One Quota That Was Overfulfilled

By Strobe Talbott

Brezhnev's arms buildup gave Moscow an edge in some key areas

When John Kennedy demanded that Nikita Khrushchev remove Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962, the American President was carrying a big stick: roughly a 10-to-1 superiority over the U.S.S.R. in nuclear weaponry. At the time, and for years afterward, it was commonly accepted in both Moscow and Washington that the overwhelming U.S. nuclear advantage had enabled Kennedy to go to the brink and force Khrushchev to back down. The episode humiliated the Soviet leadership and contributed to Khrushchev's downfall two years later. Leonid Brezhnev and his comrades were determined that the Soviet Union catch up to the U.S. in all forms of military power, but particularly in the nuclear forces that were believed to have been politically crucial in the Cuban missile crisis.*

In sponsoring the arms buildup, Brezhnev turned out to be a true Stakhanovite: he overfulfilled his quota. When he died last week, he left to Yuri Andropov a military machine that is at least as powerful as the U.S.'s in some respects, and more powerful in others. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S. now possess approximately the same number of ballistic missile warheads--more than 7,000. These warheads are the fastest, most accurate and destructive long-range weapons in the two sides' arsenals of last resort. In Soviet eyes, they symbolize the U.S.S.R.'s attainment of equality with the U.S. as a superpower.

To many Americans and other Westerners, however, the Soviet accumulation of nuclear arms represents something far more menacing. The weapons proliferated so rapidly and so massively during the 18 years of Brezhnev's reign that they conveyed the impression of a juggernaut. American deployments during the same period, while formidable in their own right, tended to occur more in fits and starts.

The Soviets have concentrated their nuclear firepower on giant land-based missiles that could, according to some worst-case scenarios, be used to launch a sneak attack and deprive the U.S. of a large portion of its ability to strike back. The smaller American nuclear weapons, by contrast, have traditionally been better suited for retaliatory, rather than preemptive, missions. Moreover, by unveiling a new generation of shorter-range missiles targeted against Europe, the Soviets have raised anxieties in NATO about the West being bullied or blackmailed in some future crisis.

The Kremlin's nuclear buildup has been accompanied by an equally disturbing increase in conventional strength and the ability to project power around the world. It has added ground forces and modernized its armored units in Eastern Europe. The Soviet navy has evolved from little more than a coastal patrol force to a bluewater, 300-vessel fleet that could threaten the industrialized democracies' sea lines of communication.

Utilizing its new global reach, the U.S.S.R. under Brezhnev also embarked on adventures far from its traditional sphere of interest. During a period when the U.S. was shrinking from overseas commitments because of Viet Nam, the Soviet Union was busy making mischief, on its own and by proxy, in Africa, Indochina and Central America, although it did avoid situations that might bring direct conflict with the U.S.

The combination of Soviet military acquisitiveness and geopolitical assertiveness has led some in the West, notably Ronald Reagan, to an alarming conclusion: despite its declared aspiration merely to attain parity with the U.S., the U.S.S.R. has actually achieved across-the-board superiority. But that judgment does not take sufficiently into account a number of problems that plague the Soviet Union and offset what otherwise might be decisive advantages. Precisely because it has been so unrestrained in beefing up its military might and throwing its weight around the world, the Soviet Union has provoked countermeasures by the West that will further complicate the U.S.S.R.'s defense planning as well as help deter it from possible aggression.

The Kremlin's much vaunted missile force, which Reagan cites as proof of Soviet superiority, is far less diversified and mobile than America's. In a few years the most threatening of the Soviet rockets will themselves be threatened by the latest U.S. warheads. Some of those are already deployed on Minuteman intercontinental missiles, and others are destined for the Trident II submarine-launched missile and the MX. Even if the MX is defeated by political opposition, the Minuteman and the Trident II programs could still expose the Soviet Union to a mirror image of the "window of vulnerability" that so worries Reagan. That vulnerability will be even more acute for the Soviets, since their submarines and bombers are far inferior to those of the U.S. So are Soviet precision-guided munitions, miniaturized guidance systems and other high-tech hardware that proved so devastating in the Falklands and Lebanon.

The Warsaw Pact has a numerical edge over NATO in various categories of weaponry, but the very name of that alliance ought to serve as a reminder of one of its fundamental weaknesses: the Soviet Union is heavily reliant on Poland and other resentful, potentially mutinous satellites for supply lines and soldiers. Moreover, 49 divisions totaling more than 500,000 troops, nearly a quarter of the Soviet army, are tied down on the Chinese border. When Brezhnev took over from Khrushchev, there were only 17 divisions in the Far East.

Thus the Soviet Union over which Andropov now presides is vastly more powerful, both in the absolute and by comparison with the U.S., than it was two decades ago. That is thanks largely to Leonid Brezhnev. But while the Soviet ability to exert force on the world has grown, so have the external dangers and internal defects with which its new leaders must cope. That too is Brezhnev's legacy.

--By Strobe Talbott.

Reported by Bruce W. Nelan/Washington

*Reappraising the crisis 20 years after it occurred, six of J.F.K.'s top advisers challenged the conventional wisdom. Writing in TIME (Sept. 27), they concluded that Kennedy had prevailed not because of his nuclear ace in the hole but because Cuba was so near the U.S. and because he had Khrushchev outgunned with conventional forces in the region.

With reporting by Bruce W. Nelan

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