The Least Awful Option?

The Least Awful Option

Concern about a "limited"nuclear war

The outbreak of nuclear war has long been regarded as a virtually suicidal exchange in which the U.S. and the Soviet Union fire thousands of atomic warheads at each other, obliterate both societies and kill scores of millions. But what if one side attacked with conventional weapons and the other retaliated with just three or four nuclear missiles? How would the first nation react to that?

This kind of contingency planning for a less than total war, sometimes called the "least awful option," is attracting attention among civilian defense experts serving congressional committees. Even Secretary of Defense Harold Brown admits that while "we should remain skeptical about small-scale nuclear demonstrations," the U.S. should preserve "the capability for a small-scale demonstration."

What has prompted renewed thought about "limited" nuclear war is America's gradual loss of its vast superiority over the U.S.S.R. in strategic weapons. The essential equivalence in nuclear arms today means that Washington probably could not check a limited Soviet provocation by threatening a massive attack on the U.S.S.R. But a U.S. threat of limited nuclear retaliation might--just might --deter a Soviet blockade of the Persian ulf s oil-shipping lanes, for example, or an invasion of a NATO ally.

Even if an atomic exchange could be cept limited, of course, it would be horrifyingly destructive. This is the conclusion of a study entitled The Effects of Nuclear War, released last month by the Office of Technology Assessment. An arm of Congress, the OTA analyzed several levels of nuclear exchange. Among them was a classic case of controlled nuclear war: an attack on U.S. oil refineries by ten Soviet SS-18 missiles, each carrying eight warheads of one megaton force. Such an attack would destroy an estimated 64% of U.S. petroleum-refining capacity, along with railways, petrochemical plants, and storage facilities near the refineries.

While the Russians would primarily be aiming at economic targets, according to the study's script, their attack would take an enormous human toll because U.S. oil production facilities are near Los Angeles, Chicago, New York and other large cities. In the first hour after the strike, more than 5 million Americans would be killed by searing heat, explosive force, high winds, fire and crumbling buildings, if the Soviet warheads exploded aboveground. (Airbursts suck up relatively little debris to settle back to earth later as radioactive fallout.) If the Soviet missiles were detonated at ground level, immediate fatalities would drop to about 2.9 million, but an additional 312,000 would die soon afterward from fallout.

In the week following the attack, says the OTA report, those living near the targets would be "in a state of shock, with their lives disrupted and further drastic changes inevitable ... People would face many immediate tasks: care of the injured, burial of the dead, search and rescue, and fire fighting." A major problem would be the treatment of the tens of thousands of third-degree burn victims. At present notes the report, the combined facilities of all U.S. hospitals can treat no more than 2,000 cases of severe burns.

The extent of suffering would depend on several variables. Example: if the attack were to take place on a clear summer weekend afternoon with most people outdoors, the number exposed to direct thermal radiation would be 25 times greater than if it were a cold winter night with most people inside their homes.

To retaliate for the strike without escalating the conflict, Washington might order a ten-missile attack on Soviet oil refineries. The OTA evaluates a case in which the U.S. fires three Minuteman Ills, each carrying a trio of warheads that can deliver a 170 kiloton explosive force, and seven submarine-launched Poseidon missiles that carry a total of 64 warheads, each with a 40 kiloton force. The attack instantly destroys 73% of Soviet refining capacity. But because the U.S. weapons are less powerful than Soviet warheads, there is less general damage. Between 1 million and 1.5 million people would die.

Having thus traded blows inflicting roughly equal economic damage on each other, Washington and Moscow might pause and decide to start negotiating. This, at least, is the argument for having a capability for waging limited nuclear war. It could buy time and prevent Washington from facing, at a moment of confrontation with the Kremlin, the dilemma of having either to capitulate or to order a massive atomic attack. But there is an obvious, enormous danger. Once the military nuclear threshold is crossed, there is no guarantee that the momentum can be controlled to keep the exchange limited. Warns Secretary Brown: The use of "any nuclear weapons. . . carries a very high risk, though not the certainty, of escalating to a full-scale thermonuclear exchange."

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