The Rise Of an Evil Protege

By Tim McGirk/ Islamabad

At the time, the meeting hardly seemed notable--let alone the start of the world's deadliest partnership. It was late in 1999, and Osama bin Laden was sheltering in Afghanistan, already deep into his plot to attack the World Trade Center. His visitor was a burly young Jordanian, bruised and furious after spending six years inside his country's worst prisons. Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi had traveled to Afghanistan with a proposal for the al-Qaeda chief: he wanted to rally Islam's "true believers" to rise up against corrupt regimes in the Middle East. Bin Laden was skeptical. While al-Zarqawi advocated a war on all fronts, bin Laden was fixated on attacking the U.S. and Israel. He was unsure whether the abrasive, ambitious al-Zarqawi would make a reliable lieutenant. But al-Zarqawi would not be dissuaded. According to an account of the meeting by Saif al-Adel, a former member of bin Laden's inner circle, that appeared on jihadist websites, al-Zarqawi "doesn't retreat on anything ... He doesn't compromise."

So began an odyssey that would transform al-Zarqawi from a brawling thug to the leader of the jihadist insurgency in Iraq, a man deemed so threatening to U.S. security that he commands the same $25 million bounty offered for bin Laden. By turning Iraq into a breeding ground for al-Qaeda foot soldiers, al-Zarqawi has given new shape to an organization that was fractured when the U.S., in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks, ousted the Taliban and sent bin Laden into hiding. And as al-Zarqawi's stature has risen, his relationship with bin Laden has apparently grown more complex and contentious, like that of an apprentice who has eclipsed his master. At stake in their struggle for control, say those who track the two men, is the future of the global Islamic terrorist movement and its war with the U.S. and its allies.

In the four years since bin Laden disappeared during the siege of Tora Bora, intelligence agencies around the world have struggled to glean information about the whereabouts and inner workings of al-Qaeda's high command. U.S. intelligence on al-Zarqawi, bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, is not strong. But counterterrorism and intelligence officials tell TIME they believe al-Zarqawi has expanded his reach outside Iraq's borders to the extent that he has become al-Qaeda's most dangerous operative. The U.S. believes al-Zarqawi has contacted about two dozen other terrorist groups in more than 30 countries in Europe, Africa and Asia in an effort to raise funds for his network and coordinate international operations. His network has forged links with jihadist groups in Europe that may be planning attacks similar to the London bombings last July. According to Arab counterterrorism authorities, since his arrival in Iraq, al-Zarqawi has been involved in attacks in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Egypt, Morocco and, most recently, the Nov. 9 triple-suicide bombing in Jordan. And American counterterrorism officials are worried that al-Zarqawi may also be reaching out to extremists hidden in the U.S. "He's certainly trying to assume the mantle of bin Laden," says an American intelligence analyst who has studied al-Zarqawi. "It may be that bin Laden's and al-Zawahiri's time has passed."

The two al-Qaeda leaders are certainly under pressure. In a statement said to have been taped in September and aired by al-Jazeera last week, al-Zawahiri claimed that al-Qaeda is "spreading, expanding and strengthening" and that "bin Laden is still leading its jihad" against the West. But intelligence officials say it's striking that bin Laden himself has not issued a videotaped statement for more than a year--a sign, U.S. intelligence believes, that while he is probably still alive, he has been forced to go further underground to avoid detection.

So, is bin Laden still in control? By tracing his relationship with al-Zarqawi through a variety of sources--interrogation of captured operatives, encrypted codes on jihadist websites, chains of messages spanning from Iraq to Afghanistan--terrorism experts have assembled a picture of the way bin Laden turned to his former acolyte to revive al-Qaeda after the fall of the Taliban. It also reveals the ways in which al-Zarqawi has steered al-Qaeda in directions his bosses probably never intended or approved of--and why that makes the terrorist threat more unpredictable, and perhaps more dangerous, than it was before Sept. 11.

The pair's first purported meeting, in Afghanistan in 1999, provided hints of their future rivalry. A senior Pakistani military officer who once advised the Taliban's inner circle says, "Osama's camp was not open to everyone. People like al-Zarqawi, who were temporary visitors, were never trusted by him." According to the officer, Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar was warned by al-Qaeda not to be swayed by al-Zarqawi's global war cry. The officer says, "Those around Mullah Omar made it clear that the Taliban should avoid fighting in other people's wars"--especially in gulf states where the Taliban and al-Qaeda had plenty of wealthy backers.

But according to a biography of al-Zarqawi written by al-Adel (now believed to be under detention in Iran), bin Laden thought it "unwise to lose the chance of mobilizing al-Zarqawi and his companions in those regions"--especially if al-Zarqawi, with his ties to Jordan's militant underground, could help carry out an attack against Israel. According to al-Adel's account, bin Laden instructed al-Zarqawi to set up his own camp, far from bin Laden's activities, in the stony hills behind Herat, near Afghanistan's western border with Iran. By 9/11, al-Zarqawi was training several dozen fighters from Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq at his Herat camp. He and other jihadis brought out their wives and children and formed an armed, Islamic commune, with al-Zarqawi as self-anointed emir, or prince.

When U.S. forces attacked in October 2001, al-Zarqawi rallied with al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders in Kandahar, the last bastion of the militants. No match for the laser-guided bombs of U.S. warplanes, al-Zarqawi and a select band of fighters fled westward into Iran and eventually northern Iraq, where he had ties with the radical Islamic group Ansar al-Islam. U.S. intelligence sources say they believe that a few months after the U.S.'s March 2003 invasion of Iraq, bin Laden dispatched a trusted aide, Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi, to see about organizing an al-Qaeda cell there. A former major in Saddam Hussein's army, al-Iraqi seemed the perfect choice. But al-Zarqawi was reportedly enraged that bin Laden had sent someone else as terrorist ringmaster and apparently refused to cooperate with al-Iraqi. U.S. intelligence officials can't confirm that account, but they do say bin Laden's choice later returned to Afghanistan. Today, say the officials, al-Iraqi acts as al-Qaeda's most lethal commander in Afghanistan, employing tactics and bombmaking skills honed in Iraq and shared over the Internet and by returning fighters.

By the time of the al-Iraqi mission, the organizational structure of al-Qaeda had been revamped. In the wake of 9/11--according to a classified report detailing elements of the U.S. interrogation of former bin Laden aide Abu Faraj al-Libbi, the contents of which were confirmed to TIME by a senior French counterterrorism official--al-Qaeda leaders delegated day-to-day authority over the group's global network to a "management committee" of five operatives, including al-Libbi. From that point on, only attacks on the U.S. homeland required approval from bin Laden and al-Zawahiri. The high command's decision to devolve authority empowered operatives like al-Zarqawi. In February 2004, U.S. authorities in Baghdad intercepted a letter believed to be from al-Zarqawi to al-Zawahiri in which the Jordanian laid out his plan to provoke Iraq's Shi'ites into a civil war with the Sunnis, one that would draw in Salafi Sunni extremists from across the Islamic world. Arab intelligence sources tell TIME that al-Zarqawi's incendiary aim may have had bin Laden's backing. The sources say that in a letter found in the possession of Hassan Ghul, a Pakistani operative arrested in Iraq in January 2004, bin Laden urged al-Zarqawi to "use the Shi'ite card"--to launch attacks on Shi'ite targets in Iraq--as a way of pressuring Iran to free a number of top al-Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden's son Saad, who fled to Iran from Afghanistan in December 2001.

In October 2004, after further meetings with bin Laden's emissary al-Iraqi, al-Zarqawi publicly joined al-Qaeda, becoming the self-proclaimed prince of its operations in the "Land of Mesopotamia." As the jihadist insurgency gained momentum, the open wariness that once characterized al-Zarqawi's dealings with bin Laden dissipated, although counterterrorism officials believe their alliance was rooted more in pragmatism than affection. "Al-Zarqawi needs bin Laden for his credibility," says a U.S. intelligence analyst. "Bin Laden needs al-Zarqawi because he is doing the real work." But the celebrity al-Zarqawi has gained through his reign of terror in Iraq has marginalized bin Laden and shrunk his circle of loyalists. A senior Pakistani intelligence officer says "several hundred" al-Qaeda jihadis, spurred by al-Zarqawi's attacks on U.S. troops, left Afghanistan for Iraq in two waves, one via the gulf and the other across the Iran-Turkmenistan border; scores were killed in Iraq, and many fell in the battle of Fallujah in November 2004.

Terrorism experts say bin Laden remains the spiritual leader of global jihad but is no longer calling the shots. "Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri may have turned al-Zarqawi into something bigger than themselves," says French counterterrorism expert Roland Jacquard. "Strategically, they didn't have much choice. They needed to give the Iraq jihad the backing and legitimacy of al-Qaeda's direction. But it's turned out to be a very emancipating development for al-Zarqawi." Evidence suggests,though, that he may have gone too far. In October the U.S. released a letter that it said was sent in July from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi--in which bin Laden's deputy urged the Jordanian to refrain from attacking Shi'ites in Iraq. It has provoked the anger of moderate Muslims around the world. Al-Zawahiri suggests such attacks "be put off until the force of the mujahid movement in Iraq gets stronger."

Although some experts speculate that the letter was drawn up by Iranian intelligence to dupe al-Zarqawi, the CIA and Pentagon insist that the 13-page missive is not a forgery and that it reveals differences between the old al-Qaeda leaders and al-Zarqawi over tactics and ideology. At the same time, the letter also indicates an acknowledgment by al-Zawahiri that the al-Qaeda hierarchy has been reordered. "It wasn't the letter of an overall commander pulling the choke chain of a subordinate," says Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert with the Rand Corp. think tank in Washington, who believes it is genuine. "It was diplomatic, cajoling, flattering and in essence sucking up to [al-Zarqawi]."

What does that mean for the future of al-Qaeda? Intelligence officials generally believe that al-Zarqawi has surpassed bin Laden as an inspirational figure for budding jihadis. "People have forgotten about bin Laden because they don't hear about him anymore," says an Arab intelligence source. Al-Zarqawi's twin challenges will be to survive divisions within the Iraqi insurgency as well as the U.S. military's hunt for him. The Pentagon believes its commandos have come close to capturing him several times. If al-Zarqawi manages to survive, he may try to attain bin Laden's global reach. He has reportedly outlined to his associates a strategy that calls for the overthrow of moderate Arab governments and the establishment of a pure Islamic state in the region in the next decade, with the ultimate goal of launching a world war against nonbelievers.

For now, although al-Zarqawi has ties to jihadist groups across Europe, they don't necessarily take orders from him, counterterrorism officials say. But over the long term, his efforts in Iraq position him to become the voice and inspiration for disaffected Muslims around the world. "More and more people are veering into Islamic extremism and embracing the Iraqi cause ... all converging on al-Zarqawi's struggle," says a senior French counterterrorism official. "To our great distress, he's doing just fine without ever turning his attention from Iraq." As long as that's true, al-Zarqawi will be at the forefront of the war against the West that his old boss started.

With reporting by Bruce Crumley/ Paris, Saad Hattar/Amman, Syed Talat Hussein/ Islamabad, Scott Macleod/ Cairo, Douglas Waller/ Washington