Twin Salvos for SALT

Starting the campaign for a new U.S.-Soviet arms pact

The SALT II offensive has begun. With a powerful rhetorical barrage, the Carter Administration last week started fighting in earnest to win support for a new U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation treaty. In Chicago, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski denounced "unwarranted alarmist" criticisms of the accord and declared that the treaty would "lead to more peaceful relations" between the two superpowers. In Manhattan a day later, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown called SALT "the foundation for progress In establishing an enduring political relationship with the Soviets that reduces tensions and sets important visible bound aries to our ideological and political and military competition." These salvos were just a taste of what is likely to be months of impassioned national argument over the accord's merits, a potentially acrimonious fight that could make last year's Panama Canal Treaty debate seem like a tea party.

Even as Administration spokesmen took to the hustings, there was a sense that the more than six years of negotiations on the accord might finally be drawing to a close. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was awaiting a Soviet reply to U.S. proposals on the last issues blocking agreement:

the use of codes in missile tests and the definition of what constitutes new types of missiles. The U.S. has insisted that the Soviets must not scramble or "encrypt" the most essential electronic data being flashed from missiles to ground monitors during test flights. Keeping the transmissions readable would allow the U.S. to continue intercepting the Soviet test data needed to verify that Moscow is not violating SALT II. The U.S. has also proposed that an increase or decrease of more than 5% in the size of an existing missile would make the weapon a "new type," hence one whose development is restricted by the treaty. The Soviets have seemed willing to accept a 5% ceiling on increases, yet would like to be able to shrink existing missiles by 12% before these weapons would be classified as new ones. The U.S., however, maintains that more than a 5% change fundamentally alters a missile's characteristics and that a smaller new weapon, utilizing technological advances in miniaturization, could be even more lethal than an older but larger one.

Except for relatively technical issues such as these, the outlines of SALT II have been in place for nearly two years. The centerpiece is a treaty, running through 1985, that would limit the American and Soviet strategic arsenals to a maximum of 2,250 strategic launchers, a category that includes intercontinental ballistic missiles (iCBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles and long-range bombers. Under this overall ceiling, some classes of weapons would be subject to further restrictions. Perhaps the most important would limit both countries to 1,320 strategic launchers carrying several warheads and known as MIRVS (multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles). To restrain the introduction of new weapons systems, the treaty would allow each side to develop and deploy only one new type of lCBM.

Even tighter restrictions on new weaponry would be Imposed by a protocol separate from the treaty. In force for 2% years, the protocol would, among other things, ban deployment of ground-and sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges of more than 373 miles and mobile ICBMS.

To the dismay of many advocates of arms control, neither the treaty nor the protocol would require much change in existing U.S. or Soviet strategic arsenals. The Pentagon now only has about 2,240 launchers. Moscow would have to dismantle about 250 launchers to get below the 2,250 ceiling; these probably would be aging ICBMS dating from the early 1960s. In an implicit acknowledgment of SALT II's very modest achievements in terms of arms reduction, the treaty and protocol are to be accompanied by a statement of principles that would set guidelines for SALT III. Among the stated goals for the negotiations would almost certainly be a call for arms cuts.

Though conceding that SALT II is imperfect, the Carter Administration nonetheless is giving the accord an enthusiastic endorsement. Defense Secretary Brown last week told a joint meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association that the pact's provisions would add a crucial measure of stability to U.S.-Soviet strategic relations. Said he: "It is probable that without SALT n, we would enter into an era of greater uncertainty--in both military and political terms--that would result in increased strategic forces on both sides as hedges against that uncertainty." He went on to say that the "net result of such a numbers race would be greater strategic force levels at vastly greater expense and at substantial risk to stability." He estimated that SALT II would enable the Pentagon to maintain "essential equivalence" with the Soviets at a saving of $30 billion during the next decade compared with the cost if a treaty did not exist. But even with an arms accord, added Brown, "substantial U.S. defense programs, expanded ones in the strategic field," would be required. Indeed, SALT II would not interfere with U.S. plans for a new Trident submarine-launched missile, a land-based mobile missile and the cruise missile.

Brzezinski explained to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations that SALT'S ceilings "simplify our future strategic planning and add more certainty to our military projections." Alluding to Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev's ill health, Brzezinski added: "When the next generation of Soviet leaders decides its policies towards strategic arms and towards the U.S., we want them to face clear and agreed restraints on the competition in strategic arms. We want these to be the restraints of SALT II."

If Washington and Moscow agree on a draft treaty, the formal signing could be the occasion for the long-delayed Carter-Brezhnev summit. After that, the battle over SALT in the U.S. would intensify greatly. The opposition has been mobilized for some time. It argues that the treaty would favor Moscow because the U.S. would not be compensated for the continuing Soviet advantage in missile size and power. There also is concern that the protocol's restrictions on technology would be to America's disadvantage. Said Texas Republican Senator John Tower: "The Soviets can continue to make qualitative improvements in their system and overcome certain technological superiority that the U.S. enjoys at the moment."

Ratification will require a two-thirds vote by the Senate. After taking a head count, California's Alan Cranston, the Senate majority whip, observed last week: "It's not impossible, but ratification faces very tough sledding." He found that 40 of his colleagues are strongly for SALT II and ten are leaning toward it; this leaves 20 firmly opposed to the treaty, ten likely against it and 20 undecided.

Ohio Democrat John Glenn, however, puts "30 or 35 in the iffy column." Though fundamentally for SALT, Glenn will oppose it if he is not convinced that the U.S. would be able to verify Moscow's compliance with the treaty's terms. Glenn told Carter last week what especially worries him is the loss of bases in Iran from which the CIA monitored Soviet missile tests. In addressing this fear, Brown declared that the Administration is "confident that no significant violation of the treaty could take place without the U.S. detecting it."

Opposition to the treaty from Glenn might sway several of the undecided Senators, but an even stronger influence on how they eventually vote will be the position taken by Washington Democrat Henry (Scoop) Jackson, who is widely regarded as the Senate's leading strategic arms expert. Acknowledged Cranston: "If Jackson was for it, there would be no contest." But Jackson has already made a number of speeches criticizing the treaty and generally is regarded as firmly in the no column.

The current lineup of Senate votes could change significantly now that the Administration has launched its offensive for the treaty. Remarked a Senate aide who has long followed the issue: "This damn thing could shift in 50 directions." One thing, however, seems certain. With the national debate on the treaty gathering force, Senator Joseph Biden, the Delaware Democrat, soon will not be able to quip as he did last week: "Half the people don't know the difference between SALT and pepper.''

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.