Reducing the Horror

In March 1977 Cyrus Vance received his real initiation as Secretary of State when he carried to Moscow Jimmy Carter's "comprehensive package" for deep reductions in the Soviet and American strategic arsenals. The Kremlin leaders rejected that proposal bluntly. Over the next two years, Vance met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko nine times, painstakingly searching out the compromises that finally led to last week's SALT II agreement. Sometimes Vance had only a day to shift gears from negotiating with Moshe Dayan on the future of the West Bank or Ian Smith on the future of Rhodesia to bargaining with Gromyko on SALT. In an interview with TIME'S Strobe Talbott, Vance described the experience.

Keeping Up-To-Date on SALT: We've discussed the issues within the Government at least once every couple of weeks. Before setting off on a trip that will include SALT, I've made a point of zeroing in again on the subject. If I had 24 hours, I could sit down and reabsorb the necessary detail before going into the negotiations. Also, my 6 1/2 years in the Defense Department were a real help. Picking up the technical aspects of SALT was not as difficult as if I'd had to start from scratch. Finally, as a trial lawyer, I've been trained to absorb a heavy dose of facts and retain them under considerable pressure.

Some of the meetings, of course, have been very difficult, very trying, very frustrating. But from time to time it's really been fun. The intellectual challenge of it is exciting, and when you finally get a breakthrough, it's really quite thrilling. SALT involves internal negotiations within each country as well as bilateral negotiations between the two countries. That aspect too is a fascinating intellectual exercise and a challenge. SALT also brings together scientific, military and political dimensions, and it involves the important interests of our allies. All that makes it more difficult, but also more exciting than other negotiations I've been involved in.

On the Frustrations of SALT: One of my real frustrations has been that it's taken us so long. The delay has inhibited us from laying out the strengths of our position and from answering misleading or false statements by those who oppose SALT. One result is that it's given an impetus to the anti-SALT movement that's going to take us a while to push back. It would have been a lot easier in some ways if we'd been able to lay it all out as we went along. But we've had to live with the realities of an ongoing negotiation; we've had to stay within the parameters of those negotiations. God knows, it's been frustrating for me when I've read some of these stories that are just plain untrue and I haven't been able to come out and say, "Here's what the actual facts are."

There's another matter that bothers me, and I don't know the answer to it. I'd hoped we could find a way of involving the Congress more in the negotiating process so that they would have a better understanding of what was going on and what we were trying to achieve. I really don't think it's worked out as satisfactorily as it might have. We just have to find a way to resolve this issue of dealing with Congress in the future, because it's in everybody's interest for the members of Congress to understand what we're trying to do and what our problems are. It's hard for them to understand if we can't share everything with them.

Lessons Learned from the Negotiations: First, we ought to give more thought in advance to what weapons systems we're going to need. We should not have to keep options open on systems that we don't really need. If you keep options open on systems that are never going to be used, then you've just complicated the negotiating process unnecessarily. I think this is an important lesson for the future--for SALT III. Second, I think there is a need for greater input in the way of arms-control considerations into the planning of military force structures. As we come to see our security interests best advanced by a stable and lower-level military balance, we will learn to integrate more effectively arms-control and force-structure planning as complementary rather than opposing elements in our defense planning.

On Dealing with the Soviets: We've learned that informal, exploratory and very private discussions are an essential part of the negotiating process. Without that kind of discussion, you just can't make the progress you want. You have to be able to sit down and talk very directly, essentially with nobody else around. That way the other side will open up and tell you, "Well now, this is what our problem is." It allows you to understand their problems and to see if there might be ways to take account of those considerations and still achieve your own objective. That's why it's of critical importance that you have this kind of channel. We found we just couldn't be as open with the press and the public as we'd originally hoped.

Why SALT Should Be Ratified: First, because it enhances the security of the U.S. and our allies. Second, it will help maintain strategic stability; it will reduce uncertainties with respect to the force structures of the two sides and thus enable each to plan forces in a more intelligent, less destabilizing way. Third, the treaty is based on adequate verification--not on trust. Fourth--and this is what I'd like to emphasize--we should never lose sight of the awesome horror of nuclear weapons and the incredible effects of a nuclear exchange. Anything that makes those horrors less likely is of fundamental importance to us, to the Soviets and to the whole world.

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