If

If George Bush had ordered American forces to prevent Panamanian soldiers from reaching the headquarters where Manuel Noriega was bottled up, the U.S. surely had the military muscle to do the job. The 12,000 U.S. combat troops under the Southern Command far outstrip the 6,000-man Panama Defense Forces in both training and hardware. But civilian and military casualties would have been high, if only because the vital military installations are situated in downtown Panama City. As a Marine officer pointed out, "Even an M-1 rifle can kill a lot of people in a crowd."

Washington says the rebels requested only that U.S. forces prevent two units of about 200 men with light infantry weapons from reaching Noriega at his headquarters. The Americans at Fort Amador obstructed the movement of the P.D.F. 5th Infantry Company, which shares the Amador base. American units from Howard Air Force base were positioned to block the nearby Bridge of the Americas over the canal to prevent the arrival of the P.D.F. 7th Infantry Company from its base some 60 miles southwest of the capital. In neither case were U.S. forces challenged.

Panamanian rebel commander Moises Giroldi apparently ignored the even greater threat from Battalion 2000, based near the airport 15 miles east of Noriega's headquarters. This group of 800 officers and men has 90% of the P.D.F.'s firepower -- including 120-mm mortars, rocket launchers and armored personnel carriers -- and many of its troops are Cuban-trained. Ultimately, it was units from Battalion 2000 that retook the headquarters and freed Noriega.

No one can say for certain how well these soldiers might have fought markedly superior U.S. Army and Marine forces backed by helicopter gunships and operating from several scattered bases. Macho U.S. officers insist the beer-bellied P.D.F. regulars would not have dared to challenge them. Skeptics argue that the limited holding operation the rebels asked for would probably have failed and that U.S. forces would have been forced into a much bloodier fight.

Even deadlier would have been any American attempt to seize Noriega when the coup leaders refused to turn him over, which would have pitted U.S. troops against not only the pro-Noriega forces but the rebels as well. Moreover, some units of the Dignidad paramilitary forces and the Doberman riot-control units, though badly trained and disciplined, might have resorted to subsequent guerrilla warfare. That would endanger not just American troops but also the 50,000 U.S. civilians living in Panama.