Mixed Signals on Arms Control

By Ed Magnuson

Behind the scenes there are signs of flexibility

Publicly, the President was standing firm on the U.S. bargaining position at the critical talks with the Soviet Union on intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Europe. Declared Reagan at his televised press conference: "When I . . . introduced this proposal for zero option, I said that we would negotiate in good faith any legitimate proposal that might be offered . . . So far no legitimate counterproposal has been offered that would warrant negotiation or study." Thus, insisted Reagan about the Soviets, "the ball is still in their court."

Privately, however, pressure was building within the Administration for the U.S. to break the impasse at Geneva by moving away from the zero option. Under this proposal, the Soviet Union would dismantle its SS-20 missiles, most of which are aimed at European targets, in return for the U.S.'s abandoning its plans to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe beginning in December. No such U.S. initiative is likely, though, until after the March 6 elections in West Germany. Any softening of the American stance before then, U.S. officials believe, would undercut Chancellor Helmut Kohl, a firm supporter of the new NATO deployment, in his race against Social Democrat Hans-Jochen Vogel.

Nonetheless, Vice President George Bush, back from what the Administration believes was a highly successful trip to explain the U.S. position in Europe, hinted at the shape a U.S. move may take. "Maybe there is a way, an intermediate way," he said in a TV interview, to reach the Administration's oft-stated goal of "eliminating an entire generation of these weapons from the face of the earth." At the State Department, a potentially influential group of senior-level officials is pushing quietly for the U.S. to seek a large, but not total, reduction in Soviet IRBMs, while in return America would agree to deploy far fewer than its planned 572 Pershings and cruise missiles. Among those who favor such a move are Lawrence Eagleburger, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Richard Burt, who finally won confirmation last week as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs after a long fight by conservative Senators to block his appointment.

There is no indication yet that Secretary of State George Shultz is willing to take up this cause, which undoubtedly would lead to a clash with Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a strong proponent of the zero option. The belief at the White House that Bush put the Soviets on the diplomatic defensive may be overly optimistic, but it reinforces Pentagon pressure on Reagan to hold fast and wait for concessions from Moscow. One White House defense strategist says that U.S. Negotiator Paul Nitze has been instructed to do "some very determined, energetic, inquisitive negotiating" at Geneva to seek out any weakening in the Soviet position. In return, some White House officials believe, Reagan would be receptive to making a U.S. counterproposal.

While all this delicate jockeying was going on, Reagan suffered an arms control setback of a quite different sort at the hands of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--a wound that was, in a sense, self-inflicted. The committee refused to confirm Kenneth Adelman, 36, now the deputy permanent U.S. representative to the United Nations, as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which supervises the U.S. negotiators. The committee of nine Republicans and eight Democrats had been expected narrowly to approve Adelman, sending the nomination to the floor. There the Administration expected to win confirmation after a stiff fight.

But when Republican Senator Charles Percy, chairman of the committee, called a meeting last week to vote on Adelman, Democrat Alan Cranston gave the group copies of a 1981 story from the New York Daily News in which Adelman was quoted as saying that arms control negotiations are useful only for "political reasons. I think it's a sham." Cranston then made a motion to delay voting on Adelman, apparently assuming that Percy had a majority in Adelman's favor. Percy, presumably under the same impression, sharply opposed the motion.

Then Maryland Republican Charles Mathias turned the tide. He noted that Reagan and his top aides "are all innocent of experience in the complex and bewildering world of arms control." He added in biting understatement: "I would hope that Mr. Adelman could be excused from taking a crash course in a subject upon which, until now, he has not concentrated. The President can then enjoy that privilege so rare in human experience, a second choice." With that, Percy knew the vote would be 9 to 8 against the appointment. He turned to Cranston and said, "I am going to ask you to renew your motion." Amid the laughter, the committee agreed, 15 to 2, to postpone a final decision.

The President seems ready to fight for his choice. "I believe the young man is eminently qualified," Reagan said at his press conference. Asked how he expected to get the Senate committee to change its position, Reagan vowed, "I will try to be as persuasive as I can and make them see the light. If that falls short, maybe I'll try to make them feel the heat."

Adelman, who holds a Ph.D. in African studies from Georgetown University, claimed that he did "not recall" describing arms control as "a sham" and that it was not his view, either in 1981 or at present. Percy tentatively agreed, at Cranston's urging, to hold a committee hearing on whether Adelman had been quoted accurately in the Daily News.

An acrimonious Senate debate over the nomination could further erode confidence in the U.S.'s ability to deal seriously and intelligently with arms control issues. Already sensing a propaganda plum, the official Soviet news agency TASS jumped on Adelman's reported anti-arms control views as "a scandalous development." Adelman was proof, TASS said, that Reagan had been "appointing incompetent persons to high offices."

-- By Ed Magnuson. Reported by Laurence I. Barrett and Gregory H. Wierzynski/ Washington

With reporting by Laurence I. Barrett, Gregory H. Wierzynski/Washington This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.