Some Elemental Differences

A Sino-Soviet powwow amid continuing frictions

"They are as different as fire and water," is the saying about the Chinese and Soviet brands of Communism. That incompatibility of elements could not have been more apparent than in Indochina, where Vietnamese troops launched new attacks against insurgents in Cambodia and thus heated up the conflict by proxy between China and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia.

Nothing could have been less auspicious for the start of a bold, face-to-face powwow in Moscow between China and the Soviet Union aimed at patching up some of their longstanding differences. The meeting was the first attempt in 16 years at wide-ranging political talks between the world's two most powerful Communist countries. Still, from the moment the ten-man Chinese delegation flew into Sheremetyevo Airport, both sides tried to put the best face on matters.

At the amiable arrival ceremony, Deputy Foreign Minister Wang Youping, who headed the Chinese mission, smiled broadly as he shook hands with the chief Soviet negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid llyichev. Wang expressed hope for "positive results" and, reviving an old bromide from the fraternal era before the Sino-Soviet schism began in 1959, declared that "the Chinese and Soviet people have built and developed a profound friendship over long years of common revolutionary struggle."

Senior leaders of both countries, however, did little to help the initial atmosphere. Soviet Politburo Member Mikhail Suslov declared that the outcome of the talks depended exclusively on China's readiness to display "a reasonable, constructive approach" to normalizing relations between the two countries. But he also noted that Moscow "resolutely condemns the ideology and policy of Maoism as deeply hostile to Marxism-Leninism, the interests of socialism and the cause of peace." In Peking, Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping similarly put a damper on the Moscow meeting in remarks to a foreign visitor, Canada's ex-Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Reported Trudeau: "He made it quite clear that in his mind the differences between Moscow and Peking have their origin in Russian chauvinism that is worse, as he put it, than in Czarist days."

The most serious obstacles to successful truce making between the two Communist powers, however, seemed highly contemporary. One week before the Moscow talks, with obvious support from the Soviet Union, Viet Nam lashed out with a series of attacks in Cambodia, where troops loyal to deposed Premier Pol Pot, backed by China, have been carrying on a stubborn insurgency.

Deploying some 180,000 soldiers, Hanoi showed signs it might be preparing a full-scale "dry season" offense aimed at wiping out Pol Pot's force of 30,000 guerrillas once and for all. If so, it was feared that China might take direct action in defense of Pol Pot, and even perhaps launch another "punitive" attack like its massive invasion of Viet Nam last February. A Chinese military operation on that scale would again raise the risk of direct Soviet intervention.

On another front, however, China prevailed over the Soviet Union. The arena was the debate over who should represent Cambodia in the U.N. General Assembly: the ousted regime of Pol Pot, as China demanded, or the Viet Nam-installed government of President Heng Samrin, as the Soviet Union insisted. After a series of heated recriminations, China won out. The U.S. joined with non-Communist Southeast Asian countries in voting, 71 to 35, to give seats to the Pol Pot delegates, on the ground that the U.N. could not accept a regime that had been created by Vietnamese troops. Responding angrily to the vote, the Soviet press agency TASS accused the U.S. and China of "coming out jointly for the continuation of genocide in Cambodia by Pol Pot."

With such frictions, why had the Sino-Soviet talks been scheduled at all? Some analysts speculated that Peking wishes to ease tensions on its frontier with the U.S.S.R. so that China can withdraw some of its 1.6 million border troops and devote more resources to its ambitious plans for internal modernization. The talks are also thought to be a logical extension of its Great Leap Outward from the isolation of the past. The Soviets, for their part, may wish to set up safeguards against nuclear war with China. In addition, Moscow may feel that by playing its "China card," it can strengthen its hand in its dealings with the U.S. Whatever the motives, accommodation between the two Communist powers seemed more remote than ever. Asked about the possible duration of the talks, a Chinese spokesman in Moscow replied that there would be a meeting Oct. 2, but that there was no indication when formal negotiating sessions might begin.

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