Cooling Off the Nuclear Debate

By George Russell

A study seeks a middle ground for hawks and doves

Living with nuclear weapons is our only hope. It requires that we persevere in reducing the likelihood of war even though we cannot remove the possibility altogether.

On that realistic note, a group of Harvard University scholars is raising a new possibility in the persistent U.S. nuclear arms control debate. Their theme: something less than a dramatic change or restructuring in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. nuclear balance may be the best and most feasible way for the U.S. to reduce the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. Their conclusion: the most consequential actions in nuclear arms control may be those "modest but real steps toward unproved safety that can be taken now." This thought comes at an auspicious moment for the U.S.: the Reagan Administration is showing signs, however slight, of progress in its own efforts to strike a nuclear bargain with Congress.

Last week, praising what he called a "bipartisan consensus" on Capitol Hill over the arms control issue, the President hailed the House Appropriations Committee's vote to release $625 million in funding for the controversial MX missile, in return for presidential acceptance of arms control measures contained in the Administration's own Scowcroft report.

Meanwhile, the tense and polarized public debate over arms control strategy continues. One side--typified by the grass-roots nuclear-freeze movement--argues that a sudden halt to development and production of nuclear weapons by both superpowers will markedly reduce the possibility of global nuclear war. The other side, led by the Reagan Administration, champions "deep cuts" in the nuclear arsenals as the basis for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks between Washington and Moscow. But it argues that a substantial further U.S. buildup is necessary to make the Soviets accept reductions.

Both of these divergent perspectives come in for heavy criticism by the Harvard scholars in their new study on the dilemmas of nuclear arms negotiation. Their collective effort, to be published next week under the title Living with Nuclear Weapons, is billed by its authors, the Harvard Nuclear Study Group,* as an exercise in ideology-free education, rather than advocacy. Much of the book is a history of the nuclear arms race. As if addressing the current congressional maneuvering over nuclear weapons, the authors reject both a comprehensive freeze on nuclear weapons development and the drastic cuts proposed by Reagan.

Both approaches, say the authors, are "atomic escapism." Adopting a nuclear-freeze policy would necessitate elaborate negotiations with the Soviets that would require at least several years. Besides, argues the group, "the danger of nuclear weapons lies in their use, rather than their existence," and a freeze does not impose constraints on existing weapons.

By the same logic, they warn that simply opting for deep cuts in existing nuclear arsenals is no easy answer to the nuclear nightmare. They point out that the "wrong kind" of reductions in superpower arsenals could increase nuclear instability and that deep cuts are only helpful if the "most destabilizing" nuclear weapons systems are reduced first, such as multiple-warhead missiles. By contrast, it would make no sense to reduce the number of missile-bearing U.S. submarines by 50%: "Fewer than ten submarines [the estimated number that would then remain on active patrol at any one time] would have to be tracked and destroyed for a successful surprise attack against what is now the most invulnerable part of our force."

They also assail a number of "half-truths" about the nuclear arms race. Among them: that the U.S. has always led in the competition; and that new Soviet weapons programs occur only in reaction to U.S. programs. "When they can be first, the Soviets try to be first," say the au thors. The Harvard group also considers to be a half-truth the view that arms control weakens U.S. defense efforts; equally misleading is the idea that arms control involves "trusting" the Soviets.

The Harvard authors recommend that the U.S. work harder in areas of arms control that now seem of lesser impor tance but that may turn into hotbeds of U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition. One important example: an attempt to prevent the development of antisatellite weapon ry, which ultimately threatens the communication between the superpowers and their deterrent forces. Strengthening of that communications network, they say, should be among the top U.S. defense priorities. The Harvard authors oppose the development of the B-1 bomber and have reservations about the deployment of sub marine-launched nuclear cruise missiles. But they support the Stealth bomber and air-launched cruise missiles, and see little gain in adopting a policy forgoing the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of war. The scholars support U.S. retention of land-based intercontinental missiles, even though the weapons are theoretically vulnerable to surprise attack. They also recommend, however, the gradual replacement of the multiwarhead Minutemen with the kind of small, single-war head weapons that were recommended by the Scowcroft Commission.

One area where the Harvard scholars could not agree was on support for the MX. Instead, as they do in other instances, they included in the book all of their differ ing points of view on the topic. Says one of the Harvard authors: "It was important to tell the public why reasonable people can disagree." -- By George Russell.

Reported by Joelle Attinger/Boston

*The authors: Albert Carnesale, academic dean of the Kennedy School of Government; Paul Doty, director of the Center for Science and International Affairs; Stanley Hoffmann, chairman of the Center for European Studies; Samuel Huntington, former coordinator of planning for the National Security Council; Joseph Nye, former deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology; Scott Sagan, Ph.D. candidate in government, who was the project's staff director.

With reporting by Joelle Attinger/Boston This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.