High-Level Lobbying for SALT

And a Soviet ploy to keep NATO from deploying new weapons

In a rare display of solidarity, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are conducting one of the most intensive lobbying efforts in the 30-year history of the alliance. Their collective aim: to persuade the U.S. Senate to ratify the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty with the Soviet Union, a pact they consider essential for their own security.

Speaking publicly and privately with undecided Senators last week, leading statesmen of the member nations kept emphasizing that it will be politically possible to deploy new medium-range theater missiles in Europe only if SALT is approved. Without the pact, jittery West Europeans living only a few hundred miles from the Iron Curtain would not consent to the nuclear weaponry that nato so urgently needs, notably 1,000-mile range Pershing II and ground-based Cruise missiles capable of striking Soviet cities and military targets.

Though the Carter Administration lad earlier claimed that SALT should be judged on its own merits, the White House was clearly linking the pact to NATO concerns last week. If the treaty is rejected, Administration spokesmen declared, Western Europe might face the breakdown of NATO and eventual "Finlandization," as its members seek private accommodations with the Soviet Union. Warned Delaware Democrat Joe Biden, a leading pro-SALT Senator: "Our NATO allies have had their confidence shaken by our slow response to the energy crisis, by the decline of the dollar, and by what they perceive as American foreign policy setbacks. For the U.S. to repudiate SALT would send through Europe the most profound and far-reaching doubts about the U.S. as leader of the Western alliance."

Trying to reassure Europeans who worry whether the U.S. would come to their assistance in case of a Soviet attack, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski told a meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association in Washington: "Let there be no question about our commitment and our determination to help defend Europe by all means necessary--nuclear and conventional. There are no conceivable circumstances in which we would not react to a security threat directed at our allies in Europe."

The need for maintaining Western unity was underscored after Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev delivered a speech in East Berlin marking the 30th anniversary of the founding of East Germany. Brezhnev warned that the new NATO weapons would "radically alter the strategic situation on the Continent," and "poison the international atmosphere." He singled out West Germany for a special threat: "It would not be difficult to imagine what consequences would await her if this weaponry was ever put to use by its owners."

After brandishing the stick, Brezhnev proffered a meager carrot. He said that the number of Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles aimed at Europe would be reduced if the NATO weapons were not deployed. He added that the U.S.S.R. would unilaterally withdraw up to 20,000 Soviet troops plus 1,000 tanks and other military hardware from East Germany within the next twelve months.

Western leaders were unimpressed with Brezhnev's offer. Sounding more resolute than usual, President Carter said at a press conference that the Soviet proposal was "not quite as constructive as at first blush it seems to be. I think it's an effort designed to disarm the willingness or eagerness of our allies adequately to defend themselves. In my judgment, the decision ought to be made to modernize the Western allies' military strength and then negotiate with a full commitment and determination mutually to lower armaments on both sides."

Western military experts pointed out that the reduction of the number of Soviet missiles aimed at Europe would be meaningless if they are replaced by missiles with more warheads, a current Soviet practice. The removal of 20,000 troops from East Germany would still leave 400,000 to 500,000 Soviet servicemen in the country. The withdrawal of 1,000 tanks would leave 6,000 Soviet tanks. Says a West German foreign ministry official: "Strategically, this doesn't mean a damn thing. The numbers are so huge that this is a small bite." The Soviets, moreover, could pull out support personnel like military police, cooks and clerks. What is more, if the 20,000 troops are moved just inside the western Soviet border, they would hardly constitute any less of a threat to Europe.

At a mid-December meeting in Brussels, the NATO members are scheduled to reach a decision on new weapons. To achieve rough parity with the growing number of SS-20 Soviet missiles targeted on European cities, NATO plans to deploy around the mid-1980s nuclear-tipped Pershing II and ground-launched Cruise missiles with a combined total of 572 warheads. Says Peter Corterier, spokesman for foreign affairs in the West German Social Democratic Party: "For the alliance to act credibly and to negotiate with the Soviets, it must make its decision now to accept nuclear weapons in the European theater. Otherwise, no arms offer has any credibility."

But if SALT is not approved, that strategy will be jeopardized. All of the European NATO nations have large left-leaning political parties that are concerned about the effect an arms buildup might have on detente. They will accept the new missiles only if they are accompanied by SALT II, which in turn will lead to SALT III negotiations and possibly a genuine reduction of nuclear armaments.

To pacify public opinion in West Germany, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt insists that other European nations accept at least a token number of the new missiles on their own soil. Britain has indicated a willingness to add to its minuscule nuclear force; Belgium has also signaled that it would be willing to go along. The Netherlands, on the other hand, seems too divided on the issue at the moment to make a decision. As Belgian Foreign Minister Henri Simonet told TIME: "Without ratification of SALT II, it will be politically impossible for the West Germans--and even more so for us Belgians and the Dutch --to say that we are going to modernize our theater nuclear forces. I will not accept the risk. It would be to commit political suicide, and if people like me don't move, you can be sure that most other politicians won't move. I'm not going to budge until I have the cover of SALT."

Under mounting pressure from SALT supporters at home and abroad, the U.S. Senate seemed to edge closer to approval of the pact last week despite the setback caused by the uproar over the Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. That issue was somewhat defused when Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Frank Church, who had helped trigger the crisis, introduced a mild resolution that he had worked out in advance with the White House. He proposed that before SALT can be approved, "the President shall affirm that. . . Soviet military forces in Cuba are not engaged in a combat role and will not become a threat to any country in the Caribbean or elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere." Thus the burden of proof is put on the Administration, not the Soviet Union. The White House interpretation is that the brigade can remain in Cuba as long as it does not appear to assume a combat role.

Another troubling issue seemed to be clearing up last week when Intelligence Committee Chairman Birch Bayh and Vice Chairman Barry Goldwater asserted that the U.S. possesses the "technical means" to monitor Soviet compliance with the treaty. The committee's final report was not an absolute assurance that verification problems have been overcome, and Ohio's Democratic Senator John Glenn was still deeply troubled by that issue. But the report helped to reduce fears that the loss of Iranian listening posts and other U.S. intelligence shortcomings would significantly impair surveillance of Soviet weaponry. Said one Democratic Senator: "This is an issue that has been crushed by exhaustion, ambiguity and boredom."

Witnesses testifying against SALT during closed-door hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees last week added no fresh arguments to those that had been heard many times. Paul Nitze, former SALT negotiator and perhaps the nation's leading SALT critic, sounded his usual warning that the enormous throw-weight (the capacity of a ballistic missile to deliver a payload) allowed the Soviet Union would "tend to nail down a dangerous strategic imbalance." He urged the Senate to postpone consideration of the treaty until the U.S. has strengthened its strategic forces. But the normally hawkish Armed Services Committee chairman, Mississippi Democrat John Stennis, replied that the Senate has devoted too much time to SALT to set it aside now. Said Stennis: "I just believe it best to go on and take advantage of the hearings we've had and debate the matter."

By a vote of 10 to 5, the Foreign Relations Committee rejected a motion proposed by Glenn to delay action on the treaty. Late this month the committee is expected to endorse the pact; there are eight sure "ayes" and possibly as many as twelve. The only question is how many amendments will be added by the committee and how damaging they will be. Full Senate debate is expected to begin some time in November. Majority Leader Robert Byrd feels that the treaty will gain support if the debate is televised and the public becomes acquainted with the basic issues. But he wants to avoid boring people by limiting discussion to a maximum of four weeks, which would require the Senate's unanimous consent.

To a considerable extent, the fate of the treaty rests with a group of undecided, largely conservative Senators. To try to win them over, Byrd and Senate Whip Alan Cranston, chief SALT strategist on the Hill, have got the Administration to agree that it will disclose its five-year estimates for military spending by early November. Until now, Carter has refused to accept more than a 3% annual increase in the defense budget, while Senator Sam Nunn and other hawks have insisted on 5%; many have made such an increase a condition for their support of SALT. But last week there were signs that the White House might be giving way. Defense Secretary Harold Brown hinted that he might favor a larger increase than 3%, and Brzezinski raised the same point in private.

Ultimately, it is the argument on behalf of NATO that may swing the necessary votes. Nunn and other undecideds were bombarded with appeals from European diplomats, notably West German Ambassador Berndt von Staden. Says a staff aide on the Armed Services Committee: "He's been working this place like a pro; he's been touching all the bases." Von Staden encouraged West German Defense Minister Hans Apel, who was visiting Washington, to pay a call on Stennis and Nunn. Apel reminded Nunn, who has become a Senate watchdog of NATO, that nothing is currently more important to the alliance than SALT. Considerations of both NATO'S future and nuclear arms control were thus becoming fused as the long wrangle over SALT neared a climax.

This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.