Nicaragua a Struggle on Two Fronts

By George Russell.

From the capitals of Western Europe to Central America's jungles, Nicaragua's Sandinista government was on the move last week. Its main objective: to outflank the Reagan Administration and its allies by force of diplomacy and of arms. On the diplomatic front, the Sandinistas were trying -- less than successfully, as it turned out -- to open a rift between the U.S. and Western Europe over the trade embargo that Washington imposed on Nicaragua earlier this month. At the same time, Nicaraguan troops were foraying along the frontier with Honduras in a continuing effort to contain anti-Sandinista contra rebels ensconced in that border region. Closer to home, yet another challenge was looming for the Sandinistas: slowly deepening resentment among many Nicaraguans against their revolutionary leadership.

Above all, the Nicaraguan government was intent on creating an image of firmness. On a blitz of Western Europe that was hastily added to a 13-day pilgrimage to East European capitals, President Daniel Ortega Saavedra repeatedly asserted that Nicaragua was not about to bend under the U.S. embargo. In Spain, France, Italy, Finland and Sweden, he pitched strongly to his hosts for help in filling the sizable trade vacuum ($168 million in 1984) left by U.S. sanctions.

Beginning his West European swing on a combative note, Ortega emerged from a meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez to describe President Reagan as "a fascist, like Hitler, who wants to turn Nicaragua into a giant concentration camp." Gonzalez was visibly uncomfortable. While cautioning that the U.S. trade embargo could force Nicaragua "to seek aid and support from the other side," meaning the Soviet Union, Gonzalez made no promises about increasing Spanish-Nicaraguan trade.

Ortega received cordial but noncommittal welcomes at subsequent stops. In Paris he met with President Francois Mitterrand, after which Spokesman Michel Vauzelle said that France "can develop its commercial exchanges" with Nicaragua. But other officials suggested that France, which already runs a $7 million trade deficit with Nicaragua, was not anxious to increase it. In Rome, Italian Prime Minister Benedetto ("Bettino") Craxi agreed to maintain Italy's current $70 million combination of aid and trade with Managua.

If Ortega's transatlantic tour was useful to Nicaragua largely as a public relations exercise, the struggle on the country's northern border had more concrete significance. The contras, short of supplies after the denial of U.S. covert aid last October, have gradually withdrawn most of their forces to Honduran base camps to await help from a network of private sources (see box). Beginning early this month, Nicaraguan infantry backed by artillery began zeroing in on the main contra camp, known as Las Vegas. Finally an estimated 1,200 Nicaraguan troops launched an unprecedented cross-border assault reaching up to four miles into Honduras. Last week smaller Sandinista units continued their cross-border raids, while Honduras deployed its own troops and declared part of the area a "military emergency zone." The Honduran move also provided protective cover for the contras, who claim that 12,000 of their troops have already returned to Nicaragua. Contra aircraft have begun flying secretly out of the Honduran air base of Aguacate into Nicaragua to air-drop supplies for returning rebels.

The Nicaraguan government evidently feels that its military presence close to the Honduran frontier will be enough to contain the contras. But the Sandinistas do not seem to have a strategy for the domestic disenchantment that has begun to seep even into their own ranks. In Managua's Barrio Riguero slum, a stronghold of militance during the 1979 insurrection against former Dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a Sandinista activist named Maria says she remains faithful to the revolution's principles, but "life is getting harder." The main problem: "Basic necessities cost more and more, and some items are almost impossible to find."

One reason for the shortages is the disruption caused by the three-year contra war. Another lies in government economic policies. The Sandinistas claim that 60% of the Nicaraguan economy is in private hands. That assertion, says Ramiro Gurdian, vice president of the Superior Council of Private Enterprise, is "fake. The private sector owns the means of production, but the government tells you what to do. What decision is left?"

More serious than the shortages may be the flaunting of privilege by Nicaragua's political bureaucracy. Officials drive trim, Soviet-built Lada sedans while private autos frequently lack doors or windshields because spares are not available. In a Managua supermarket, many of its shelves gapingly empty, a shopper complains that he has been unable to find powdered milk for 15 days. As he talks, a woman waits at a check-out counter with, among other things, a can of powdered milk. Says a third customer: "You see, she has connections. With the right connections you don't lack anything."

For some of those without connections, the Sandinista explanation that the U.S. is the cause of everything that goes wrong in Nicaragua is losing credibility. One possible sign of eroding popular support is that the "defense committee" system responsible for neighborhood surveillance and security is breaking down. A Western diplomat estimates that 50% to 60% of the population are what he calls "passively" anti-Sandinista, even if they have not yet drawn political conclusions from the economic squeeze. Says he: "If these people were Poles or U.S. citizens, they would be rioting in the streets. It may be they see no credible alternative at the moment."

Certainly no such alternative is on display in the National Assembly, which was elected last November. The Sandinistas hold 61 of 96 seats, reflecting their 66% election majority. The remainder are divided among six small parties that are described as opposition but that often vote with the Sandinistas. The main opposition group outside the legislature, the Coordinadora Democratica Nicaraguense, refused to participate in the election and remains leaderless and in disarray. In any case, the work of the Assembly is largely peripheral. Under a constitutional state of emergency declared in 1982 in response to the contra threats, almost all important decisions are enacted by presidential decree.

Yet even the government's harshest critics admit it has preserved a measure of pluralism and political freedom. According to some dissidents, that attitude is pragmatic: it encourages Western nations to provide assistance. Opposition leaders say privately the threat of the contras has also had a moderating effect. For his part, Vice President Sergio Ramirez Mercado insists, "There's not a step we could take that would be acceptable to Reagan, except to leave the country." He adds, "We have never thought of establishing a one-party system of Marxism. We don't want a Soviet or Bulgarian model." Among a growing number of Nicaraguans, that distinction may be irrelevant. It is the Sandinista model that they find increasingly hard to accept.

With reporting by Ricardo Chavira and Janice C. Simpson/Managua