Political Interest

By Michael Kramer

For those Americans for whom peace in the Middle East has been their life's work, the letdown is understandable. Midwives often endure depression as the fruit of their labors is enjoyed by others. Yet the wisest have always known that a settlement imposed by outsiders rarely holds, that the end of enmity requires that the combatants themselves desire it. They know too that the glow of face-to-face agreements invariably fades as the vital enabling details are fashioned. Thus while Anwar Sadat and Menachem Begin reached beyond Washington's mediation in the 1970s, cementing the eventual Egyptian-Israeli treaty required Jimmy Carter's skill at Camp David. The play today is similar. As only they could, Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin have set the course, but America's continuing involvement is inevitable.

Bill Clinton's initial response has been perfectly pitched. By overly praising Israel, Clinton has assured Israelis that Washington will block any Arab attempt to exploit Jerusalem's goodwill. Even the prospect of U.S. troops in Gaza is possible, much as American forces helped monitor the Sinai accord a decade ago. Clinton must move beyond merely reviving the aborted U.S.-P.L.O. dialogue and actively embrace Arafat. As the P.L.O. leader's weakness dictated compromise with Israel, it now burdens the peace. Hard-line rejectionists want Arafat's head, literally. Prime Minister Rabin has come to understand that Arafat is as constrained by internal Palestinian politics as he is by Israel's. Washington will have to remind Rabin of that reality if Arafat rattles his saber to protect his flanks -- and perhaps act as a court of appeal when disputes arise.

To guard against a collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement if Arafat is killed, Washington should encourage other Arab states to recognize Israel immediately. Still in debt to the U.S. for the Gulf War, the Saudis and the gulf emirates can be cajoled, and a quick, final Jordanian-Israeli agreement should be a top U.S. priority.

Syria is a harder case. President Hafez Assad is not eager to be seen as following Arafat's lead, and he believes the P.L.O.'s settling for a staged autonomy threatens his own ambition for a one-step return of the Golan Heights to Syrian control. Washington will have to stroke Assad, knowing that Israel needs time to digest the latest events before ceding territory to Syria, no matter the peace that would be its price. In Clinton's favor is the fact that Assad can no longer count on Moscow to support his pan-Arab dream and Syria's need for Western assistance.

Money is also the best guarantee of Arafat's personal survival and of the peace process generally. As nothing else, a thriving Palestinian economy can stay the Arab fundamentalists' hand. But "if ((the West Bank's)) economy continues to more closely resemble Somalia's than Singapore's," says an Arafat adviser, "then all bets are off." With America's wallet thin, Clinton must craft a massive multilateral aid effort, much as the Administration brokered funds for Russia. Clinton can also encourage private investment and help fashion a Middle East common market. "It is yet to be proved that this is one of the great moments of history," says former Israeli President Chaim Herzog. "But certainly it is one of the great opportunities." As various U.S. governments helped create that opportunity, so the U.S. can now help ensure it is not squandered.