The Amal Arises

Last week when Muslim guerrillas of the Shi'ite Amal militia led the attack on Lebanese Army units controlling West Beirut, it signaled the emergence of yet another faction from the wings onto center stage. With that stunning victory, the once obscure Amal, under Leader Nabih Berri, was suddenly poised to play a decisive role in Lebanon's future.

The Amal's newly won prominence is long overdue. In 1932 the last official census established the Christians as Lebanon's largest group and justified an agreement guaranteeing them a dominant role in the government. By most estimates, however, the Shi'ites now outnumber all other factions, constituting roughly 40% of Lebanon's population of 3.5 million to 4 million. Until recently the Shi'ites have remained a silent underclass. Made up of impoverished farmers from the south and also of Beirut's urban poor, the Shi'ites long adhered to conservative Islamic teachings that called for political obedience to the ruling government, regardless of its injustices.

That began to change in the 1975 civil war. As other power-hungry factions oiled their guns, the Lebanese Shi'ite leader Imam Moussa Sadr formed the Amal (meaning hope in Arabic), originally intending it to be a political organization exerting pressure to better the lot of Shi'ites living in poverty in Beirut's southern suburbs. But in a country constantly at war, it quickly became clear that social and political change would be achieved only through military force. The Amal developed a military wing, fortifying the Shi'ite neighborhoods with sandbags and training youths in street fighting and in the use of Kalashnikovs.

Initially weak, the Amal at first kept a low profile. When P.L.O. forces in West Beirut came under attack from the Israelis in the summer of 1982, however, the Amal supported the Palestinians. That loyalty was rewarded when the P.L.O. finally evacuated the city and the Amal obtained substantial quantities of P.L.O. arms. Thus strengthened, the Amal set up what was effectively a Shi'ite state within a state in the southern suburbs.

Despite its increasing military muscle, the Amal has steered a relatively moderate course, rejecting the fanatical Islam associated with the Shi'ites of Iran's Ayatullah Khomeini. When Moussa Sadr mysteriously disappeared after a falling-out with Muammar Gaddafi during a visit to Libya in 1978, he was soon succeeded by the forceful Berri, a lawyer by training, who quickly won a reputation for keeping his own counsel. Like other Muslim leaders, Berri has fiercely opposed the Christian Phalangists. But although the Amal gets much of its financial and military support from the Syrians, Berri has refused to align himself completely with Damascus, arguing that the Amal's interests are best served by remaining independent.

That moderation, however, is increasingly endangered by a wave of religious fundamentalism washing through the Shi'ite community. In June of 1982, an aide to Berri, Hussein Musawi, broke away to form a radical splinter group, the Islamic Amal. Musawi has since forged close links with Islamic Jihad, the Muslim extremist group that claimed responsibility for the attacks on the U.S. and French compounds last October, and the murder of Beirut's American University President Malcolm Kerr last month. Within the mainstream Amal, young Shi'ites have attacked occupying Israeli troops in southern Lebanon with the encouragement of pro-Khomeini Shi'ite clerics, despite pleas from the Amal's leaders for passive resistance. During last week's fighting, zealous young Amal militiamen launched puritanical bottle-smashing attacks on bars in Beirut. Admits Ghassam Seblani, one of Berri's top aides: "There are people who will act independently in a situation like this. We will impose our own discipline on our members. They must behave properly."

Schismatic problems within the Amal may be compounded by growing tensions between Berri and his Druze allies, led by Walid Jumblatt. After joining forces to rout the Lebanese troops from West Beirut, the two factions may soon find themselves jousting for supremacy in a new political order. Now that the Amal has joined the ranks of the principal players in Lebanon, it is discovering the frustrations that come with power.