Mutiny in the Valley

By William E. Smith

As war jitters rise, Israel warns Syria against "a fatal mistake"

Day after day, Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat led motorcades into eastern and northern Lebanon last week for a series of public pep rallies and private meetings with his military commanders. At every whistle-stop along the way he told his Palestinian followers that dissension within P.L.O. ranks was being fomented by Libyan Leader Muammar Gaddafi and "some other Arab regimes." If Gaddafi did not stop his interference, Arafat warned, he would "cut out his tongue." As a result of such troublemaking, said Arafat, the Palestinians must fight harder than ever to maintain their solidarity and must prepare for another war with Israel that could break out as early as this summer.

There were signs that war could come even sooner. Amid the rhetoric from the Soviet-backed government in Damascus, a Syrian jet fired an air-to-air missile at an Israeli reconnaissance plane over the Bekaa Valley, but the Israeli pilot successfully eluded it. Then, when the Syrians announced that they would stage large-scale maneuvers in the Bekaa, Israel placed its armed forces on alert and began a partial mobilization of reserves.

The Reagan Administration is convinced that neither Syria nor Israel wants a war at the moment, but the risks of an accidental outbreak were clearly increasing. Although both sides have exacerbated the tensions, U.S. officials put most of the blame on Syria. In a sharply worded statement, the State Department warned that the Syrian buildup of forces "could only lead to increased tensions in an already volatile area and could threaten the uneasy peace in Lebanon."

Gone for the moment was any thought of an immediate withdrawal of Syrian, Palestinian and Israeli forces from Lebanon, as envisioned by the recently signed Israeli-Lebanese accord. Warned Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir: "We hope Syria won't make a fatal mistake." Later the Syrians said that the purpose of the maneuvers was purely defensive, leading Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens to declare that "if true," the statement was "good news."

Arafat's campaign to reassert his dominance over the P.L.O. was prompted by an unprecedented rebellion within the ranks of his Fatah organization, which has been his main power base ever since he helped found it in 1959. The mutiny, which at its peak in mid-May involved only a few hundred of the 10,000 to 15,000 P.L.O. fighters in Lebanon, apparently never posed a serious threat to Arafat's leadership. But it dramatized the weakened condition of the P.L.O. in the wake of its expulsion from Beirut last year by Israeli forces, particularly the organization's susceptibility to pressure from Syria and several other hard-line Arab countries. Despite a tepid rapprochement between Arafat and Syrian President Hafez Assad, Syria appears to be intent on controlling the P.L.O. and will not hesitate to try to undermine Arafat's authority in the process.

At the heart of the mutiny within the P.L.O. is some dissatisfaction over Arafat's political decisions since last summer, starting with the withdrawal from Beirut. Most recently, many followers questioned his agreement with Jordanian King Hussein that the goal of peace negotiations should be some kind of confederal relationship between Jordan and a Palestinian entity embracing the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such a solution to the Palestinian problem would be a vast improvement over the present plight of the West Bank and Gaza under Israeli occupation but falls short of the Palestinian dream of a fully independent state. The opposition began within the P.L.O. hard-line factions but spread to Fatah, which controls about 80% of the P.L.O.'s fighters. The trouble was centered in the Bekaa Valley, where the influence of the Syrians is strong. Though Arafat denounced only Libya by name last week, his lieutenants freely acknowledged that he was talking about Syria as well. The Libyans reportedly helped finance the dissidents, while the Syrians gave them political advice and perhaps some military assistance.

Among other things, the P.L.O. dissidents accused Arafat of planning a withdrawal of P.L.O. forces from Lebanon, although it is by no means certain that he was prepared to do so. Arafat said last week that he was willing to negotiate with the Lebanese government on "our own Lebanese-Palestinian agreement," leading to a P.L.O. withdrawal. By contrast, Syria has refused to discuss the matter at all. Nonetheless, Arafat seems unlikely at the moment to take any step that conflicts sharply with the views of Assad, who is keeping the P.L.O. forces in his country on a short leash. Syria has, for example, virtually embargoed some 4,000 tons of P.L.O. supplies that arrived from Eastern Europe last summer. As a senior West European ambassador in Damascus puts it, "Arafat is becoming a virtual prisoner of the Syrians. He has no leverage on Assad at all." This fact is said to have influenced a recent P.L.O. decision against making any further increase in its force of fighters in Lebanon.

The central figure in the mutiny is Said Mousa, 54, a veteran Fatah colonel more widely known by his code name, Abu Mousa (literally Father of Moses). In early May, Abu Mousa, who has served as second in command of the P.L.O.'s military headquarters in Beirut and later in Damascus, won support for a protest from some of the men in two battalions of a P.L.O. brigade in Lebanon. When he learned what was happening, Arafat ordered Abu Mousa transferred to Tunisia, where the P.L.O. now maintains its nominal headquarters. Instead, Abu Mousa headed for the Bekaa Valley and launched the mutiny, rounding up about 200 fighters and setting up two camps. Backed by the Abu Nidal faction, a renegade group that has long opposed Arafat's rule, the dissidents announced that they were intent on "correcting the path of the revolution and preventing deviation in the Fatah command."

Arafat responded with a campaign of persuasion, urging the rebels to return peaceably to their ranks. Then when Gaddafi gave a speech denouncing Fatah's "reactionary leaders," Arafat lashed out at him for his mischief making and, more important, was able to portray the mutiny as a result of external interference. Gaddafi has been none too popular with the Palestinian leadership since last summer, when he told Arafat that P.L.O. fighters should commit suicide rather than leave Beirut.

Last week, as he barnstormed the Palestinian military outposts and civilian communities of the Bekaa Valley, Arafat was working hard to strengthen his position as well as to demonstrate his continuing support. On one of these excursions, his eight-vehicle motorcade raced over the rutted, dusty roads of eastern Lebanon at 70 m.p.h., with the chairman riding in a dark-blue, late-model Chevrolet sedan equipped with bulletproof windows. At a stop along the way, as a group of bedraggled soldiers stood around him, Arafat said of the mutiny, "It is over. It is over." Again he blamed Gaddafi for the trouble, declaring that the Libyan leader "thought his money and his petroleum were more precious than the blood of our martyrs." Predicting that P.L.O. forces in Lebanon would be subjected to a terrible bombardment by Israeli artillery and aircraft, he told his men, "You must show the same steadfastness you demonstrated in Beirut, because if you can survive the first assault, you will be victorious." Ordering them to improve their defenses, he added, "You must dig, dig, dig, dig."

According to an Arafat lieutenant, all but about 50 of the mutineers have returned to the Fatah fold. Of these 50, all but Abu Mousa and four other officers who have disobeyed direct orders will still be permitted to return to the ranks, supposedly with no questions asked. Abu Mousa and the four others are not likely to get off so easily.

Whatever the precise intent of the mutineers may have been, it is obvious that they were aiming at Arafat's primary constituency and the source of his authority. The extent of the damage they may have caused him is not yet known. But the fact that he felt obliged to go out and rally support is a sign that he was extremely worried. As a result, the P.L.O. leader will be under increased pressure to avoid any moves toward moderation of the kind that the U.S., Israel and Lebanon would welcome. --By William E. Smith. Reported by Harry Kelly/Jerusalem and Roberto Suro/ Damascus

With reporting by Harry Kelly/Jerusalem, Roberto Suro/Damascus This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.