Monday, Oct. 08, 1979

Battles, Plans and Travels

Battles, Plans and Travels

Nearly everyone was getting into the action

The tiny desert outpost of Abu Darbah changed hands last week as Israel yielded a third slice of the Sinai Peninsula in accordance with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Indicative though it was of continuing progress, it went virtually unnoticed in the flux and fury of events elsewhere in the region.

Only a day before, sonic booms and cannon fire reverberated in the clear blue sky as Israeli and Syrian jets clashed over Lebanon. Flying U.S.-built F-15 fighters, Israeli pilots shot down four MiG-21s in a 90-sec. dogfight apparently provoked by the Syrians. The Israelis claimed that all their planes went unscathed. The dogfight underscored the fragility of the Lebanese ceasefire.

At the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance cited the clash and announced a U.S. initiative for a "broader truce" in southern Lebanon. The American plan had actually been hatching since late August, when a series of heavy bombings convinced State Department officials the time might be ripe. Washington policymakers felt the Israelis were concerned that reports of civilian casualties in Lebanon were undermining their support in the U.S. The P.L.O., riding the crest of a successful diplomatic wave, might be amenable to moderation. The Syrians were believed eager to withdraw some of their troops in the face of mounting political problems at home. The State Department therefore drew up a set of general principles calling for a pullback of all forces from southern Lebanon, reinforcement of U.N. peacekeeping troops, and a larger role for the Lebanese government.

The U.S. had no specific step-by-step plan for the truce, nor was it seeking an all-parties truce conference involving direct negotiations between Israel and the P.L.O. "We're not that stupid," says an Administration source. "We will deal with the Israelis and the U.N., and we will deal with the Lebanese. The Lebanese will deal with the Palestinians and with the Christian militia."

Initial responses to the plan have been positive, though somewhat skeptical. The Israelis, for instance, have indicated they would abandon their policy of pre-emptive shelling if the P.L.O. would pledge similar restraint. Some faint hopes for broader cooperation between these two groups eventually were also raised by Israel's Foreign Minister, Moshe Dayan, who hinted in New York last week that Israel might even consider direct dealings with the P.L.O. one day. But only if it were to transform itself from a "military organization" into a "political framework," he was careful to insist.

U.S., Egyptian and Israeli representatives meanwhile met in Alexandria for a sixth--and noisy--round of talks on Palestinian autonomy. The opening session turned stormy when Egyptian Prime Minister Moustafa Khalil pounded his fist on the table and barked that "good faith" had been "shattered" by the Israeli decision to allow its citizens to purchase land on the West Bank. Israeli Minister of the Interior Yosef Burg sarcastically retorted that the Egyptians were "using a big gun to shoot a small bird."

Both sides remain at loggerheads on the meaning of autonomy. The Israelis see self-rule for the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza as limited to local administrative matters. The Egyptians want the Palestinians to have broad judicial, executive and territorial rights. The final communique lamely predicted "an eventual agreement" and reiterated the hope that the West Bank Palestinians might soon join the autonomy talks.

Two prominent West Bank mayors visiting Washington for a two-day conference on Palestinian rights scarcely encouraged that hope. Fahd Qawasmi of Hebron and Karim Khalaf of Ramallah told their American audience that Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza overwhelmingly support the P.L.O. "as our representative" and would refuse to deal with Israel until they regained sovereignty over their ancestral lands.

While the West Bank mayors were lobbying for the Palestinian cause in Washington, the P.L.O. received a boost from U.S. Civil Rights Leader Jesse Jackson, off and running on a self-styled Middle East peace mission. Sparks flew from the moment Jackson arrived in Jerusalem, where Premier Menachem Begin snubbed the black activist because of his sympathy for the P.L.O. Said Jackson: "Mr. Begin's refusal to meet me represents a rejection of blacks in America, their support and their money."

Touring a Palestinian refugee camp north of Jerusalem, Jackson worked the UPI streets like a politician on the hustings, kissing babies, hugging women and praying for the redemption of Palestine. "I identify with the underdogs because I am one of the underdogs," Jackson told the refugees. In the city of Nablus, on the Israeli-occupied West Bank, he was greeted with glad shouts of "Jackson! Arafat!" and hoisted on the shoulders of several men.

Such scenes inevitably irritated some Israeli officials and provoked the angry defection of two Jewish Americans in his delegation. Yet Jackson had some critical advice for the other side as well. Addressing a Nablus town meeting, he urged the Palestinians to renounce terrorism and live in peaceful coexistence with Israel. "Somebody must have the strength to break the cycle of terror and pain," he said. Then he conveyed the same message to Yasser Arafat.

Most U.S. officials, but not all, took a dim view of Jackson's personal diplomacy. Said one: "If nothing else, Jackson's trip will show the Israelis that there is growing curiosity in the U.S. about why the Palestinians are still refugees."

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