Roomful of New Realities

The experts assess the Egyptian-Israeli treaty

A mix of promising opportunities and dangerous risks. This is the cautiously balanced view of many U.S. experts on the Middle East as they analyze the likely effects of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Says a State Department senior aide: "We're moving into a roomful of new realities in the Middle East, but nobody can be sure what will happen to people's perceptions as we go through the door."

Perhaps the most profound development, in the view of many specialists, is that the Middle East alignment has been altered. Says Harvard Professor of Government Nadav Safran: "The whole chessboard has been changed by the move of one of the major pieces on that board--Egypt." This move significantly reduces the chances of yet another war in the region. Explains American University President Joseph Sisco, who was the State Department's chief Middle East adviser under Henry Kissinger: "Without Egyptian participation, war is simply not a viable Arab option at this point. The treaty thus deepens the irreversibility of the peace process." Safran agrees, noting that the signing of the accord "broke the spell: the largest and most powerful Arab nation has recognized Israel as a legitimate country and part of the Middle East. No matter what happens in the future, this cannot be taken back. The psychological effect of this act is of immense significance--despite all the rantings and ravings of other Arab states."

Nearly as significant is the way the treaty and the long negotiations have drawn the U.S. into Middle Eastern affairs. Says Johns Hopkins Political Scientist Robert W. Tucker: "It's not merely a peace that is backed by the Americans; it's a peace that almost has been created by the Americans. It can only stand up if the Carter Administration is prepared to act accordingly." Tucker favors a Marshall-Carter plan to give Egypt the necessary economic help to preserve its political stability.

Furthermore, says Tucker, "the logic of the treaty necessitates U.S. military involvement in the Middle East" as a stabilizing force. Among other measures, he favors the U.S.'s taking over the sprawling air base at Etzion, which the Israelis will be giving up as they evacuate the Sinai. He also suggests that Washington consider reinforcing the U.S. Mediterranean fleet and establishing a naval base at Haifa.

But there is a price for increased American involvement. By signing a memorandum promising some form of support for Israel if the treaty's terms are violated, for example, Washington has guaranteed that it will be deeply immersed in the controversies that most certainly would accompany allegations of cheating. Another price is the billions for aid to Egypt and Israel. Says a Senate Foreign Relations Committee aide: "There's a very basic feeling that this is a worthwhile investment for peace, but that can easily change. We are only at the beginning of what promises to be a long haul." He notes that "our mail has been running heavily against appropriating those aid funds."

The experts emphasize, as do Jimmy Carter and Administration spokesmen, that last week's pact was but a single step toward a comprehensive peace. Says Hisham Sharabi, a Georgetown University historian and president of the National Association of Arab Americans: "The treaty doesn't even touch the central problem of Palestinian self-determination. As a result, the Arab world is more bitter and frustrated than ever."

Adds former Under Secretary of State George Ball: "The treaty is a very useful achievement only if it is followed up. If it is not, it could cause more harm than good." Ball suggests several steps Washington should soon take. For one thing, he urges the Administration to open "immediate, direct discussions with the Palestine Liberation Organization so that the Arabs in the Gaza Strip and West Bank can feel that they have some representation." According to Ball, Washington's recently repeated offer to negotiate with the P.L.O. only if it recognizes Israel is evidence that the Administration is "not biting the bullet."

For another thing, Ball urges "an outright declaration by the U.S. that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are not a lesser breed and that they have the right to self-determination." In the context of a final peace settlement, moreover, Ball suggests that the U.S. consider establishing a military base on the West Bank in order to reassure both sides of the American determination to help keep the peace.

While Safran agrees that the Palestinian problem has not been resolved, he stresses that the treaty "gives the parties time to accomplish what they might not otherwise have been able to. The whole framework, indeed, could unravel. But the solidifying element of the American commitment will work in favor of an agreement on the Palestinian question." And Princeton's Fouad Ajami, a native of Lebanon, who is very sympathetic to the Palestinians, admits that the treaty surely places the Palestinians in no worse a situation than they were. Says he: "They were not going anywhere before the treaty, and their position is not that much different now."

Crucial to progress toward a broader peace is help from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. James Noyes, a Saudi affairs expert at Berkeley's Institute of International Studies, observes that Saudi Arabia is in "an exquisite dilemma. It has to support Sadat but condemn him at the same time." Without help, Sadat could fall, throwing the future role of Egypt into confusion.

This could be one of the most explosive consequences of the treaty, but a number of experts are relatively sanguine about the prospects of Sadat's getting help from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Says Sisco: "Both countries seem to be adopting a wait-and-see attitude while making the proper statements to appease the more radical Arab nations." Safran feels that while Saudi Arabia may appear to be siding with the Arab hard-liners against Egypt, "the Saudis will feel compelled to support the fait accompli, despite their carping." If Saudi Arabia becomes vocal in backing Egypt, Safran believes that Jordan's King Hussein might then stop equivocating about whether to endorse Cairo's treaty with Israel.

Ultimately, the success of the Egyptian-Israeli peace will probably depend on Washington. Notes L. Dean Brown, a former U.S. Ambassador to Jordan and now president of the Middle East Institute in Washington: "The main burden [in getting the treaty's terms fulfilled] will once again fall on the President. He will be forced to hammer out compromises on these serious problems, and that will take up an enormous amount of his time. But Sadat cannot afford to let Carter off the hook because the American's presence in the talks may be the only way to consistently get the Israelis to heed the urgency of the Palestinian problem." This view is seconded by Noyes, who says, "What Carter has got to do is to put some teeth into the next proceedings."

Ball, however, confesses that he is "pessimistic about whether we'll have the will to address this central [Palestinian] problem, particularly with an election year coming." Still, concludes Tucker, if the U.S. "follows through on the commitments implied in the treaty, then I am hopeful that it will work."

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