The Desert Bear

By Dean Fischer/On the Kuwaiti border

With a John Wayne swagger and a growl like a grizzly, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf confronted a camouflage-clad Special Forces company newly arrived in the forbidding desert of Saudi Arabia. "How long have you guys been standing out in the hot sun?" he demanded. "Two hours, sir," replied a soldier. "I think you're tough enough to take it," said the commander. "You better be. We may have some plans for you later on."

Schwarzkopf's inspection was delayed by an unscheduled meeting with Sultan Mohammed al-Haza, administrator of a remote northern principality sparsely populated by Bedouin sheepherders. As incense wafted through the room, Schwarzkopf perfumed his hands in preparation for a lunch of chicken and rice. Observance of the ancient ritual of Arabian hospitality was reminiscent of his introduction to the exotic culture of the region 44 years ago. At age 12, Schwarzkopf spent a year in Iran, where his father, a major general, trained the Shah's imperial police during World War II.

As commander in chief of the American military forces in Saudi Arabia, expected to reach 250,000 by the end of the month, Schwarzkopf is constantly performing the dual roles of soldier and diplomat. Because of his imposing physique (6 ft. 3 in., 240 lbs.) and gruff manner, the C-in-C (pronounced sink) is affectionately known as "the Bear" by subordinates and as "Stormin' Norman" by rival Pentagon brass. He is aware that the U.S. presence in the conservative Islamic society of Saudi Arabia has created a potential clash of cultures that could undermine the alliance against Saddam Hussein's aggression. For instance, to avoid antagonizing the Saudis, Schwarzkopf has banned alcohol for the troops he leads. He himself abstains even on trips to neighboring gulf countries that allow liquor. "More than any other command," Schwarzkopf said, "this is a political-military assignment."

Peering out the window of his Air Force C-20 en route to visit the Special Forces units, Schwarzkopf contemplated the empty desert below. "There's no front line," he said. "If Saddam were to attack, I would want to suck him into the desert as far as I could. Then I'd pound the living hell out of him. Finally, I'd engulf him and police him up. It's that simple."

Schwarzkopf believes his strategy may be tested by the increasingly cornered Iraqi leader. Although Schwarzkopf is confident of U.S. ability to fulfill its defensive mission, Saddam's unpredictability worries him. Defensive strategies against most opponents are based on an assessment of their capabilities and intentions. "In Saddam's case," says Schwarzkopf, "you have to look purely at his capabilities and not try to figure out his intentions."

That requires vigilance against a variety of threats, including terrorism and chemical and biological warfare. To reduce the danger of an attack on U.S. forces, Schwarzkopf has relocated thousands of troops who had been temporarily housed in hotels, spreading them out horizontally rather than stacking them vertically. Troop encampments in vulnerable areas are protected by sentries carrying loaded automatic weapons and by concrete barriers positioned in front of barred gates. "We're not going to have another Beirut barracks bombing if I can help it," says Schwarzkopf. He is less worried about chemical and biological attacks, since he contends that the Iraqis lack reliable systems to deliver chemical warheads to their targets.

Schwarzkopf had an unexpected opportunity to assess Iraqi preparedness two weeks ago. Hours before his arrival at a remote Saudi patrol post on the Kuwaiti border, 13 Iraqi soldiers turned up. According to Saudi officers, such peaceful incursions across the border by Iraqi troops seeking food and water are common. Some of them defect; others, fearing for the lives of their families, are allowed to return. While the Saudis debriefed their Iraqi guests, Schwarzkopf discovered one of their trucks had a transmission leak and a battery without water. "That shows the poor state of their maintenance," he said.

A red telephone in his Riyadh office links Schwarzkopf directly to General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the two talk on a scrambled line at least once a day. Schwarzkopf refused to speculate about the possibility of a U.S. strike. "The forces we have on the ground have both defensive and offensive capabilities," he said, "but the only mission we have is to deter and to defend if attacked." Yet he agreed with the widespread view that merely a withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait would constitute "a small win for the U.S., a small win for Saddam Hussein and a big loss for the gulf. We don't want to win the war and lose the peace."