The End of Rose-Petal Fantasies

By Joe Klein

Let us consider the case for optimism about Iraq. A fool's errand, you say, and you may be right. The road from here to anything resembling a functioning country is daunting. But now, at least, we are brutally aware of all the plans and strategies that haven't worked. Our universe of potential idiocies has been diminished, and this painful wisdom may, in itself, be cause for dour optimism. Long past are the days when a U.S. proconsul, the extremely unfortunate L. Paul Bremer, would attempt to design a new Iraqi national flag (and produce something that looked like the Israeli one). Indeed, there are signs that the Bush Administration is preparing to chart a more realistic course in Iraq and in the world.

It is even possible that we are witnessing the twilight of the neocons.

Oh really, you say, but what about that wildly idealistic Inaugural Address the President delivered two weeks ago? What about the continued power and influence of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld? No doubt, Bush's speech will stand as the template for this Administration's future rhetoric, but sometimes politicians use high-minded oratory as tactical camouflage. In the Reagan White House, tough talk--"Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!"--set the predicate for real diplomatic progress. This President is not one to announce a change of course, since that would imply a defective previous course. A moderate turn, if one is coming, will be inferred from straws in the wind. As for Cheney and Rumsfeld, both were complicit in rose-petal scenarios in the first term. It stands to reason that each may be less susceptible to bellicose fantasies floated by Utopian underlings now.

The announced departure of Douglas Feith, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, may be a sign of new wisdom at the Pentagon.

Feith was the most overripe of neocons--a man who served as an adviser to Israel's then Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (he advised Netanyahu to invade Iraq); a man who was "in charge" of postwar "planning" for our invasion of Iraq; a man who oversaw the Office of Special Plans, which hyped evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq; a man whom General Tommy Franks once called "the dumbest f______ guy on the planet." To be sure, much of the neocon dream team survives at the Pentagon, but friends of Rumsfeld have noted that he is less enchanted with that crowd than he once was. The fact that the Weekly Standard, the prime neocon media outlet, slags Rumsfeld just about every week is a sign that the neos aren't too thrilled with him anymore either.

"The time for diplomacy is now," said Condoleezza Rice at her swearing-in last week, and the new Secretary of State has put together an absolutely first-rate team of diplomats to prove it.

Cheney was a major factor in encouraging Robert Zoellick, a forceful conservative realist, to become Rice's Deputy Secretary--which may be a sign of new vice presidential wisdom as well. Philip Zelikow, who won praise as executive director of the 9/11 commission, will probably serve as Rice's counselor. Nicholas Burns, a career diplomat, will probably be Under Secretary for Political Affairs.

And, in a quietly significant move, the post of Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs may go to a diplomat, David Welch, rather than to a neocon (although it is expected that the ever present Elliot Abrams will have a hand in this area from his perch at the National Security Council). The neoconservative lockout at State has led to speculation that the U.N. post might be thrown to them as a sop. The rumor last week was Paul Wolfowitz; the rumor the week before was Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton. There is a tradition of neoconservative eloquence at the U.N.: Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick were excellent U.S. representatives during the Soviet era. And an argument can be made that the U.N., an institution the neocons despise, is the most appropriate forum for their passionate advocacy of freedom and democracy.

None of this may make a difference. Iraq may be beyond salvaging; Iran may not be talked out of its desire for a nuclear bomb. But there is hope for a breakthrough between the Israelis and Palestinians, and a world of other problems to address. A less peremptory, more conciliatory--though still tough-minded, conservative--U.S. foreign policy could help with all of these. Even the hawks are grudgingly aware of the limits of military action in the Islamic world.

Finally, there is a shred of hope that the imminent arrival of an independent, majority-Shi'ite government will create a new dynamic within Iraq. The Sunni insurgency remains the dominant fact of life, of course, but significant Sunni groups like the Association of Muslim Scholars have hinted they may cooperate on a new constitution.

It is also possible now that armed Shi'ite militias--members of the Badr Brigade, for example, who have been providing local security throughout the south--may be more willing to be reorganized and retrained to defend a central government that Grand Ayatullah Ali Husaini Sistani has blessed. That may be too optimistic, especially in a country where pessimism usually equals reality but, at long last, it is not unthinkable.