Keep The Powder Dry General

By MICHAEL KRAMER, John Galvin

Q. Is the West witnessing a true perestroika, or restructuring of the Soviet system, with a diminished desire for expansion, or merely a peredyshka, a breathing space, during which Moscow wants to rebuild its economic might without any real change in its long-term geopolitical objectives?

A. I agree the words are sweet, but there are a number of significant anomalies. There is a lot of dissonance between what they say, which seems to have captured everyone's imagination in the belief that the cold war is over, and what is actually being done. For example, Mikhail Gorbachev talks about withdrawing 10,000 tanks, but Soviet tank production is very high. They're now producing about 3,000 tanks a year -- far better tanks, by the way, than anything they are talking about removing. Consider what just this one indicator means. They say, and I agree after having studied it, that it will take them about two years to pull back the 10,000 tanks in an orderly fashion. By then they will have added at least 6,000 newer ones. It is certainly strange that their tank production is so high when they already have such a superiority relative to the allies. Recall too that this increase in tank production is occurring when Gorbachev says he's cutting military expenditures in order to deal with domestic needs. Taken alone, this evidence could compel you to throw up your hands, say Gorbachev isn't serious and walk away. But it is possible that Gorbachev has simply changed so many variables already, like retiring the old marshals and permitting civilian think tanks to comment on military strategy, that production is an area he simply hasn't got around to yet.

On the other hand, maybe he wants to delay dealing with armaments production till he feels more confident about his control over the military. The Soviet sale of bombers to Libya is another action that makes no sense when compared to Gorbachev's rhetoric. The fact that one has to weigh and wonder about all this means that we have to keep our powder dry and not rush into big reductions when the jury is still out.

Meanwhile, the problem of Western euphoria over Gorbachev is complicated by Moscow's having been particularly clever in its understanding of the public relations value of unilateral announcements -- something the West has yet to learn. When the Soviets make unilateral announcements, Moscow reaps a tremendous p.r. benefit, and I'm left with the reality -- continued huge Soviet military capabilities. It's difficult to get the public to realize that unilateral pronouncements uncodified by treaty are easy to turn around, as are intentions generally. I'm routinely criticized for a supposedly overly simplistic insistence on assessing capabilities rather than intentions. Well, we hope Gorbachev means what he says, but if he changes his mind and we have reduced our own military strength on the basis of a rhetoric of intentions when his capabilities haven't really changed much at all, then we could be in big trouble fast.

Q. But Gorbachev has now offered to reduce the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces essentially to parity with NATO's. Isn't that what we've always wanted?

A. It depends on the fine print and on what becomes of our nuclear capability in the process. A parity of conventional forces has never meant peace in Europe.

And even if an agreement on conventional parity does come off, we need to know the nature of the forces that would be left. The tank-production anomaly, for instance, indicates that we'd face a leaner but meaner Warsaw Pact force when all is said and done.

Q. Assume that a parity satisfactory to you is finally achieved. At that point, would you be willing to denuclearize Europe, as the Soviets and many Europeans want?

A. No. I don't want to see us ever do away with our nuclear capability in Europe. My No. 1 mission is to deter war, not simply win one. For 500 years, every European generation has had to learn anew about war. Now, for four decades we haven't had one here. I don't think it's a coincidence that this period has coincided with the nuclear age.

The logic for nuclear weapons in Europe has always been twofold. First, they have compensated for the conventional-force imbalance between the alliance and the Soviet bloc. Second, and more important, they are a deterrent. They raise the level of uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor. He has to consider that the cost of war may be too high. It's the element of unpredictability of what might happen in a nuclear exchange that keeps war from happening. So regardless of whether we can ever get conventional-force parity, I believe nuclear weapons have an indispensable peacekeeping value irrespective of the conventional balance.

Q. The West Germans say they believe in the value of a nuclear deterrent, but they want to negotiate with the Soviets on the short-range nuclear force (SNF) right away. What's wrong with that?

A. The problem is that the result of a negotiation might be different. We could be railroaded into something we don't want to do, which is to wipe out all nuclear weapons in Europe, the so-called third zero.

While it's true that the Soviets have more short-range nuclear weapons -- and that they've modernized their short-range missiles while we are still relying on our old Lance, we nevertheless have a sufficient capability to create that crucial uncertainty in their mind regarding a war's outcome. I don't want to risk a run to zero by opening up a negotiation in the current climate.

Q. Some who are sensitive to the internal German political situation, like Senator Sam Nunn, are urging that the West indulge the Germans' desire for immediate SNF talks, but would mandate that whatever nuclear agreement is reached not be implemented until the conventional-force agreement is carried out. Isn't that an acceptable compromise?

A. I admit it sounds fine. But, again, there is so much uncertainty about everything now that I wouldn't want to risk that kind of tied-together negotiation's running away from us to a third zero.

Q. If European opinion demands no ground-based nukes at all on European soil, NATO would still have substantial air and sea nuclear capability. Wouldn't they be sufficient?

A. Theater nuclear forces were put in Europe in the first place because Europeans didn't find it credible that the U.S. would come to their defense < with nuclear strikes if only Europe were in danger of being overrun in a conventional war. Putting the nuclear capability to sea would not only be returning toward the discredited massive-retaliation doctrine, it would also mean that most if not all of the capability would be in the hands of the U.S. and Britain, which would probably cause the continental nations to again wonder if their allies would use these weapons if it became necessary. Also, the Soviets have a superior air-defense capability, and the alliance has relatively few airfields. It is therefore possible that in the Soviet military's mind, the Warsaw Pact could suppress a nuclear strike from NATO aircraft and thus lower the cost factor sufficiently so that they might conclude they could win a war in Europe that would be worth winning. That's why having nuclear missiles in Europe is essential to the overall mix.

Q. NATO only has 88 Lance short-range nuclear-capable missile launchers. The U.S. and Britain want to modernize them. Germany and most of the other NATO nations are against modernization. Since the Lances are mainly on German soil, why shouldn't their view prevail?

A. The Lance will be dead by 1995 unless is it is modernized. There is such a thing as electronic rust. That means that by '95 you could fire a Lance without enough assurance that it wouldn't be a dud. Increasing the range should be appealing to everyone, including the Germans. That means we could move the missiles back from the front lines. Increasing the Lance's range would give us more territory in which to hide them, thus making the deterrent safer, and it would give us greater flexibility about actually using them. The farther back, the more likely the missiles will survive until you need them. But we have to be careful not to push the Germans. At this point, we have the luxury of being in the research stage and of not having to push anyone on the deployment question at a time when their circuits are overloaded. My view is that we shouldn't force answers to questions before we have to ask them.

Q. But what happens to the NATO strategies of forward defense and flexible response if there is no Lance at all?

A. Forward defense is the strategy the alliance wants. It is a militarily feasible strategy, but, of course, it is not the classic defensive strategy. The classic defense is one that is mobile, trading space for time. We don't have the space to pull back, so we rely on nuclear weapons. But in a Lance- - less world, we might have to relook the strategy. The risks would increase greatly simply because we would have lessened the nuclear capability available for deterrence purposes. I for one would not like to operate at that level of risk, and I don't think the alliance would find it very satisfactory over the long run.

Q. What if the European environment changes so radically that there are no longer any nuclear weapons on the Continent at all? Defense Secretary Dick Cheney said it would be almost impossible to keep 326,000 U.S. forces in a denuclearized Europe. As the saying goes, "No nukes, no troops." Do you agree with Cheney?

A. First of all, it was the U.S. Secretary of Defense who said that -- and I might add that his predecessor said the same thing -- and it seems to me that people have got to take that into serious consideration.