The U.S. Stays the Course

By George Russell

Washington emphatically says no to talks with the guerrillas

"Let them shoot their way into the --government? No dice!" That was the crisp response of Secretary of State George Shultz last week as he traded views with members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee over the nettlesome issue of El Salvador. For what seemed to be the umpteenth time, some of the committee's members, led by Republican Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa and Democratic Congressman Stephen J. Solarz of New York, had suggested that the Reagan Administration agree to negotiations on power sharing between the beleaguered Salvadoran government and opposing Marxist-led guerrillas as a way to end the Central American country's three-year civil war. Shultz's reply: "The guerrillas are busy upsetting people in El Salvador, creating hell, shooting their way around. They are responsible for the levels of violence and difficulty in that country. If they want to take part in a civilized way in the activities of that country, they are welcome to do that."

The exchange had an all too familiar ring. Once again a small but vocal number of U.S. legislators were expressing their skepticism at Reagan Administration policy in El Salvador. Once again the Administration was insisting that its combination of support for electoral democracy, social reform and human rights, together with sizable doses of military aid ($26 million for fiscal 1983, $86 million proposed for 1984), was the only solution that could prevent a Communist takeover.

The challenge to Administration policy was a minor but troubling one. For the moment at least, congressional opposition is not as strong as it may appear. The majority of U.S. legislators are trying to ignore the prickly El Salvador issue. Explained Leach: "In the public mind, there's a great wish that the issue would go away. Like Viet Nam, it's something we'd like to forget. But, like any issue, some people won't let it be forgotten, some for political reasons, some for humanitarian."

One of those critics, Massachusetts Democrat Gerry Studds, earlier this month persuaded 93 Congressmen to co-sponsor a resolution that would cut off all U.S. military aid to El Salvador on the grounds that the Reagan Administration was mistaken in claiming that there had been significant human rights progress in the country. Studds, who speaks from personal conviction, finds echoes of Viet Nam in the Salvadoran situation. Says he: "The U.S. is backing itself into a corner. There's overwhelming public opposition to the Administration's policy."

Whether or not that is true, the congressional tug of war neatly spotlighted one of the Reagan Administration's chief dilemmas in El Salvador. Says Democratic Congressman Peter Kostmayer of Pennsylvania, a self-styled "realistic pessimist" who supports the option of negotiating with the guerrillas but recognizes that they must also lay down their arms: "It's really a two-front war. One front is in Washington, one in El Salvador. The Administration is losing on both fronts."

Not really. The latest bout of congressional querulousness was partly inspired by disappointing news from the Salvadoran battlefront. In the town of Suchitoto (pop. about 11,000), 27 miles from the capital of San Salvador, hundreds of guerrilla members of the Faribundo Marti National Liberation Front (F.M.L.N.) last week were continuing a prolonged attack against a garrison of 150 to 200 national guardsmen and police. All access roads to the town were cut off. Within the besieged area, food, medicines and potable water were growing scarce, and civilian refugees could escape from the fighting only by rowboat across a nearby reservoir. Bragged an F.M.L.N. commander: "The puppet forces of the dictatorship do not have a coherent strategy to combat our forces. They are confused as to whether they should concentrate and fight us or disperse into smaller groups."

The guerrillas were intent on repeating a psychological triumph of three weeks ago, when they occupied the virtually undefended provincial center of Berlin for three days, then retreated before the belated arrival of Salvadoran army reinforcements. U.S. officials in El Salvador discounted the showy guerrilla actions as armed propaganda exercises, producing results that were militarily worthless even though psychologically valuable. Nonetheless, as a senior American official admitted, "the guerrillas are getting better at what they're doing. They have better coordination, better timing between their operations."

Much of the blame for the guerrillas' success is placed on Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia. Ignoring U.S. military advice, Garcia has wasted the energies of the 22,000-man Salvadoran army on massive and fruitless sweep operations in the hinterlands, while allowing the guerrillas to exercise their mobility fully in economic sabotage and spectacular urban takeovers. Says a Western military analyst in El Salvador: "There has to be a complete shake-up over at the Salvadoran high command, and a lot of changes within about 60 days, or this thing is going to get a whole lot worse." By some accounts, Garcia may be ousted relatively soon by El Salvador's Provisional President, Alvaro Alfredo Magana. Among other changes that may be necessary are a further increase in U.S. military aid and a boost in the number of U.S. military advisers in the country from the current 40 or so. Insists U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Deane Hinton: "The Salvadoran army today, compared to what it was two or three years ago, is a much better army. It is not changing fast enough for some impatient Americans, but it's changing."

News from the political front in El Salvador has been slightly more heartening. After months of complicated maneuvering, members of the country's freely elected Constituent Assembly have succeeded in neutralizing that body's ultra-rightist President, Roberto d'Aubuisson, 39. Long accused of being a stumbling block to social and economic reform, D'Aubuisson has been foiled in recent at tempts to fill key government posts with members of his ARENA party.

Small as those changes may seem, they give impetus to the prospect, staunchly up held by the Reagan Administration, that the electoral process offers the best hope for El Salvador's future. U.S. policy, officials point out, should be long term, not withstanding congressional impatience and occasional setbacks in El Salvador. Says a senior State Department official: "There has been a lot of pulling and tugging, but [the Salvadoran government] has not faltered in moving toward the creation of full democratic institutions."

The greatest danger to that trend probably still lies with the debate on Capitol Hill. The persistent discussions among U.S. legislators over negotiations with the F.M.L.N. have produced a noticeable erosion of Salvadoran morale, one that could, over time, lead to a government collapse and a rebel victory. Complains Hugo Carillo, first secretary of the Salvadoran Constituent Assembly: "U.S. policy on El Salvador proceeds on two levels, and unfortunately they do not meet. There is the policy of the State Department and the White House and there is the foreign policy of the Congress. The Congress is trying to play politics with our problem."

Another hazard is a growing antipathy among Congressmen of all political persuasions toward U.S. foreign aid in general. A key element of F.M.L.N. strategy has been to conduct attacks on the Salvadoran economic infrastructure, even though the greatest burden of those assaults falls upon the poor that the guerrillas claim to represent. To counter that effort Washington has offered El Salvador economic aid that far outstrips its military support: in fiscal 1983, the U.S. gave $105 million in Salvadoran economic aid, and the Administration now wants an additional $35 million. But Congress refused to pass the Administration's overall foreign aid bill last year and is likely to repeat that action this year. As a result, aid to El Salvador may not rise above the current level.

The irony is that congressional skepticism about the Reagan Administration policy is, as Secretary of State Shultz pointed out, playing directly into the hands of the guerrillas. The F.M.L.N. has long held negotiated power sharing to be its chief war aim. Says Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders: "I see no way that you can bring direct talks by force without simply destroying the government." One of the many painful paradoxes of El Salvador is that the Reagan Administration is being taken most severely to task for insisting that ballots, rather than bullets, should decide the fate of the country.

--By George Russell. Reported by Timothy Loughran/San Salvador and Evan Thomas/Washington

With reporting by Timothy Loughran, Evan Thomas/Washington This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.