New Life for an Ailing Bird

By Ed Magnuson

Reagan's START concessions revive the MX missile

When Congress last year killed the dense pack basing plan for the MX, the 96-ton ten-warhead missile seemed permanently grounded. Then the blue-ribbon Scowcroft Commission recommended last month that the U.S. develop a smaller, possibly mobile, single-warhead Midgetman missile. In the meantime, the commission suggested, the U.S. should demonstrate its political will by placing 100 MX missiles in existing Minuteman silos, even though these sites might be vulnerable to attack. Key members of Congress wanted the Midgetman, as well as a more flexible approach to arms control. President Reagan wanted the MX and was willing to make concessions to get it. The result: the MX rose from the ashes last week, while the Midgetman be came part of Reagan's arms-control equation.

The revival of the MX was shrewdly engineered by the President. Reagan lobbied hard in public, declaring on a political foray into Ohio that "if Congress rejects these [Scowcroft] proposals, it will have dealt a blow to our national security that no foreign power would ever have been able to accomplish." Then he met privately with legislators who remained skeptical about the MX. He also sent accommodating notes to lawmakers who had asked for changes in the Administration's negotiating position in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks with the Soviet Union, which are scheduled to resume in Geneva on June 8.

One letter went to nine House Democrats who wanted both super powers gradually to reduce reliance on multiple independently targetable (MIRVed) missiles. These missiles are considered destabilizing because they are tempting first-strike targets. The reason: it takes only one incoming warhead to knock out a Hydraheaded missile on the ground. If each side deployed only single-warhead missiles, there would be more targets, and each incoming warhead could hit only one enemy warhead at a time.

In his reply, Reagan said he "wholeheartedly" endorsed the single-warhead concept, but he was vague about how he planned to incorporate it into his arms-control policy. He wrote: "We are conducting a review of our START proposal with the intention of developing such modifications as are necessary to reflect the commission's approach."

A second letter went to Senators Charles Percy and William Cohen, both Republicans, and Sam Nunn, who carries considerable clout on military matters with his Democratic colleagues. Their major interest was to get the President to endorse the idea of a "build-down" in nuclear missiles. As outlined by Cohen in a newspaper article last January, this plan would have each side dismantle two existing warheads every time it deployed a new one. Reagan liked the idea so much that he called the surprised Cohen to suggest that the concept be refined.

Last week, after long meetings with Senators at the White House, Reagan endorsed the build-down principle, but said the 2-for-l formula was not flexible enough. Pentagon officials had objected that this ratio would penalize the U.S., which is in the process of modernizing its missile forces. The Soviet Union, which is further along in its plans, would have less reason to deploy new missiles, thus escaping the requirement to scrap old ones. An equitable build-down would probably require "variable ratios" designed to bring the U.S. and Soviet forces into rough balance. Reagan agreed with the Senators that a permanent high-level advisory commission, with terms that overlap those of Presidents, should be created to provide continuity in arms-control policy.

With those presidential assurances, however unspecific, committees in both the House and Senate voted to release $600 million in MX funds that had been frozen. The money would be used for flight testing and for studies on how to modify Minuteman silos to accommodate the MX.

Just how much the Administration's arms-control proposals will actually change at Geneva remained in doubt. Up to now, the U.S. has wanted to impose a ceiling of 850 land-based launchers. This would almost certainly have to be raised. The State Department is pushing for a new cap of 1,150, while the Pentagon prefers no limit at all. U.S. planners envision eventually deploying up to 1,000 Midgetmen.

The real sticking point in the Geneva negotiations is the number of warheads to be allowed. Unless the U.S. drops its demand that land-based strategic warheads be limited to 2,500--which would require drastic reductions in the Soviet arsenal, while permitting an actual increase on the American side--no agreement seems likely.

The uncertainty about the Administration's intentions on arms control, despite its reassuring rhetoric, made some critics of the MX in Congress think their colleagues had been hoodwinked by the President. New York's Democratic Congressman Joseph Addabbo charged that Reagan had produced "a smokescreen to cover up what the Administration wants: procurement of the MX, which would waste $20 billion." Wisconsin's Democratic Congressman Les Aspin, while not questioning the President's sincerity in offering arms-control concessions, was worried about whether the Air Force would actually build Midgetman once it had its MX. "The President may not be President in 1985," Aspin said. "The Air Force goes on forever."

Indeed, once a huge weapons system like the MX gets started, it is difficult to kill. But there are many more votes ahead in both houses before MX construction contracts are finally awarded, and wary lawmakers are ready to pull the plug on the MX if the Administration reneges on its arms-control promises. Warned Nunn: "If they change their minds, I can change mine."

--By Ed Magnuson. Reported by Douglas Brew and Evan Thomas/Washington

With reporting by Douglas Brew, Evan Thomas This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.