The Watchword Is Wariness

By Kurt Anderson

Weinberger outlines six criteria for sending troops into combat

Everyone agrees that the long, dreadful U.S. experience in Southeast Asia implies certain important truths about what the nation should and should not attempt overseas. But exactly what are those lessons? In military terms. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger declared in an address last week, the conclusions are simple: pick wars carefully, make sure the public will cooperate, and then fight to win. Weinberger's rules are nothing new. Thoughtful U.S. military officers have been recommending the same deliberate course for some time. But Weinberger, rather surprisingly, has codified that consensus into an explicit checklist of the prerequisites for military action, a kind of national how-to guide.

On many issues, Weinberger is regarded as the leading hard-liner in the Reagan Administration. He has been skeptical even about pursuing nuclear arms-control negotiations with the Soviets. Yet last week's speech, which he wrote himself and delivered to the National Press Club, was prudent. And the precision of his manifesto was welcome from an Administration that has seemed disconcertingly vague about its foreign policy goals. Weinberger cleared the speech in advance with the White House and got approval from the National Security Council. A few hours before he delivered it, he gave a copy to Secretary of State George Shultz. The two men have been on opposite sides of national security issues, although there is no consistent ideological pattern to their differences.

On the doctrine of using conventional military force, the Defense Secretary now seems to have staked out the more temperate position. "Employing our forces almost indiscriminately and as a regular part of our diplomatic efforts," Weinberger declared, "would surely plunge us headlong into the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Viet Nam War . . . The President will not allow our military forces to creep--or be drawn gradually--into a combat role in Central America or any other place in the world . . . Clearly, there are . . . situations where U.S. combat forces should not be used, [and] I have developed six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad." Intending to "sound a note of caution," Weinberger argued that:

> Combat forces should not be committed "unless the particular engagement. . . is deemed vital to our national interest."

> If combat troops are to be dispatched, "we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning." By contrast, from the outset in Viet Nam, U.S. military strategy was strictly defensive.

> "We should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives." Weinberger criticized the Marines' untenable Beirut mission: "We must . . . not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peace keeping."

> Leaders must constantly reassess their strategic goals, and adjust tactics to suit that overall military strategy--or cut and run if necessary.

> "There must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people and . . . Congress."

> Military action must be "a last resort."

Weinberger's most controversial assertion, though, concerned the War Powers Act, which prevents a President from committing combat troops abroad for more than 60 days without specific congressional authorization. "Decision-making authority in the Executive Branch has been compromised by the Legislative Branch to an extent that actively interferes," Weinberger declared, a position that Reagan and Secretary Shultz share. In essence, the eleven-year-old act limits the President's freedom to wage undeclared wars. For Congress that constraint is one of the lessons of Viet Nam. But critics point out that the time limit of the act might also cede an important advantage to military enemies: if it seems possible that Congress will not authorize combat past the first 60 days, the enemy has a built-in incentive to sit tight and wait for time to run out.

--By Kurt Andersen