Helping to Hold the Line

By William E. Smith

Again and again the big 5-in. naval guns roared with the sound of 70-lb. shells being dispatched toward shore. Steaming to within two miles of the Lebanese coast, the U.S. destroyer John Rodgers and the nuclear-powered cruiser Virginia, part of an American flotilla that had grown to more than a dozen vessels with the arrival of the battleship New Jersey late last week, hurled some 600 rounds into the wooded hills above Beirut. For residents of the Lebanese capital, the shells zooming overhead produced a piercing whistle that sounded at first like some strange aircraft preparing for a landing. But moments later, the hills shuddered and burst into flame. Along the ridge that ascends abruptly behind Beirut, columns of smoke rose into the clear autumn sky.

To help the U.S. ships spot their targets, Navy officers ventured into the hills alongside the Lebanese Army. At one point, the situation became so tense that A-6 fighter bombers equipped with 1,000-lb. laser-guided bombs took off from the aircraft carrier Eisenhower and prepared to join the action. At the last minute, when U.S. officers diplomatically suggested to the Lebanese that the naval guns had done the job, the jets were called back. Concerned that the Lebanese Army command had overestimated the danger, some U.S. officers went to the front lines the next day to get first-hand information. At about the same time, a Soviet-made SA-7 missile was fired at a U.S. Navy plane flying over the region but missed its target. Four more U.S. Marines were wounded during the week, and on Saturday a Marine helicopter came under ground fire but was not hit.

For the first time, U.S. military force was being used in direct support of the Lebanese Army rather than in retaliation for attacks on U.S. personnel. The Reagan Administration argued that to protect the 1,200 U.S. Marines headquartered at Beirut International Airport, as well as U.S. diplomats in the capital, American forces had to help the inexperienced but determined Lebanese Army hold on to Suq al Gharb. The mountain village had taken on enormous symbolic importance for the Christian-dominated government of President Amin Gemayel. If the army failed at Suq al Gharb, the Syrian-backed forces might be in a position to replace Gemayel's government with a regime that would be more to Syria's liking. Inevitably, such a regime would be receptive to Soviet influence and hostile to Western interests in the region. Thus the crisis in Lebanon is almost certainly the most daunting foreign policy challenge that the Reagan Administration has yet faced.

The U.S. naval attacks came at a time when the Administration was in the process of reaching an armistice of sorts with Congress over the legality of the U.S. Marines' deployment in Lebanon. Many Senators and Congressmen agreed with the Administration that the Marines must remain in Lebanon for the time being to strengthen the Gemayel government. But some members of Congress, upset about the deaths of four Marines in the past month, questioned the degree of U.S. involvement. In trying to force Reagan to invoke the 1973 War Powers Act, which would have required him to withdraw the U.S. forces within 60 to 90 days unless Congress specifically endorsed their mission, some members also hoped to revive a longstanding tug of war over the control of U.S. foreign policy. At first, the President was reluctant to concede that Congress should in any way curb his options. But under the compromise worked out between the White House and key legislative leaders early last week, Congress appeared ready to pass a resolution giving Reagan authority to keep the Marines in Lebanon for 18 months.

Toward the end of the week, there were signs that the U.S. show of force had helped persuade the various belligerents to negotiate a ceasefire. U.S. Special Envoy Robert McFarlane had been shuttling around the area for three weeks in search of a ceasefire. So had Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan, reflecting his country's heightened interest in reconciling the warring factions. But the most recalcitrant of the principal players was still Syrian President Hafez Assad, who has cleverly and brutally used the current Lebanese crisis as a vehicle for bringing Syria back to the center of Middle East powerbrokering. With his armed forces newly strengthened by an estimated $2 billion worth of Soviet weapons, Assad hoped to bring down Gemayel and press for a new Lebanese government in which Muslims of his choice would be more strongly represented and in which Syria would have more influence. Nonetheless, as the new week began, President Reagan announced that the two sides had agreed to a cease-fire that was to begin this Sunday evening. Said he: "It is a first step and you can see my fingers crossed."

The latest round of fighting started in early September, when the Israeli army abruptly withdrew its forces to the southern banks of the Awali River, some 17 miles south of Beirut. As the Israelis pulled out of the Chouf Mountains, their positions were quickly occupied and fought over by the Druze militiamen and their enemies, the Christian Phalange militiamen. Reinforced with arms and ammunition from Syria, the Druze promptly trounced the Phalangists and appeared to threaten the Lebanese Army's hold on its own capital. The Druze have enjoyed the support of as many as 2,000 Palestinian guerrillas, some from the various Palestinian groups that are opposed to Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat and some from other Palestinian units under Syrian control. Two weeks ago Arafat showed up in the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli, and last week he tried to enhance his weakened position within the PL.O. by announcing that Palestinians had joined the fighting in the mountains as part of their struggle against Israel. In actuality, the Syrian-dominated Palestinian units engaged in the combat were trying to entrench themselves throughout as much of Lebanon as possible, and perhaps hoping then to achieve an emotion-charged return to West Beirut, the city from which the P.L.O. was evicted little more than a year ago.

In the meantime, the once beautiful capital city and its suburbs endured another week of random violence. The fires in the hills were caused by a four-sided artillery duel whose participants included the Druze and Christian militias, the Lebanese Army and the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Even the U.S. ambassador's residence in the suburb of Yarze took several rounds, which set the garden ablaze and forced Ambassador Robert Dillon to seek refuge in the Presidential Palace, a short distance away.

Beginning at dawn on several days last week, Druze and Christian militiamen exchanged artillery fire in villages on both sides of the Beirut-Damascus highway. Ambulances, their sirens wailing, raced up and down the main road as shells whizzed overhead. Small-arms fire echoed in the hills a few hundred yards from the Lebanese Defense Ministry. Much of the time, Christian East Beirut was largely shut down, the streets empty, most shops closed. Shells and rockets fell on the predominantly Muslim southern suburbs as well as on the Christian areas along the coast to the north.

In the villages of the hills and the mountains beyond, Christians and Druze alike were feeling the effects of the fighting. Dwellings were destroyed, people uprooted, and hundreds reported killed, some of them in incidents that amounted to undocumented slaughter. The Christian village of Beit ed Din, site of the long-unused Presidential Summer Palace, is a shambles, its houses burned and its shops looted. It is deserted except for its Druze occupiers, who sit idly in the shade, cradling their weapons. Across a narrow ravine, within easy sniping distance, is the besieged Christian town of Deir al Qamar, scene of a notorious massacre of Christians by Druze in 1860. The Christian militiamen claim there are now 40,000 refugees crammed into the village. In other times, Deir al Qamar would strike a visitor as a wondrous place, with its fountain in a central square and its houses clinging to a steep mountainside. But today it is, as Mayor George Dib Nehme puts it, "like a very small jail with far too many people." He continues: "We have no assurances of food, water or medicine. We are living day by day, and there is no end in sight. Fourteen people have been killed so far in the shelling. There is sniping, but we don't shoot back. We can't. We are hostages."

Indeed they are, as are the people of Ain et Tine and other shell-shocked Christian towns that are not surrounded. But then so are the people of Aley and Ain Zhalta and other Druze towns, all prisoners of collective folk memories in which rights and wrongs are forever remembered. "We are the first people of Lebanon," says a Druze village elder, referring to his sect, which broke away from Islam in the 11th century (see box). "We cannot be ignored. We respect the rights of others, but they must respect our rights too."

Of all the world's fragmented little nations, Lebanon is one of the most perplexing. Once the home of the Phoenicians, it has been overrun at various times by Egyptians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs, European Crusaders and Ottoman Turks. In 1932, when Lebanon was a French mandate, France conducted a national census that showed the Christians with a slight majority. When Lebanon became independent in 1943, followed by the evacuation of French troops three years later, the preponderance of political power was apportioned between Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims on the basis of the 1932 head count, with a minimal share of representation for such minority groups as the Druze and the Shi'ite Muslims. In the late 1950s and 1960s, with Lebanon prospering as a Maronite-dominated haven of stability and mercantilism and as the only real parliamentary democracy in the Arab world, its rulers shrewdly neglected to take a new census. But a higher birth rate among the Muslims and the influx of Palestinian guerrillas in the early 1970s upset the prevailing political balance. The result was the bloody civil war that raged for 18 months in 1975 and 1976 and left Lebanon vulnerable to the growing power and ambition of Syria.

Whatever fragile equilibrium the Lebanese managed to recover during the ensuing years was upset by the Israeli invasion of June 1982. The Israelis openly took sides with the Phalange and welcomed the election of Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Phalangist-dominated Lebanese Forces, as President. When Gemayel was assassinated nine days before his inauguration, his older brother Amin instead took the job following his unanimous election by parliament. With some 38,000 occupation troops in Lebanon, Israel tried to impose a peace treaty on the country. The Lebanese refused, but after U.S. pressure the two countries signed an agreement last May under which the Lebanese would conduct future negotiations with Israel "on the movement of goods, products and persons" across the Israeli-Lebanese border, and the Israelis would withdraw their forces from the country. The Israelis, however, made their pullout contingent on a simultaneous withdrawal of the remaining P.L.O. forces as well as the Syrians, who control most of the Bekaa Valley and much of northern Lebanon. When the Syrians refused to leave, so did the Israelis. Only on Sept. 3, under pressure from politicians and citizens back home, did the Israelis decide to withdraw unilaterally to a more secure line well to the south of Beirut and the Chouf Mountains.

At the time, the security of the Gemayel government was being bolstered by relatively small contingents of American, French, Italian and British peacekeeping forces, all of whom had underestimated the Lebanese capacity for settling old scores. Realizing almost too late the extent of the danger, the Reagan Administration asked the Israelis to postpone their withdrawal. Though the Israelis delayed their move by a few days, Washington concluded that the only hope for stability over the short term lay in shoring up the Gemayel government and the relatively new and untried Lebanese Army.

Thus last week the symbol of this ancient and hopelessly intricate struggle became the hill town of Suq al Gharb. Here the Druze, having already virtually driven the Christian militiamen out of the mountains, hoped also to hold off the army of the Christian-led government. Here the Syrians hoped to weaken the Gemayel government, and here the Palestinians hoped to win a victory and perhaps a chance to return to West Beirut. The government and its army knew that they must make a stand. At midweek Gemayel, who has been slow in his efforts to broaden his political base or even to exert strong personal leadership during the current crisis, suddenly appeared at Suq al Gharb to visit his beleaguered army garrison, even as it came under yet another tank and artillery attack.

For the Reagan Administration Suq al Gharb had become the key position of the "red line," the frontier beyond which the Druze and their allies could not sbe allowed to pass. For several weeks Special Envoy McFarlane had been pressing the Administration to broaden the Marines' role in Lebanon. At the time of the Israeli withdrawal in early September, McFarlane had proposed that Marines be used to take over certain military positions in the Chouf. He also sought permission to move the Marines into the Chouf as part of a cease-fire offer. In a rare display of agreement, Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger prevailed upon Reagan to refuse, fearing for the lives of the Marines and also, perhaps, for the political consequences.

In the past two weeks, however, the Administration realized that the Lebanese Army must somehow be given a stronger hand in order to bolster the Gemayel government. Last week, while sticking to the pretense that its ultimate aim was to protect the lives of U.S. military personnel on the ground, the Administration ordered the naval guns to attack Druze positions around Suq al Gharb. In so doing, the U.S. provided crucial help to the embattled Lebanese Army.

On his way to China last week, Weinberger told reporters that the Lebanese armed forces were doing well and that the Marines were not fighting in their behalf. He continued: "There is one exception, and that is the village of Suq al Gharb, which we are determined should not fall into hostile hands." The reason for this "forward defense," he said, was to protect Marine positions around the airport. Under existing rules, the Marines are not permitted to return fire into a village or occupied area. But that rule has been rescinded, Weinberger added, in the case of Suq al Gharb.

The Administration's ability to take a strong stand in the Lebanese crisis was endangered by the continuing dispute with Congress over the application of the War Powers Act. Under the law, which was passed in 1973 by a Congress weary of the Viet Nam War, a President who sends U.S. troops to places where "imminent involvement in hostilities" is likely must notify Congress within 48 hours. After that, he must receive explicit congressional support for his action; otherwise the mission must be ended within 90 days.

Most members of Congress believe that the law became operative late last month after the fighting broke out and particularly after the first two Marines were killed by shelling. (Another Marine had been killed in Lebanon last year, but not under combat conditions.) Even some of the President's most reliable allies in Congress urged him to find a way to live with the act. But the Administration resisted it, not wanting its powers in the crisis to be curtailed or to set a precedent. Reagan argued that the Marines had been sent to Lebanon for peace keeping, not combat. In addition, officials said, any deadline on the Marines' presence in Lebanon would only encourage the Syrians, the Palestinians and others to hold off their attacks until the Americans had gone home.

The compromise, when it came at last, was a sensible if slightly tardy solution to a serious standoff between the Executive and Legislative branches of Government, an impasse that could well have required intervention by the Supreme Court. The prospect of such a stalemate, at a time when U.S. Marines were under fire in Lebanon, was undoubtedly a factor in leading to an agreement, although a number of lawmakers, including Senate Democratic Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia, remained unhappy about it.

Under the compromise, which appeared to be gaining acceptance last week, Congress would pass a resolution stating that it assumes the War Powers Act is in effect. The President would sign it, while expressing his disagreement with the reference to "hostilities" in Lebanon. This device, the Administration felt, would prevent the present case from becoming a precedent. The draft resolution also specifies that the President may leave the Marines in Lebanon for 18 months, a time limit that could always be extended. The document states that the role of the military mission would be subject to the limitations of the multinational force, but it also says that the mission can engage in "such protective measures" as are necessary to ensure its safety. That escape clause, as Senator Byrd pointed out, is wide enough "to run Amtrak through it."

One advantage of the 18-month deadline was that it would carry the whole controversy past the 1984 presidential elections, and thus would reduce its importance as a campaign issue. In announcing the proposed deal, Reagan declared that he was pleased with the congressional support on a "solid bipartisan basis." Asked who had won the dispute, White House Chief of Staff James Baker, who had headed a four-member Administration team that negotiated with congressional representatives, replied, "The country won. To the extent that there was uncertainty in Damascus and elsewhere as to what this Government would do, the uncertainty is eliminated." In fact, Congress had forced the President to acknowledge the War Powers Act and to accept a time limit on his authority to keep the Marines in Lebanon.

A possible hitch developed Wednesday when the House Appropriations Committee voted to cut off all funding for the Marines in Lebanon unless the President acts affirmatively under the War Powers Act. But the vote was not expected to survive in the full House. Later in the week the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved the carefully wrought compromise.

With the matter all but settled, Reagan assured a group of Republican visitors that the Marines would be brought home from Lebanon "the first minute there is no longer a need for them to be there." That minute is not likely to come any time soon, but as the week ended there were reports from Beirut and Damascus that the sides in the fighting in Lebanon were drawing closer to a ceasefire.

Until then, the signals had been disappointing. Sharing a key role with Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan, U.S. Envoy McFarlane helped to prepare a draft proposal that called for an end to hostilities, to be followed by a conference of all Lebanese factions. At such a meeting, the Druze, the Shi'ite Muslims and other groups would be able to press the Maronite Christians for a greater share of political power. Two weeks ago, the Syrians demanded that as part of the cease-fire agreement, the Lebanese government had to withdraw its army from the Chouf and promise never to use it in future domestic conflicts. Last week the Syrians insisted that the Lebanese government delegation to the subsequent conference include neither the Prime Minister nor the Speaker of parliament, both of whom, under the 1943 agreement, are Muslims. Behind the demand is Syria's conviction that the present Beirut government is so dominated by right-wing Christians with Israeli connections that no Muslim member could be considered genuinely representative. Gemayel rejected the demands as unacceptable.

Back and forth went Special Envoy McFarlane, and back and forth to Saudi Arabia went Prince Bandar. On Bandar's only visit to Beirut, the people of the city, who were desperately eager for the fighting to end, were greatly encouraged. When he left, they again became despondent. Assad remained obdurate, and according to some diplomats, Gemayel too seemed less than eager to end hostilities. Each leader apparently thought he could still strengthen his bargaining position by making military gains on the ground.

During those periods last week when a cease-fire appeared to be at hand, some observers speculated that U.S. naval support of the Lebanese Army at Suq al Gharb might have convinced Assad that a simple military victory by his allies was not in the offing, and thus it would be more advantageous for Syria to accept a ceasefire. Others speculated that Gemayel had for a time been so impressed with the ability of his army that he thought it was now strong enough to push back the Druze, Syrian and Palestinian forces in the Chouf. According to this theory, cooler heads persuaded him to quit while he was ahead, or at least even.

Another factor was that with Prince Bandar playing an important role in the negotiations, the Syrians would not want to be responsible for an embarrassing Saudi failure. Saudi Arabia, after all, still bankrolls Syria to the tune of almost $ 1 billion a year. More compelling for the Syrians may be the renewed interest that Israel has begun to show in the area it evacuated less than a month ago. Last week the Israeli army stepped up its patrols to the north of the Awali River and sent low-flying reconnaissance planes over central Lebanon. Said a U.S. diplomat: "They have begun to realize that the righting in the Chouf is an avenue for Palestinian infiltration." At the same time, some Israeli military commanders have recently expressed concern that if the U.S. is now hopelessly involved in the Lebanese morass, Israel is to a large extent at fault. As a result, the Israelis may be prepared to help the U.S. in its efforts to help prop up the Gemayel government. Last week the Israeli government warned Lebanese Druze leaders that it would not stand idly by if the Druze or their comrades were to attack Deir al Qamar, the Chouf village where thousands of Christians have taken refuge.

Late last week, the announcement of a cease-fire was expected momentarily. The Lebanese Cabinet discussed a draft agreement Friday, and sent Lebanese Businessman Rafiq Hariri to Damascus with some minor changes. There was speculation that Gemayel would announce the agreement in a Friday-evening address marking the end of his first year in office.

Although the final details were not settled, the cease-fire was to be enforced by a special security committee composed of members of the Lebanese Army, the Christian militias, the Shi'ite militia Amal, and the National Salvation Front, a new Syrian-backed opposition group headed by Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt, former Prime Minister Rashid Kararrti and former President Suleiman Franjieh. The committee would be assisted by foreign observers, from either France or Italy, as Gemayel prefers, or perhaps from Saudi Arabia or Yugoslavia, as some of the opposition groups advocate. After that, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd would issue an invitation to Gemayel and other Lebanese leaders to come to Saudi Arabia for a conference on national reconciliation. Among the topics that would be on the agenda: power sharing within Lebanon, a new balance in the government, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and perhaps even the Lebanese-Israeli agreement, which the Gemayel government helped negotiate but has never put into effect.

But then, just as all sides appeared ready to accept the agreement, Syria's Assad was reported to have imposed new conditions. He asked that the decisions of the proposed national reconciliation conference be binding upon the Lebanese government. In addition, Assad was said to be insisting that the conference take the position that the Israeli-Lebanese withdrawal accord be abandoned. And yet, just as Lebanon appeared headed for still another round of heavy fighting, McFarlane met with Gemayel this Sunday to tell him that the two sides had agreed, after all, to a ceasefire. Reagan later called Gemayel to congratulate him on the news.

Whatever happens next, the U.S. has little choice but to stay put in Lebanon for a while. To do otherwise would be to jeopardize the Gemayel government, alienate other moderate Arab regimes, radically reduce Washington's influence and prestige throughout the Middle East, and transform that region into an unchallenged target of opportunity for the Soviet Union. So the U.S. strategy will be to maintain the military commitment, probably at roughly the present level, until such time as a central Lebanese government is able to stand on its own.

The U.S. naval action last week was harshly attacked in the Soviet Union, where TV news programs showed clips of U.S. warships firing cannons, quickly followed by scenes of an anguished Arab mother clutching a dead or dying child. The TASS news agency said Moscow "resolutely condemned" the U.S. military moves. Reaction from U.S. allies, including those that have sent peace-keeping forces to Lebanon, has been mixed but generally supportive. In London, a Foreign Office spokesman said that each contingent in the multinational force must "take its own decisions about self-defense." In Italy's coalition government, Socialist Prime Minister Bettino Craxi showed concern about the U.S. intervention at Suq al Gharb, while Christian Democratic Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and Republican Defense Minister Giovanni Spadolini supported it. In Paris, Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson criticized the U.S. naval action, saying it was "not the best method" of solving the crisis. Added Cheysson: "If the Americans want to take the place of the Israelis, that is their responsibility, not ours." Three days later, however, after a barrage of rockets fell on French and Italian troops in Beirut, eight French Super Etendard fighters attacked Druze and Syrian gun positions in the mountains. It was the first time the French had joined the combat, and the first time fighter planes of any multinational-force nation had carried out raids.

The Lebanese understand the limitations of the U.S.'s ability to influence events in their country. Said Foreign Minister Eli Salem last week: "The Americans are defending us politically, but the U.S. will not use force to extend Lebanese sovereignty throughout the country. We have not asked for this, and they have not offered it." After all, he added, "there is no military solution to Lebanon's problems."

Whether there is a political solution is an open question. If there is, it would certainly have been easier to achieve last year after the evacuation from Beirut of at least 6,000 P.L.O. commandos. Now as many as 2,000 of them are back in the areas to the east and north of Beirut, and Arafat seemed almost unchanged last week (save for the disappearance, perhaps only temporarily, of his famous beard) when he addressed a Palestinian crowd outside the northern Lebanese port city of Tripoli. Scarcely three months ago, he had been expelled from Syria, which backed his opponents in a P.L.O. factional dispute. Now, as he spoke in an area of Lebanon controlled by the Syrians, he acknowledged that there had been "some differences" between himself and Assad, and added that "we are trying to limit these differences and close the gap."

Another lesson to be derived from the impasse in Lebanon is that the refusal Israel, particularly under Prime Minister Menachem Begin, to compromise on the Palestinian issue has created a chronic and festering crisis in the region, with implications well beyond Israel. If, as many fear, the Israeli takeover of the West Bank is now permanent and irreversible, so may be the broader crisis.

Says Harold H. Saunders, former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: "The U.S. has been operating from the premise that Israel should withdraw from the territory it occupied [in the 1967 war] in exchange for peace and security. Yet Israel is operating from the premise that it will take all the land of the West Bank of the Jordan River. If Israel forecloses a compromise peace in the Middle East, then it guarantees another generation of conflict. Sooner or later we have to ask whether the U.S. is unfailingly committed to protecting Israeli conquest of the West Bank, the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem." It would be a mistake, Saunders believes, to let Yitzhak Shamir, who is likely to replace Begin as Prime Minister, think he can write his own ticket with the U.S., as Begin did. Adds Saunders: "That would mean letting things drift, and when things drift in the Middle East, they get worse."

For the U.S., one of the biggest diplomatic challenges in the region is to launch a dialogue with Syria. Since McFarlane became special envoy last July, there seems to have been as much discussion between Washington and Damascus as during Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy of a decade ago. The Syrians feel they have long been neglected by the U.S., especially concerning their loss of the Golan Heights, which Israel seized from Syria during the 1967 war and has now virtually annexed.

Late last week, as Beirut newspapers published headline stories about an imminent ceasefire, officials in the Lebanese Defense Ministry speculated about how many battalions they could push through training programs before the fighting started again. It was a logical thought for anyone with a knowledge of Lebanese history, since cease-fires are as much a fixture of the national life as the fighting. The Lebanese knew, far better than anyone else, that when the armies grew tired and the circumstances seemed propitious, there would be a cease-fire in Beirut and in the highlands overlooking the Mediterranean. But they also knew that it would be only a ceasefire, and not a peace. -- By William E. Smith. Reported Johanna McGeary/ Washington, William Stewart and Roberto Suro/ Beirut

With reporting by Johanna McGeary, William Stewart, Roberto Suro This file is automatically generated by a robot program, so viewer discretion is required.