SALT:A 5% Solution?

Kissinger's testimony helps concentrate an emerging consensus

"In his essay 'Perpetual Peace,' the philosopher Immanuel Kant wrote that world peace would come about in one of two ways: after a cycle of wars of ever increasing violence, or by an act of moral insight in which the nations of the world renounced the bitter competition bound to lead to self-destruction. Our age faces precisely that choice. . ."

So said Henry Kissinger as he began his presentation last week before the Senate committees analyzing the SALT II accord. By the time the former Secretary of State had completed 7 1/2 hours of testimony, he had moved beyond Kant in arguing forcefully that today the U.S. must seek peace by pursuing two parallel paths: one attempting to find areas of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other ensuring that the nation's military arsenal is strong enough to preserve the balance of power. Kissinger's appearance helped transform the proceedings into one of the most probing analyses in years of the nation's military strength and its relations with the U.S.S.R.

As the hearings recessed at week's end, after a month of testimony, SALT II's chances in the Senate seemed perceptibly brighter. The accord's opponents have mostly failed to dent the Carter Administration's key argument that this agreement is better than no agreement. Exclaimed a White House aide: "No one laid a glove on the treaty itself--at all."

Paradoxically, however, dedicated arms controllers have lost ground during the hearings because the price of the treaty is almost certain to be a U.S. arms buildup. This was not only Kissinger's message, but that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Secretary Harold Brown, Democratic Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and others. Indeed, the main issue no longer appears to be whether SALT II will pass, although that is not yet certain; instead, it is what kind of measures will accompany the treaty to strengthen the nation's defenses and send the right signals to the Kremlin and America's allies.

As the chief architect of the 1972 SALT I accord, a shaper of SALT II and an old hand at analyzing the dynamics of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, Kissinger had long been awaited at the hearings. On Tuesday spectators began lining up for seats hours before he testified, and the Caucus Room was filled to capacity for his appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee. Thursday he came before the Armed Services Committee. Senators of both parties clearly were dazzled by Kissinger; their questioning was deferential and they frequently addressed him as "Mr. Secretary."

Emphasizing his own commitment to the SALT process, Kissinger explained that a major purpose of the arms control effort is to find a formula that preserves each superpower's "capacity to retaliate" against a nuclear strike, "thereby reducing the incentive and capacity for surprise attack." It is not enough simply to advocate a reduction in atomic arms, he added. Concern for national security requires building a huge weapons arsenal while the efforts are under way to build an enduring peace. Said he: "How to avoid nuclear war without succumbing to nuclear blackmail--this is the overwhelming problem of our period."

Because of the difficulties inherent in this problem, he preferred not to give a simple answer to the basic question of whether the Senate should approve SALT II. Instead, his response was "Yes, but" --a big but. He acknowledged that the treaty contains a number of "beneficial aspects." For one thing, the pact's overall ceiling of 2,250 strategic systems "will force the Soviets to get rid of 250 [systems], including some modern ones." For another, the treaty would limit the number of warheads that could be fired by a missile.

But despite these accomplishments, he stressed that SALT II "is essentially peripheral to our basic security and geopolitical concerns." To get at these urgent matters, he said that the Senate should endorse the treaty only under certain conditions. They are:

> An "obligatory understanding between the Congress and the President" to remedy "the grave peril posed by the current military balance." He called for extra military spending for the current fiscal year and a revised five-year defense plan, which he suggested should be drafted during Congress's August recess so that the funds could be authorized and appropriated before SALT II comes to a vote. Said Kissinger: "If the Administration is unable to put forward such a program to this session of Congress, I recommend that the Senate delay its advice and consent [on SALT II] until a new military program has been submitted to and authorized by the next session of Congress." When asked why the spending commitment should precede approval of the accord, he replied: "If we do it later, the Soviets will say that we are not living up to the spirit of the agreement."

> A statement by the Senate, attached to its resolution approving SALT II, declaring that the terms of the treaty do not interrupt "cooperative relationships with allies." In this way the U.S. would be on record as insisting on its right to share weapons technology with its allies and insisting that such action does not violate SALT II's "non-circumvention clause." This provision bars Washington and Moscow from using "third parties" to circumvent SALT II's limitations.

> A clear-cut declaration that the treaty protocol, which bans deployment of the ground-and sea-launched cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 373 miles, would not be extended beyond the end of 1981, when it is scheduled to expire. Kissinger reasons that this would make it harder for Moscow to argue that the protocol's restrictions are a precedent for SALT III. A further ban on ground-and sea-launched cruise missiles, he maintains, should be accepted only if Moscow agrees to limits on some of its own short-range "theater" weapon systems, such as the SS-20 missiles and the Backfire bomber, which can reach targets in China and Western Europe.

> A set of instructions to the SALT III negotiators to eliminate the "inequities" in the present treaty. One of them, according to Kissinger, is letting Moscow deploy 308 giant SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles while barring the U.S. from developing similarly powerful ICBMs. He suggested a number of possible ways SALT III might remedy this imbalance: Moscow could give up its heavy missiles; the U.S. could gain the right to have as many such missiles as the U.S.S.R.; or the U.S. could obtain a compensating advantage by being allowed to have more of some other weapon system than the Soviets. (Ironically, the Soviet heavy-missile monopoly is the result of the freeze on existing ICBMs imposed by SALT I and the 1974 Vladivostok guidelines; in both instances, the negotiations were directed by Kissinger.)

> A "vigorous expression" by the Senate that there is "linkage between SALT and Soviet geopolitical conduct." For instance, said Kissinger, this means that the SALT process would suffer if the Soviets exacerbate regional conflicts or support "groups and activities seeking to undermine governments friendly to the U.S." To monitor this linkage, Kissinger wants the Administration to submit an annual report to the Senate evaluating Moscow's global behavior. He also urged the Senate to vote every other year on whether Soviet conduct merits continuation of whatever arms talks might then be under way.

In a tense exchange with Delaware's Joseph Biden, Kissinger said that unless his suggestions were accepted, he would urge a "no" vote on the treaty. But he also made it clear that, as an arms control advocate, he did not enjoy offering them. Said he: "The course I propose will make SALT II far from the turn in the arms race many of us hoped for when the negotiations were inaugurated. But too much time has been lost, too many weapons systems have been unilaterally abandoned [by the U.S.], too many military adventures have been encouraged by the Soviet Union."

He admitted that there would be a price to pay for a SALT defeat. For example, he said, it would undermine "international confidence in our ability to perceive our own interests or to harmonize the various branches of our government." It would also "have a disruptive impact on East-West relationships, creating a crisis atmosphere." But he added that the price could be much greater if the Senate approves the pact without strengthening defense: "If the custodian of free world security neglects its task, sooner or later panic will become inevitable."

Already, said Kissinger, "the military balance is beginning to tilt ominously against the U.S. in too many significant categories of weaponry." He pointed out that while the Kremlin long has led in conventional forces, this dominance used to be offset, in great part, by American preponderance in strategic and battlefield nuclear weapons. But the Soviets have been surpassing the U.S. in some key strategic categories. In ICBMs, for example, the Soviet arsenal jumped from 860 in 1968 to 1,398 today, while the number of U.S. ICBMs has stayed at 1,054. Kissinger repeated what a number of witnesses had already told the Senators: that by the early 1980s, "improvements in missile accuracy and warhead technology will put the Soviets in a position to wipe out" nearly all U.S. land-based ICBMs. Said Kissinger: "Rarely in history has a nation so passively accepted a radical change in the military balance."

What especially worries Kissinger is the possibility that if Moscow achieves overall strategic superiority it might gain powerful diplomatic leverage. Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church questioned Kissinger's reasoning; the Idaho Democrat pointed out that even when the U.S. enjoyed nuclear superiority, the Soviets were not inhibited from building the Berlin Wall or putting missiles in Cuba. Kissinger riposted softly, "They might feel less inhibited if we didn't have superiority." While concern about Soviet superiority had been raised by other witnesses, such as the Joint Chiefs, it carried extra weight coming from Kissinger. Just five years ago, he declared: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it?" But last week he recanted, explaining that the statement had been made "after an exhausting negotiation" and that it "reflected fatigue and exasperation, not analysis." When New York's Jacob Javits later referred to this change of heart, Kissinger jokingly alluded to his famous ego, saying that this confession of error was "a historic occasion."

By carefully proposing changes only in the "strategic environment," while keeping intact the painstakingly negotiated SALT II text, Kissinger was able to stress that his proposals would not require new bargaining with the Kremlin. Explicit Soviet approval would not be needed for the strictly unilateral actions sought by Kissinger. He thus distanced himself from those Senators who have demanded fundamental revisions in the accord, such as Henry (Scoop) Jackson of Washington and Jake Garn of Utah. Minority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee has also been seeking major changes of the pact's provisions, but he hinted that his position might shift as a result of what he had heard from Kissinger. Kissinger indicated that he had no major worries about verifying Soviet compliance with SALT II, something that has bothered Senator John Glenn of Ohio.

From the Administration there was almost an audible sigh of relief after Kissinger's appearance. Because he had given no clue to what he intended to say, some Carter aides had feared that the former Secretary might propose "killer amendments." After the Tuesday testimony, the State Department said that while it did not agree with all of Kissinger's points, it welcomed his "general approach."

How much a strong defense will cost is uncertain. Kissinger put no price tag on the extra efforts that he urged, but he cited the Joint Chiefs' recommendation for a 5% boost (after inflation) in the Pentagon budget. The Administration already is committed to an annual 3% real increase. The hike asked for by the Joint Chiefs probably would mean increasing the proposed 1980 defense outlays of $122.7 billion by more than $6 billion.

This would confront the Administration with a painful choice: either cutting civilian programs to spend more on the military or increasing the budget deficit and probably fueling inflation. Advocates of higher military spending note that during almost every year since 1968, U.S. defense outlays (adjusted for inflation) actually were shrinking while the Soviet arsenal kept expanding. But Kissinger sees no alternative to higher spending. Said he: "The Soviets will never agree to unilateral reductions. If we want equality, we must build to equality."

He proposed no new weapons systems. Instead he said that the extra money should be used to accelerate existing strategic arms programs, such as the Trident missile and submarine, the MX mobile ICBM and the air-launched cruise missile. In addition, he called for improved tactical nuclear weapons, expanded conventional forces and a larger navy.

Although Kissinger wants the size and shape of the extra defense effort determined before the SALT II vote, the Senate and Administration are unlikely to move that quickly. The chances seem good, however, that the White House will be willing to accelerate programs for modernizing the U.S. arsenal. Said a top Administration aide: "We'll work out the dollars if that will get the treaty."

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