Middle East Enter the Soviet Union

By Jill Smolowe

The timing was astute. While Washington chose to go slow on Middle East diplomacy, Moscow accelerated its activity. Last week Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was on a ten-day sally through five countries, leaving deep tracks everywhere he touched down.

At his first stop, in Syria, Shevardnadze unveiled a three-step proposal to convene an international Middle East peace conference under the auspices of the United Nations. He took the plan to Jordan and Egypt for an approving welcome. And before proceeding on to Iran and Iraq, Shevardnadze spent four days in Cairo for a bit of showmanship that could not help grabbing headlines: back-to-back meetings with Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Arens and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat.

What fresh ideas was the new thinking Soviet Foreign Minister promoting? Not many. Shevardnadze's peace proposal was largely procedural, reiterating an idea that has been floating around the region for several years and is widely endorsed by most of the relevant parties, except Israel. But as a public relations ploy, the trip was effective. Shevardnadze amply demonstrated Moscow's intention to break Washington's monopoly as the peace broker in the Middle East. With his shrewd charm and flair for appearing to generate goodwill, Shevardnadze sent a new breeze through the Middle East -- a breeze that George Bush promised would come from the U.S. Indeed, while the Soviets were launching their most important Middle East diplomatic initiative in more than a decade, the Bush Administration was bogged down in a review of 28 foreign policy areas, including the Middle East.

The contrast between Moscow's splash and Washington's plodding was reinforced by the rhetoric on both sides. While Shevardnadze warned that the Middle East "could be climbing the unpredictable ladder of nuclear escalation," Secretary of State James Baker asserted in a television interview, "I don't think it's ((an area)) that if it incubates further, it blows up." Somewhat testily, Bush also applied the brakes: "I don't want to be stampeded by the fact that the Soviet Foreign Minister takes a trip to the Middle East." Though he praised Shevardnadze's trip as a "good thing," the President reiterated that the Soviet role in the region "should be limited." Shevardnadze had a canny response: "This is very sad because it injects an element of rivalry that is unnecessary." Then, with a smile, he added, "This is my first critical remark about the President of the United States."

The most dramatic moments of Shevardnadze's trip were saved for his 2 1/2- hour meeting with Arens. Building on a flirtation that began several years ago, the two Foreign Ministers made history by holding their meeting on Arab soil. They pledged to continue their bilateral courtship at a high diplomatic level, though they accomplished nothing concrete that would further the peace process. On specifics, they had little in common. Shevardnadze pressed Arens to drop Israel's opposition to an international peace conference and talk to the P.L.O. Arens replied by urging Shevardnadze to sign on to Jerusalem's preference for direct talks with the other Arabs, sponsored by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Later, Shevardnadze warned that Moscow would not resume diplomatic ties with Israel until Jerusalem accepted an international forum. Arens said restoring relations was not a precondition, but Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir insisted that normalization still must precede a larger Soviet role in Middle East diplomacy.

Nonetheless, the diplomatic flurry had other modest symbolic achievements: Arens met with President Hosni Mubarak, marking the first time since 1982 that an Egyptian leader has been willing to talk with a member of Israel's right- wing Likud bloc. That very act seemed to signal some thaw in the "cold peace" that prevails between the two countries. Shevardnadze's revival of the international-conference proposal skillfully shored up the Arab moderates who have long advocated it, and his presence in Cairo, the first visit by a Soviet Foreign Minister since 1975, invigorated long-dormant Soviet influence in Egypt.

Ultimately, Moscow was probably the big winner from the trip. If Shevardnadze's journey actually did little to nudge the mired peace process, it helped the Soviets gain a larger role in the region. Even the Israelis seemed to accept their presence, despite long-standing fears that a higher Soviet profile could bring unwanted pressures to bear. Said Galia Golan, a professor at Hebrew University: "Israel is treating the Soviet Union as virtually a factor equal to the United States."

More important, the Soviet initiative reinforced an emerging consensus in the Middle East that the conflict can no longer be ignored. "The postponements have ended," said a Cairo-based diplomat. "Now, either there will be progress toward peace or there will be a moment of truth that the gaps between the parties cannot be bridged."

Nothing in last week's diplomacy suggested a way out of the substantive stalemate: how to bring both Israel and the Palestinians to the bargaining table. No one believes Moscow can single-handedly make peace. Any hope of overcoming that logjam still requires American influence. "The Arabs and the Soviets know that until the United States joins the game, there is no game," says a U.S. Administration official. Then perhaps Moscow's aggressiveness will spur the idling Bush Administration.

With reporting by Dean Fischer/Cairo and Robert Slater/Jerusalem