No Cause for Celebration

By William E. Smith

One year later, Israel has little to show for its invasion of Lebanon

The ceremonies, conducted in a second-class hotel in the Beirut suburb of Khalde and three hours later in a community cultural center in the Israeli border town of Qiryat Shemona, were aptly symbolic. In the Khalde ceremony, Lebanese Negotiator Antoine Fattal held his chin in knit fingers, and his eyes were downcast. He applauded politely but without enthusiasm when his Israeli counterpart, David Kimche, made a brief speech praising the agreement that was about to be signed. Lebanese President Amin Gemayel summed up his countrymen's attitude when he later declared, "Lebanon is not holding celebrations today. Lebanon's real feast will come on the day the external forces leave our territory."

That feast day does not seem imminent. In spite of the 24-page agreement laboriously negotiated by Lebanese, Israeli and U.S. diplomats over five months, there was little hope that any of the foreign troops now in Lebanon were actually prepared to leave. It was understood by the three countries that Israel would not withdraw its estimated 38,000 troops from Lebanon until the 50,000 Syrian troops and the 10,000 to 15,000 Palestine Liberation Organization commandos had first been removed, and Syrian President Hafez Assad has made it clear that he has no intention of cooperating.

The effective failure of the agreement that had just been achieved was a fitting ending, in a way, to the first year of Israel's war in Lebanon. Israel had removed the threat of P.L.O. bombardment of Israel's northern cities, but had failed to destroy the organization as a political force in the Arab world. The Soviets, who were humiliated by their client Syria's poor military performance against Israel last summer, seem to have recouped their position in the area and are proclaiming that peace in the Middle East is impossible without them. Israeli troops, in the meantime, are still bogged down in Lebanon.

The week's formal events went largely as expected. The Lebanese Cabinet and Parliament approved the withdrawal agreement unanimously. The Israeli Knesset also approved it, by a vote of 57 to 6, with 44 members of the opposition Labor Party abstaining as a gesture of protest against the way in which the government of Prime Minister Menachem Begin had conducted the war.

The agreement calls on Israel to withdraw its forces within eight to twelve weeks after the accord goes into effect. After that, a limited number of Israelis would be allowed to operate in southern Lebanon as members of eight Lebanese-Israeli joint supervisory teams and at liaison centers to be established near Hasbeya and Mayfadun.

The agreement further specifies that the security area in southern Lebanon, stretching generally from the Israeli border to a line running east along the Awali River, which enters the Mediterranean Sea just north of Sidon, is to be divided into two zones. The northern sector is to be patrolled by a regular Lebanese army brigade, while the southern is to be patrolled by a territorial brigade made up of soldiers from the immediate area.

Some of the more sensitive matters were dealt with in confidential memorandums. The U.S. and Israel signed a document specifying that Israel had the right to retaliate, in self-defense, against attacks by terrorists in Lebanon. Also handled privately was the status of Major Saad Haddad, the former Lebanese army officer who heads a militia armed by and loyal to the Israelis. The Lebanese government agreed that Haddad will become a deputy commander of the southern territorial brigade of the Lebanese army.

The formal agreement does not go very far in describing the character of future relations between the two countries. But it does call for further negotiations, to begin within six months, on the "movement of goods, products and persons" across the Israeli-Lebanese border. This clause will enable Begin to tell his countrymen that they have stabilized relations with Lebanon as a result of their sacrifices during the invasion and occupation. It is also one of the clauses that most enrage the Syrians because, as Syrian Foreign Minister Abdel Halim Khaddam put it last week, it indicates that Lebanon has become, in their view, "an Israeli protectorate."

The Reagan Administration seemed reluctant to admit that it had a problem on its hands. The President noted at his press conference that the Syrians had previously said they would leave Lebanon and that "a number of their Arab allies are urging them to stick with their word and to leave when all forces are prepared to leave." Earlier Reagan had told reporters at a White House photo session that "the opportunity shouldn't be allowed to slip away. The risks, if the withdrawal fails, are far greater than the risks of completing the withdrawal."

Less than two weeks earlier, the Syrians had promised Secretary of State George Shultz that a high-level American negotiator would always be welcome. But last week the state-run Syrian press agency declared that Syria had "nothing to discuss" with Special Envoy Philip Habib, whom it described as "one of the most hostile American diplomats toward the Arabs and their cause." At the time of the signing, the Syrians expressed their displeasure by closing highways in the Syrian-controlled areas of northern and eastern Lebanon. The Syrians have hinted that they might close the Syrian-Lebanese border indefinitely. The newspaper of the ruling Baath Party spoke of "a crushing civil war that would splinter Lebanon's unity and cancel its existence as a country."

The Lebanese were taking such talk seriously. As an aide to President Gemayel said, "We cannot dismiss the possibility that at some point the Syrians could declare Lebanon's existence null and void [as they] annex the areas of Lebanon that are under their control." What is certain is that the Syrians are already trying to influence Lebanese politics by exerting pressure on a variety of factions within the beleaguered country to oppose the agreement. Last week a meeting of those factions was held in the northern Lebanese town of Zgharta.

In the face of such concerted Syrian opposition, President Gemayel urged Secretary of State Shultz to return to the Middle East immediately for a round of face-to-face talks with Syrian President Assad. But Shultz took the position that some time would have to pass before the Syrians would be prepared to negotiate in earnest. In the meantime, U.S. diplomats emphasized that they did not consider the latest Syrian rebuffs "a final closing of the door." They noted that only two Arab states, Libya and South Yemen, have joined Syria in denouncing the agreement, while Egypt and Algeria have expressed their support. Most Arab leaders, including Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, whom Assad visited two weeks ago, have refrained from taking a position.

For the Israelis, the yearlong war has brought few of the benefits they were expecting. To be sure, the P.L.O. fighting force was driven out of Beirut last August, and the organization has not recovered from its military setback--nor can it in the foreseeable future. A senior P.L.O. official now in Damascus remarked recently, "I miss Beirut. We could breathe there." But last week P.L.O. Chairman Yasser Arafat, sounding more belligerent than at any time since his departure from Beirut last September, told a group of P.L.O. officers in Syria that "effective war is the only available means for redrawing the political map [of the Middle East]." Nor has the war restored Lebanon to the relative stability it once enjoyed. Beirut is again threatened by violence between long-feuding Christian Phalangist militiamen and Druze fighters. Worse, Gemayel's bold decision to go ahead with the Israeli agreement places him on a collision course with a newly rearmed and perhaps overly confident Syria.

Israel scored a modest gain in improving the security of its northern border towns. But the cost was extremely high: the lives of almost 500 Israeli soldiers. Even now, under frequent guerrilla attacks, the Israeli forces are suffering far higher casualties than the civilian losses of northern Israeli communities before the war, and this creates considerable dissatisfaction back home. Says a State Department official: "Begin is learning the difficulty in a democratic society of waging a prolonged war. When the going gets rough, the home pressure is to pull out." While Begin remains politically secure, he is beginning to feel the sting of Israeli disapproval arising from a problem that has so far defied solution.

Israel's relations with the U.S., which hit rock bottom during the ten-week siege of Beirut, have improved, although a sense of strain on both sides remains. One of the most important effects of Shultz's trip earlier this month was to restore relations between the two countries to a sort of equilibrium. Last week President Reagan lifted the embargo he imposed last June on the sale of advanced F-16 jet aircraft to Israel. The U.S. has no intention, however, of reinstating the November 1981 "memorandum of understanding" on strategic cooperation that entitled Israel to broad U.S. collaboration on military matters. That memorandum was canceled by the U.S. after Israel's outright annexation of the Golan Heights in December 1981. When asked whether he thought Israel's recent efforts to revive the strategic relationship would be successful, a State Department official in Washington privately replied last week, "No dice."

After their invasion of Lebanon, the Israelis boasted that by shooting down 86 Soviet-built Syrian jets over the Bekaa Valley they had dealt a severe blow to Soviet prestige in the area. The Soviets, however, have returned to the area with surprising speed. They replaced most of the Syrian equipment destroyed last year, and supplied the Syrian armed forces with sophisticated new weaponry. There are now 4,000 to 6,000 Soviet technicians and advisers on Syrian soil, representing an increase of some 2,000 since the war. Also, for the first time, Moscow has installed its advanced SA-5 surface-to-air missiles outside the Soviet Union. The two batteries of SA-5s, located near the Syrian towns of Dumar and Shimshar and manned by So viet technicians, are in a position to strike aircraft in northern Israel.

Despite the high cost of the war to Israel, the hostilities gave the U.S. a rare diplomatic opportunity to press for a solution to some of the region's longstanding problems. As of last September, the P.L.O. had been defeated, the Syrians had been virtually disarmed and the Soviets discredited in their ability to influence events. The U.S. responded with an admirable plan, the Reagan initiative, but then allowed precious months to slip by as the Israelis dallied, the Soviets rearmed the Syrians, the P.L.O. recovered part of its strength, and Jordan's King Hussein tried to decide whether to risk negotiating with Israel and the U.S. The moment of opportunity passed, and with it the Reagan initiative. In time the Syrians and the P.L.O., backed by the Soviets, managed to scuttle King Hussein's efforts to join in the peace talks, and now seem bent on blocking the "pax Americana" in Lebanon as well. Due to the continued occupation, efforts to reconcile hostile factions within Lebanon have come to naught, and the country's internal stability is by no means assured. Some of the Lebanese militias, taking their cues from foreign mentors, have resumed their traditional quarrels.

All this is happening at a time of uncertainty and instability throughout the Middle East. As the Iran-Iraq war continues, Iraq shows increasing signs of internal stress, even suggesting its possible disintegration. The Muslim fundamentalist movement, the same tumultuous force that caused a revolution in Iran, is showing strength in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia and the gulf. Some Middle East experts are speculating about what could happen if Muslim fundamentalists and radical ideologues in any of half a dozen countries ever manage to form a common front. In Saudi Arabia, whose reduced oil revenues have curtailed its ability to offer financial aid to other Arab governments, there are rumors of serious squabbles between King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah. In Lebanon, the threat of fighting between the Israelis and the Syrians grows greater as the Syrians, emboldened by their Soviet armor, find ways to block the Israeli-Lebanese accord.

So far, nobody has offered much of a plan to meet these challenges or cut these risks. Last week U.S. Envoy Morris Draper paraphrased the late United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskj01d in saying that the U.S. joined with Lebanon and Israel "in looking to the far horizon." As it happens, nobody in the region, in cluding the signatories to last week's agree ment, seems to be able to see more than a dozen steps ahead. -- By William E. Smith.

Reported by David Halevy/ Jerusalem and Roberto Suro/ Beirut

With reporting by David Halevy/Jerusalem, Roberto Suro/Beirut This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.