Reading The Fine Print

By BRUCE VAN VOORST

After months of coolness and caution, the U.S. and the Soviet Union suddenly seem consumed by arms-control fever. First, Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze ended their tete-a-tete in the Tetons by announcing plans for a spring summit. A few days later, George Bush and Shevardnadze were at the United Nations competing to see who could get rid of chemical weapons faster.

But the most startling symptom of dovishness came from the Pentagon, in the just-released 1989 edition of Soviet Military Power. In the past, the Defense Department has used its annual threat assessment to present the latest scary examples of Soviet high-tech weaponry. This year's version features a cover photo of Soviet soldiers in retreat from Afghanistan under the headline "Prospects for Change." The report concludes, "Today the likelihood of conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is perhaps as low as it has been at any time in the postwar era." Admiral William Crowe, who retired last week as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agrees. "Every parameter of the strategic environment," says he, "is in transition."

Behind the surprising statements and sweeping proposals, however, a certain gamesmanship was at work on both sides:

CHEMICAL WEAPONS. Bush offered to destroy 80% of the 30,000-ton U.S. arsenal in eight years if the Soviets reduce their 50,000-ton stockpile to the same level. Shevardnadze upped the ante by proposing that the superpowers unilaterally wipe out their stocks and cease all chemical-weapons production.

But Congress has already ordered the President to destroy by 1997 even more of the American stockpile than he proposed. Moreover, by making the complete elimination of chemical weapons contingent on the assent of 20 nations deemed capable of producing them, Bush gave veto power to mavericks like Iraq and Libya. Until such an agreement is reached, the U.S. insists on modernizing its supply with new binary nerve-gas weapons -- a position that the Soviets have termed unacceptable.

STRATEGIC WEAPONS. Shevardnadze made what appeared to be an important concession by dropping the Soviet demand that reductions in ballistic missiles be linked to limits on U.S. testing of the antimissile Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets also proposed separate discussions on submarine- launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCMs), despite their earlier insistence that the talks be part of the strategic-arms discussions.

Shevardnadze's new flexibility on Star Wars was in part offset by his warning that the Kremlin would abrogate a future START treaty if the U.S. goes too far with SDI testing. And the Senate would certainly want to review any deal on Star Wars as part of a START ratification process. "The Soviets made a constructive step which may facilitate negotiations," concludes House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Dante Fascell. "But it only puts off the day of reckoning."

Nor was it clear that the Soviets would sign a START agreement without a deal on submarine-launched cruise missiles, whether achieved separately or not. Even if they do treat SLCMs as a separate issue, the Soviets are certain to use the negotiations to propose reductions in naval forces, an issue the U.S. is reluctant to confront. Discussions about cruise missiles with nuclear warheads might quickly lead to discussions about SLCMs with conventional warheads, a weapon for which the Navy has big future plans.

NUCLEAR TESTING. The Threshold Test Ban treaty, signed in 1974 but never ratified, provides for a ceiling of 150 kilotons on underground nuclear blasts -- a limit that both nations currently observe. Baker and Shevardnadze agreed in principle on verification procedures that should allow the treaty to be completed at next year's summit. Yet nuclear testing will remain contentious: the Soviets still want a comprehensive ban on all underground blasts; the U.S. insists that nuclear weapons must continue to be tested for safety and reliability.

, AMERICAN RELUCTANCE. The Administration still seems perplexed over arms control, fearful of both a domestic right-wing assault on its policies and of sliding down the slippery slope of psychological disarmament. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, for one, is determined to stonewall arms treaties until congressional funding of his defense budget is ensured. And although Bush allowed last week that a strategic-arms treaty could be achieved by next year's summit, key White House aides seem inclined to dismiss START as a bothersome holdover from the Reagan Administration.

It can be argued, of course, that American resolve was what brought the Soviets around. For all the uncertainties, progress to date is largely due to an almost heedless Soviet willingness to say da. "This is an entirely different Soviet attitude than we have ever seen before," says a senior aide to Baker. But until the Administration decides what to make of that attitude, START -- and other issues -- could stay stalled.