the deadlock. Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, though exhausted by the protracted negotiations, pleaded that both sides must keep trying. Said he: "We can't let the President leave in this spirit. The U.S. is the most important ally we have. We have to reopen the door for further negotiations." To which Begin retorted: "It is up to the Americans to decide whether they are leaving or staying."
Yet Dayan persisted. How about sticking, he suggested, to the words of the original Camp David agreement? This would mean that Israel would drop its demands for Sinai oil and Egypt would do the same on the matter of a liaison office in Gaza. "Let's leave them for further negotiations," exhorted Dayan. But Begin and most of the Cabinet disagreed.
Then Dayan telephoned Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and invited the Americans to join the deliberations. Vance, Brzezinski and other members of the U.S. team hurried to the Knesset committee room while Carter remained in his sixth floor suite at the King David Hotel. The talks remained deadlocked. Said one Israeli Cabinet member to the Americans: "We need more time to make the kind of decisions you are asking us to take."
At this point, William Quandt, the National Security Council's Middle East expert, called Presidential Adviser Hamilton Jordan at the King David and glumly told him: "It's the end of the line." Recalled a senior U.S. aide later: "We were very, very down." As the meeting at Begin's office broke up, Ephraim Evron, Is rael's ambassador to the U.S., asked Brzezinski what he thought. "I don't think the Cabinet wants peace," answered the American. "No, no," Evron responded hurriedly. "Don't jump to conclusions. We can find ways."
When the Americans returned to Carter's suite, Vance gave what one U.S. participant called "a very dismal" report. Carter was due to leave Israel that evening, and some of his bags had already been put into a guarded van outside the hotel. Judging that it was already too late to leave that day, however, the President decided to remain overnight and invite Begin to a farewell breakfast Tuesday morning. He would then fly to Cairo for a one-hour courtesy stop at the airport to brief Sadat. For four hours Monday evening, while Carter's plans remained uncertain, the highway from Jerusalem to Ben-Gurion Airport remained closed to provide absolute security for the expected presidential motorcade.
Later that evening, Dayan called Vance and asked for another meeting. It lasted about an hour, after which Vance told Carter that there suddenly appeared to be some room to maneuver. Encouraged, Carter told Vance to try once again to draft some new ideas. The Secretary and his team worked until 1 a.m., were up again at 6 and were ready to brief Carter an hour later.
At 8:30, Begin arrived for breakfast, and Carter offered him Vance's proposals, which were not very different from those that Dayan had been urging the Israeli Cabinet to accept. The main points: -- Israel will drop its demand for preferential rights to buy guaranteed quantities of Egyptian oil if Cairo will sell oil to Jerusalem on nondiscriminatory commercial terms. The U.S. will extend to 15 years the five-year commitment that it made in 1975 to guarantee Israel's supply of oil if that country is unable to meet its needs on the world market. --Egypt will drop its demand for an Egyptian liaison office in Gaza and its insistence that Gaza Palestinians have an implied priority over West Bank Palestinians in achieving autonomy. These two matters will be dealt with in the next stage of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. -- Israel will withdraw from the western half of the Sinai within nine months and will do so in stages, as Sadat had requested. In return, Cairo will agree to exchange ambassadors with Jerusalem one month after that phase of the military withdrawal is completed.
Begin, who seems to have an exquisite sense of when the breaking point is near, suddenly became conciliatory. He said that he would present these "serious proposals" to his Cabinet. If it supported them, he added, they would be sent to the Knesset. And if the proposals were defeated there, his government would resign. Begin, in fact, was almost effusive as he bade Carter farewell at Ben-Gurion. Said he: "You came on the highest mission in humanity, for peace, and you have succeeded." Then he added: "Now, of course, it is the turn of Egypt."
A Egyptian officials waited at Cairo's International Airport for Carter's plane, they said that they were still hopeful. But one added: "How can you be hopeful when you're dealing with Begin?" Carter and Sadat had been scheduled to meet for about an hour; in fact they huddled in the VIP pavilion for 2% hours. Glancing at notes on a small yellow sheet, Carter briefed Sadat on the talks with Begin. Said the American: "We succeeded some on oil, but we didn't get what you wanted on Gaza." Indicating that he thought the Israelis had a strong case on the Gaza matter, Carter said: "It's time to cut the Gordian knot." After some hesitation, Sadat replied: "I agree." He added that he would trust Carter to pressure Begin to live up to the treaty terms promising autonomy for Gaza Palestinians.
Using a hookup provided by Air Force One's communications center, Carter called Begin and told him of Sadat's acceptance of the proposals. "Fine," said Begin. "I'm glad to hear that." The moment appeared almost anticlimactic. When Carter and Sadat emerged from the VIP pavilion, neither of them displayed much emotion. The American simply announced that his host had agreed to new proposals that Begin would be submitting to the Israeli Cabinet. When a reporter shouted, "If the Israeli Cabinet accepts this, does it mean peace?" Carter smiled and nodded affirmatively. Sighed a White House aide: "We survived."
Just as Carter's reputation would have suffered, especially abroad, if his mission failed, he could now look to the rewards of the prospective peace. Conceded House G.O.P. Leader John Rhodes: "Carter undoubtedly stands taller. For the time being, his stock is higher." An elated White House aide exclaimed: "I'd like to keep Sadat on TV! He keeps saying, 'Jimmy Carter did it.' We'll make that part of our election campaign manual."
Carter's achievement will probably help him most in silencing those who accuse him of feckless leadership. Said Democratic National Committee Chairman John White: "I'd advise those Republicans to get themselves a new speech, because the old, weak leadership number just won't wash any more." Tun Hagan, Democratic leader of Ohio's Cuyahoga County, speculated that Carter's triumph "will slow down everybody who has any idea of challenging him for re-election."
What worries some politicians, however, is the potentially enormous tab that the U.S. may have to pick up as its part of the peace treaty (see box). It may be painful for the White House to ask for billions in economic and military aid for Egypt and Israel at a time when domestic programs are being trimmed. To any such difficulty, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd answered: "Whatever the price, the cost of peace must be weighed against the cost of war."
One benefit of Carter's successful diplomacy is that the President should now have more tune for such urgent domestic concerns as energy and inflation. At week's end the President secluded himself at Camp David to review energy policies. Key advisers were to join him Monday to plan, among other things, a strategy for increasing the supply of energy. Carter is expected to announce new policies by the end of the month.
How much added clout Carter will have on other issues because of the acclaim he has won for his Middle East policy is uncertain. Democratic leaders feel that some Administration programs have already benefited; they point to the healthy margins by which both houses last week approved the White House formula for maintaining nonofficial economic and cultural ties with Taiwan. However, on a more crucial issue, like an arms limitation treaty with the Soviets, an Administration aide cautions that Senators "are going to vote on SALT according to whether they think it is a good treaty, not whether the Egyptian-Israeli accord is a good one." Whatever the domestic political dividends of Carter's Middle East mission, he and his aides realize that they will probably be short lived. When D.N.C. Chairman White saw the President and exclaimed, "You're the Babe Ruth of American politics, a real home-run hitter!" Carter candidly replied: "Just for today."
The main rewards of peace, if that finally emerges as a result of Carter's diplomatic mission, would of course go to Egypt and Israel. Their citizens would be spared the constant threat of renewed warfare, and the immense military burden on their national budgets (as much as 35% of the total) could be significantly eased. Their consumer economies, now greatly hampered by defense spending, might grow much more rapidly.
Moreover, the very psychology of Egyptian and Israeli societies would probably be transformed once it became clear that they were no longer living on the edge of war.
Although the accord with Cairo would greatly reduce the chances of war with Egypt, Israel must still be concerned about its frontier with Syria, especially now that Damascus has been forging closer ties with the hard-line regime in neighboring Iraq. Explained Energy Minister Yitzhak Modai: "We do not yet have a peace treaty. We have only a nonbelligerency agreement on one front."
Most Egyptians, too, greeted last week's breakthrough without great emotion. Wondered Abdel Ismaili, a Cairo grocer whose son was killed in the 1973 war with Israel: "Is peace magic?" After so many starts and stops, the news of a prospective settlement now fails to excite Egyptians as did Sadat's dramatic journey to Jerusalem 16 months ago.
The rewards seem certain to remain limited as long as the peace itself is limited. The greatest payoff, therefore, must await a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, and with the front-line states of Jordan and Syria. Following that, Israel might be able to normalize relations with such key Arab nations as Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
Just how difficult this will be was indicated by the outrage with which almost the entire Arab world, from the western Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea, reacted to last week's developments.
Arab leaders who for more than a year have condemned Sadat for even talking with the Israelis all but declared war on him. "An act of treason," proclaimed the Algerian government. "Humiliating concessions," said Syria's state-run Damascus radio. "We do not turn the other cheek," declared Yasser Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
"We slap back twice as hard."
On the West Bank, Palestinians expressed anguish that Carter, whom they had hailed in the past as a friend, had abandoned their interests, as they saw it, in favor of hurrying through an Egyptian-Israeli accord. Said Gabi Baramki, vice president of Bir Zeit College near Ramallah: "He did not seem to be concerned at all about us or our rights. We seem to be forgotten."
While many Arab leaders talked of possible sanctions against Egypt, some called for reprisals against the U.S. as well. "This is war," declared Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in demanding the nationalization of all American interests in the Middle East. Demanded another Palestinian leader: "Why don't we toss the oil in Carter's face? It is our right to use this weapon in defending our cause." The threat of economic revenge understandably chilled many U.S. businessmen and bankers in the region.
In Riyadh, however, there was official silence from the Saudis, who provide about 15% of the oil imported by the U.S. Saudi leaders in the past have expressed opposition to the Camp David summit and to any separate peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, but they have remained a force for moderation in the Middle East. Jeddah's newspapers, which generally reflect the rulers' views, sniped at the U.S. position. Al-Madina, for example, accused Carter of trying "to appease Begin" to build political support among U.S. voters. Still more ominously, the Saudis' Princeton-educated Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al Faisal, suggested in an interview with a Lebanese magazine that his government might want to develop friendlier ties with the Soviet Union.
Brzezinski's mission this week to Saudi Arabia and Jordan is aimed in great part at calming the Arab anger against the Cairo-Jerusalem pact. The Americans will stress Washington's commitment to a comprehensive peace. A similar message was delivered to Saudi Arabia and Sudan last week by Egyptian Vice President Husny Mubarak, who then went on to Britain, France, West Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia and Rumania to explain Sadat's policies. Sadat has responded to charges that he has abandoned his fellow Arabs by saying: "I have gone as far as I can go. I have done more than any other Arab leader to start the process for the return of Arab lands and the rights of the Palestinians. Let any other Arab leader show how else it can be done and I will gladly follow him."
But it is no easy matter to provide the leadership needed for negotiating a comprehensive Middle East peace. Such leadership requires stamina, virtuosity and the courage to take chances. These are all qualities demonstrated by Carter's performances at the Camp David summit and in his mission to Cairo and Jerusalem. Recognizing that he must devote more time to domestic problems, the President last week said: "I want to get out of the negotiating business." That, however, may be a luxury that neither the nation nor the West can afford. Speedy progress toward a general Middle East settlement has become a geopolitical imperative.
And it requires active U.S. diplomacy, often the kind that only a President can personally provide. --
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